

ŚĀNDILYA  
BHAKTI  
SŪTRAS

with  
Svapneśvara Bhāṣya

SWAMI HARSHANANDA

## ABOUT THE BOOK


The doctrine of bhakti is as old as the R̥gveda itself. The doctrine of grace, which is an important aspect of bhakti is clearly mentioned in the Upaniṣads. By the time of the Epics and the Purāṇas, this doctrine was systematised into a regular philosophy and religion rolled into one, technically termed as the Bhāgavata Religion. Śāṅḍilya Bhakti Sūtras are an important work of this Bhāgavata school.

Unlike the Nārada Bhakti Sūtras which is simple, direct and sādhana-oriented, the Śāṅḍilya Bhakti Sūtras is a terse philosophical work. Its approach is academic and polemical, and it has successfully provided a philosophical base to the doctrine of devotion. It is nearer to the Brahma Sūtras in its style and diction.

The earliest extant commentary on the Śāṅḍilya Bhakti Sūtras is that by Svapneśvara. It is simple and gives a natural explanation of the sūtras. It occupies the same place in antiquity and importance with respect to the Śāṅḍilya Sūtras as the bhāṣya of Vyāsa on the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali. It would have been difficult to comprehend the sūtras of Śāṅḍilya without Svapneśvara's bhāṣya.

This is the first time that the original Śāṅḍilya Bhakti Sūtras and Svapneśvara's bhāṣya on it in Devanāgarī script along with an English translation are being published. The translation is lucid and follows the original closely. Profuse notes appended to the translation enhance the value of the book.

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# SĀṆḌILYA, BHAKTI SŪTRAS

WITH

## SVAPNEŚVARA BHĀṢYA

*(Text in Devanāgarī with English Translation)*

SWAMI HARSHANANDA



1984

**ŚĀNDILYA BHAKTI SŪTRAS WITH SVAPNEŚVARA  
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## PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We are extremely happy to present the ‘Śāṅḍilya Bhakti Sūtras’ to the public in the present form.

We are under a deep debt of gratitude to Sri Swami Harshanandaji who has permitted us to publish this book in this form.

We are also grateful to M/s Samskrita Sahitya Sadana for the exquisite printing.

**R. L. Anantharamiah**  
*Director-in-charge*



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## TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION





## **The Doctrine of Bhakti was not imported**

In his preface to his *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Dr, S. Radhakrishnan writes : 'Ignorance of the subject of Indian thought is profound. To the modern mind Indian Philosophy means two or three "silly" notions about *māyā*, or the delusiveness of the world, *karma*, or belief in fate, and *tyāga*, or the ascetic desire to be rid of the flesh. Even these simple notions, it is said, are wrapped up in barbarous nomenclature and chaotic clouds of vapour and verbiage, looked upon by the "natives" as wonders of intellect. After a six months' tour from Calcutta to Cape Comorin, our modern aesthetè dismisses the whole of Indian culture and philosophy as "pantheism," "worthless scholasticism," "a mere play upon words," "at all events nothing similar to Plato or Aristotle, or even Plotinus or Bacon."

No wonder that such Western scholars have traced the origin of the doctrine of *bhakti* (or devotion to God) to Christian ideas and influences. Even E. B. Cowell who has done yeomen service to the cause of Indian philosophy by his pioneering works through his

translations of *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha*, *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and *Śāṅḍilyaśatasūtrīya* is constrained to write in his preface to the last-mentioned work (p. viii) thus: 'Dr. Lorinser, Prof. Lassen, and Prof. Weber have maintained that the doctrine of *bhakti* arose in India as a more or less direct reflection of Christian ideas .. I cannot pretend to speak positively on the controversy ; I would only confess to a some-what hesitating inclination towards Prof. Weber's moderate opinion on the question.' Of course, these views have been contradicted by other scholars who have made a more dispassionate study of Indian thought. Garbe says in his *Philosophy of Ancient India* (p 84) : 'For one who is intimate with the intellectual life of ancient India the doctrine of *bhakti* is entirely conceivable as a genuine product of India. No shadow of evidence has up to now been brought forward to support the theory that the conception of *bhakti* is derived from Christianity. The religious significance contained in the word *bhakti* has nothing exclusively about it that is specially Christian. Not only have devotion to God and faith in Him developed themselves gradually in other monotheistic religions, but even beyond the circle of monotheistic ideas the two conceptions are to be found. And particularly in India we possess all the essentials on the strength of which we have to regard *bhakti* as "indigenous" fact, as Barth says, since monotheistic ideas are to be found prevalent from the time of the R̥g-Veda onward through almost all the periods of the religious history of India, and

the powerful longings after the divine, peculiar to the Indian soul from yore, must have developed such sentiments as divine love and divine faith in a popularly conceived monotheism.’<sup>1</sup>

### Its Vedic Origin

Actually the doctrine of *bhakti* is as old as the *Rg-Veda* itself. While commenting on the aphorism ‘*bhaktiḥ prameyā śrutibhyaḥ*’<sup>2</sup> (*Śāṅḍilya Sūtras* 1. 2. 9) Śrī Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has accumulated quite a mass of unassailable evidence to prove its Vedic origin. Take for instance this *ṛk* where the Lord has been praised and there is also a reference to the recitation of His names: ‘You praise that Ancient Cause, the Origin of *ṛta* (the Divine Law), according to your knowledge. You will be freed from birth. If you cannot praise Him, recite His name. However, we, O Lord Viṣṇu devote ourselves to your light and attributeless form!’ (*R. V.* 1.156.3.) And again, this *ṛk* where there is a clear allusion to the hearing and reciting of His names as also surrender to Him: ‘He who offers (his all) to Lord Viṣṇu, the husband of Śrī (or Lakṣmī), the Ancient Cause, the Creator, the Ever-new, he who recites the glorious birth and works of this glorious Being, that giver, that reciter, obtains fame (or material enjoyments) and reaches the Highest Abode’ (*R.V.* 1.156.2). Another *ṛk* considers Indra the great God as father and mother: ‘O Vasu! O Śatakṛatu! You have become our father! You are mother! So now we bow down to you!’ (*R.V.* 8.98.11)

Coming to the Upaniṣads we see that though they are mainly devoted to knowledge, the doctrine of grace which is an important aspect of the philosophy of devotion, is evident as for instance in this statement of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*: 'Whom the Ātman chooses, by him is He obtained; to him He reveals Himself' (2.23). So also in another: 'When he who is devoid of desire-motivated actions, through the grace of God the supporter, sees the Paramātman's glory, then does he become freed from sorrow' (*ibid* 2.20). The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* actually uses the word *bhakti* and clearly states *prapatti* (self-surrender) also: 'He who has supreme devotion (*bhakti*) towards God, and as towards God so towards the teacher, to him verily, the great soul, all these things declared (thus far) will reveal themselves' (6.23); 'To Him who at the beginning created Brahmā, and who gave the Vedas to him, to Him the God who reveals the knowledge of Himself, desirous of liberation, do I fly for refuge' (6.18).

### The Bhagavata Religion

Gradually the doctrine of *bhakti* was systematised into a regular philosophy and religion. It came to be known as the Bhāgavata-religion and has also been variously designated as the Nārāyaṇīya, Sātvata, Ekāntika, or Pāñcarātra religion.<sup>3</sup> Its main sources are *Nārāyaṇīya* section of the *Mahābhārata*, the *Viṣṇu Purāna*, the *Bhagavad Gītā*, the *Bhāgavata Purāna*, the *Pāñcarātra Āgamas* and the *Bhakti Sūtras* of Śāṅḍilya and Nārada.

Not being satisfied with the impersonal Brahman of the Upaniṣadas, the Bhāgavata religion has converted Brahman into the Personal God. Īśvara, Nārāyaṇa and Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva are the names most commonly used with respect to Him. He cannot be apprehended by the senses nor by logic and arguments. Śruti or the scriptures at best point towards Him. His grace is the supreme factor in realising Him. Single-minded devotion (*ekāntīā bhakti*) is the only thing by which His grace can be obtained and He can be captured. Actually He is not independent as others make Him out to be, because, He is subject to the will of his devotees (*bhaktaparādhiṇa*). He is always fond of those devoted to Him and reveals Himself to them. Complete resignation (*prapatti* or *śrñāgti*) is another means of attaining Him. These are its chief tenets in brief.

### The Sūtras of Narada and Shandilya

In Sanskrit literature it is commonly seen that the propounder of any doctrine or philosophy or for that matter, any branch of knowledge puts it down in the form of *sūtras* or aphoristic statements which are supposed to be brief but pregnant with deep meaning. Either his disciples or those coming in that tradition generally compose more detailed explanations of those *sūtras* called variously as *bhāṣya*, *vṛtti*, *vārttika* or *ṭikā*, depending upon their length, form etc. It is impossible to understand these *sūtras* accurately without the help of such traditional commentaries. Since this

*sūtra* literature along with the respective commentaries forms the basic work in any branch of knowledge it is usual for the students of that branch to make a deep study of them. Looking from this standpoint, it is imperative that serious students of the doctrine of devotion must make a careful study of both the *Nārada Bhakti Sūtras* and the *Śāṅḍilya Bhakti Sūtras*. Before we delve deeper into the latter which is the subject of this work, it is worthwhile making a brief comparative study of these two.

Though both the works are associated with the names of two great sages who adorned the spiritual horizon of our country, though there are no doctrinal differences between them, and though they deal with the subject in a more or less systematic way, their mode of approach to the subject is so different that we are compelled to say that each is complementary to the other and that our study of devotion will not be complete without studying *both* of them. Śāṅḍilya's approach is more intellectual while Nārada's is more emotional and practical. Hence we can safely say that Śāṅḍilya has evolved a philosophy of devotion whereas Nārada has made it a practical religion of devotion. Śāṅḍilya is very particular in mentioning the *pramāṇas* (the means of knowledge) as also the nature and mutual relationship among the various constituents of the *prameya* (what is to be known) like *Īśvarā*, *jīv* and *prāṇṛti*. He discusses about the reality of creation, controverts the theory that knowledge alone can give liberation, propounds and defends devotion as the sole means of liberation and also

delineates the various forms of devotion. Nārada however does not seem to be interested a whit in all these intellectual gymnastics but goes straight to the practical aspects. Apart from defining devotion and describing its various forms, he gives several invaluable practical hints, warns against the pitfalls, eulogises the importance of devotion, gives its special characteristics to enable the aspirants to imitate them and finally paints a vivid picture of the ideal devotees.

When we look at the sūtras of Jaimini, Patañjali or Bādarāyaṇa, we would perhaps be more right in putting the sūtras of Śāṅḍilya in that class. May be for the same reason, several commentators have chosen to comment upon these sūtras and leave Nārada's untouched. Neither do the latter need any commentary since they are so simple and direct.

It would however be extremely interesting, and even fascinating, if an attempt could be made to intelligently synthesise the two into a single treatise on devotion.

### **Shandilya, the Sutrakara**

The ancient Indian mind seems to be sweetly indifferent to 'history'. If an oriental scholar of the west is prepared to devote his whole life-time to collect exact historical data regarding a Śaṅkara's date of birth, just to know whether he was born in 680 A. D. or 788 A.D, the Indian paṇḍit would begin to trace 'his story' to the promised descent of Lord Śiva (who is also known as Śaṅkara) in Kailāsa! That is

why Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says<sup>4</sup> that the problem of determining the exact dates of early Indian systems is as fascinating as it is insoluble and it has furnished a field for the wildest hypotheses, wonderful reconstruction and bold romance.' The problem of our Śāṅḍilya is no exception to this.

If we can just manage to forget the well-known Vedic dictum *śātāyurvai puruṣaḥ* ('man lives but hundred years'), we will be amazed to find our Śāṅḍilya almost in every age! In the Tretāyuga we find him as the spiritual guide of king Dilīpa. In the Dvāpara age, he is the priest to the king Nanda of the cowherds. In the beginning of this Kaliyuga, he is very busy performing the *Putreṣṭi* sacrifice of Śatānīka, the son of Janamejaya. At one time he is the priest of king Triśaṅku. At another time he is seen chatting with Bhīṣma, the grand old man of the Mahābhārata sitting on his bed of arrows! He is also the father of Śaṅkha and Likhita, the two well known authors of a smṛti.

Neither can we fall back on the Upaniṣads which contain his name, since there are three Śāṅḍilyas mentioned in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*<sup>5</sup> alone, and since the dates of these Upaniṣads themselves have not been determined with any accuracy so far. There is a well known passage in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*<sup>6</sup> which goes by the name *Śāṅḍilya-vidyā* which is also referred to in the *Śāṅḍilya Sūtras*. But the commentator says that it refers to an earlier Śāṅḍilya. Nor is there any definite internal evidence in the sūtra-work itself.



However there is some evidence available though very fragile-with the help of which we may just limit the period of his existence. Śāṅḍilya has been quoted as an author in Pāñcarātra literature. The author of these *Bhaktisūtras* also belongs to the Pāñcarātra school since that is the philosophy propounded here. He draws upon the *Bhagavad Gītā* freely and even directly mentions it once.<sup>7</sup> Therefore he comes definitely after the age of the Mahābhārata (500 B. C).

Although the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* occupies almost a central place in this *Bhāgavata* cult there is no direct reference to it anywhere in the *sūtras*. Even Svapneśvara the earliest commentator on these *sūtras* has not quoted from it except once (*sū.* 72) and that too not having any direct bearing on the *sūtra* itself, though he quotes profusely from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*. It is only *Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha* that finds a reference to the *Bhāgavata* in the *sū.* 84 while interpreting the words *tathā hyāha*. Since Svapneśvara supplies a more apt quotation from the *Gītā* to this very *sūtra*, we need not take *Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha*'s reference very seriously. Hence we would not be wrong if we say that Śāṅḍilya existed before the composition of the *Bhāgavata* which is normally assigned to 900 A. D. This limits his existence to the period between 500 B. C. and 900 A. D.

Two sages Kaśyapa and Bādarāyaṇa are mentioned in the *sūtras* 29 and 30. Bādarāyaṇa is mentioned again in *sū.* 91. It is well known that he is

the author of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, though nothing definite can be said about Kaśyapa. Indian scholars put the lower limit of the date of these sūtras to 200 B. C.

Then, there is definite and clear reference to the Yoga system of Patañjali in the sū. 19. The words *smādhi* (sū. 20) and *kliṣṭa* (sū.33) belong to yogic terminology. Hence the yoga of Patañjali must have been a well-known system by the time of Śāṅḍilya. According to scholars the *yoga sūtras* must have been composed anywhere between 200 B. C. and 300 A. D. Since there are clear indications<sup>8</sup> that our author believed in the *satkāryavāda* (the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause), and also a few other doctrines of the *Sāṅkhya* school, and since the earliest work of this system *viz.*, *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is assigned to the 3rd century A. D., Śāṅḍilya's date is now restricted to the period between 200 A. D. and 900 A. D.

There are two other works *Śāṅḍilya Saṁhita* and *Śāṅḍilyopaniṣad* associated with the name of Śāṅḍilya. But nothing can be said definitely whether our sūtra-kāra was their author.

### Svapneśvara, the Bhashyakara

The earliest extant commentary on the sūtras of Śāṅḍilya is that by Svapneśvara. It has been tradi-

Nārāyaṇā Tīrtha and another one by Bhavadeva.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha was an advaitic monk and lived in the latter half of the seventeenth century at Vārāṇasī. He was a disciple of Śrīrāma Govinda Tīrtha and had his education under one Vāsudeva. He was a very great scholar and has ten other works to his credit which include two commentaries on Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Siddhāntabindhu*, two on the Sāṅkhyan treatises, *Tattvakaumudī* and *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, one commentary each on the *Yoga Sūtrās* and *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana and another work on devotion, *Bhaktiyadhikaraṇa māla*.

His *Bhakticandrikā* is very exhaustive and replete with quotations, especially from the *Bhāgavata*. His interpretations are elaborate and often independent of Svapneśvara's views though at times he elucidates his *bhāṣya* also. It is evident that he has drawn largely upon Madhusūdana's *Bhagavad-bhaktirasāyana*.

It is interesting to note that Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha while commenting on the sūtras 32 & 33, refers to the interpretation of Śrī Rāmānujācārya.<sup>14</sup> Since Śrī Rāmānuja's life and works are well-preserved in the annals of his *Māthas* and since nothing has been heard of his having ever written a commentary on the *Śaṅḍilya Sūtras* this statement of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha is intriguing. It is perhaps worthwhile making some research in this direction.

Another factor to be noted in *Bhakticandrikā* is that it gives three additional sūtras which are not in Svapneśvara's version, but omits one from the latter.<sup>19</sup>

### Other Bhaktisutras

Śrī Baladeva Upādhyāya in his Sanskrit introduction to the excellent edition of *Bhakticandrikā* refers to two other sūtra-works on bhakti which he has appended at the end: *Bhaktimīmāṃsā* and *Parabhakti sūtrāṇi*. The former is a work of the thirteenth century and consists of 102 sutras, divided into four chapters, each chapter being subdivided again into two *pādas*. Śrī Upādhyāya thinks that this work belongs to the *Bhāgavata* cult and follows very closely the doctrines of the *Muktāphala* of Bopadeva. The latter is the work of Svāmī Hariharāraṇya, a well-known scholar on Yoga. It is a short work of only 26 sutras and is divided into four *ahnikas*.

### The Philosophy of Śāṅḍilya Sūtras

Let us now turn to the philosophy of Śāṅḍilya as depicted in his sūtras, depending mainly on het

*Bhāṣyā* of Svapneśvara. For the sake of convenience in understanding the philosophy of the sūtras, the same can be discussed under four main headings : (a) The *Pramāṇas* or means of knowledge ; (b) The *Prameyas* or the objects to be known through these means; (c) The *Śādhana*s or the practical means to be adopted to gain liberation; and (d) *Mukti* or absolute liberation from mundane existence.

(a) *The Pramāṇas :*

Though the philosophy of the sūtras\* seems to have a close affinity with the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara, only three means of knowledge like the three eyes of Rudra are accepted, as against the six of the Śāṅkara school. They are *pratyakṣa* or sense-perception, *anumāna* or inference, and *śabda* or verbal testimony of the scriptures the last one being the chief. In sense-perception an important point to be noted is that knowledge through it comes in two stages : When the senses come into contact with their objects, the ignorance covering them is first destroyed, and then only, knowledge will arise in the mind due to its being illumined by the soul.

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\* Śaṅḍilya and Svapneśvara appear to be *bhedābhedavā-*  
dins accepting both difference and nondifference between the  
individual souls and God, difference in the state of bondage and  
nondifference in the state of liberation.

(b) *The Prameyas :*

*Īśvara* or God, *jīva* or the individual soul and *jagat* or the created world are the three *prameyas* we come across in the work as in other theistic treatises.

*Īśvara para cit* and *bhajānīya* are the words used in the sūtras to denote God. Devotion to Him gives liberation and not knowledge of him. His *śakti* or power is called *māyā* or *prakṛti*. He creates the world through this *māyāśakti*, putting it up as a screen as it were. Hence it is this *prakṛti* that undergoes modifications and not He Himself. Since He and His power are identical, this creation also is identical with Him. His power is unobstructed. He is ever the Lord and ever free. He is of the nature of consciousness. He out of pity for the created beings takes on a divine body through His power and is born in the world out of His own free will in order to destroy the demons or propagate the Vedas. In fact after creating the world consisting of the high and the low, he also, like a father, creates the Vedas. There are several well-known incarnations of His, devotion to whom also will give liberation. Though there are several modes of devotion even one is enough to please Him if practised intensely. When devotees give up their bodies in this world before attaining supreme devotion to Him, they are reborn.

in His world where they will continue their practice and ultimately attain Him. He is the dispenser of the fruits of our actions, of our merit and demerit.

The individual soul or *jīva* is of the nature of consciousness and is essentially identical with God, also called *Brahman* by the commentator. His individuality, his separation from God has been caused by his association with *buddhi* or *antaḥkaraṇa* (intellect or internal organ) which consists of the three *guṇas* and is an *upādhi* (a limiting adjunct). Again this association and the consequent bondage of *sāṃsara* have been caused by lack of devotion to God and not by lack of knowledge of Him. Being an evolute of the *prakṛti* of God, which is real, this *upādhi* is also real and not an illusion caused by ignorance. Hence it cannot be removed by knowledge. When a red china rose is kept near a crystal and the crystal appears red, it cannot be got rid of however intently or cleverly one may gaze at it! <sup>16</sup> It can be removed only by the removal of either of the two things or the contact between them. Similarly here also. Since the soul is eternal and all-pervading, the only other alternative left is to dissolve this *upādhi* viz., the *buddhi* back into its original cause, the *prakṛti* of God. This can be done only by supreme devotion to God. Once this is done liberation is attained. Though the individual soul is actually identical with God, because of the multiplicity of the *buddhis*, it also appears as many. It is like the sun appearing as many being

reflected in several mirrors. When the mirrors are removed, the several reflections are merged back in the sun. It is for this very reason, when one soul is liberated, others are not, like the reflections continuing in other mirrors even though one is removed.

Apart from the conscious entity which exists in a two-fold form (God and individual soul), the only other reality that exists is the insentient *prakṛti*. There is no third reality apart from these two.

This *prakṛti* is actually the power (*śakti*) of God and is also called *mayā* and *Pradhna*. It functions also as the material cause for creation. Being the power of God, it is real and not unreal as some others think. Hence this world, the whole creation, which is its product or effect, is also real. Arguing backwards, *prakṛti* is the generality or totality of insentient creation. Hence it pervades every one of its products. But being insentient, it cannot by itself evolve into this wonderful universe. Neither can the intellect of an ordinary being do it. It is possible only for God. The order in which creation takes place from God is practically the same as in the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta. Dissolution takes place in the reverse order.

The sūtras uphold the *sat-kārya-vāda* or the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause and the consequent pervasion of the former by the latter. Hence creation (*sr̥ṣṭi*) and destruction (*pralaya*) are



actually manifestation (*āvirbhāva*) and disappearance (*tirobhāva*). The doctrine of production (*utpatti*) which says that the effect is a new product, produced by the combination of the causes, is criticised and disapproved.

(c) *The Sādhanas :*

*Bhakti* or devotion is the sole means to liberation. It is defined as supreme attachment to and love for God.<sup>17</sup>

All, down to despised souls, are entitled to tread the path of devotion.

This devotion is not of the nature of knowledge (*jñānu*) for these reasons : (i) It is lacking in the knowledge of one who hates. One who hates another may have knowledge about him, but he cannot be said to be devoted to him ! (ii) Knowledge gradually gets eclipsed as devotion arises ; (iii) It is the opposite of hatred. Hatred being an emotion, devotion also must be likewise. It is well-known that the opposite of hatred is love and not knowledge ; (iv) Devotion is spoken of as a *rasa* which is the same as *rāga* or attachment, and as *anurāga* which clearly means attachment to God ; (v) Lastly, there is the famous example of the milkmaids of *Vṛndāvana* who attained liberation through devotion even though they had no knowledge.

Though devotion is of the nature of *rāga* (attachment), it cannot for that reason be condemned,

because the object of that attachment is God and not human beings or the things of the world. It is only in the latter case that it becomes condemnable.

Neither can it be identified with work (*kriyā*) will or wish (*icchā*), nor even with faith (*śraddhā*)

Then, what is the place of knowledge in the scheme of liberation ? It is a secondary *sādhana* which helps to destroy the impurities of mind and thus pave the way for the rise of devotion.

It is interesting to note that Śāṅḍilya calls the *prasthānatraya* (the *upanishads*, the *Gītā* and the *Vedāntasūtras*) as *Brahmakāṇḍa* and not as *Jñānakāṇḍa* as it is usually termed. He argues that *jñāna* or knowledge is common to both the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* (called *Karmakāṇḍa*) and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*. In both cases the object is to give us the knowledge about things which are previously unknown : of *karma* (ceremonial rites) in the former case and of Brahman in the latter case. After giving this knowledge the former urges us to perform these rites and the latter, to attain liberation through devotion to Brahman, termed as *saṁstha* <sup>18</sup>.

The path of Yoga as taught by Patañjali is also useful as a secondary discipline since it helps in the purification and concentration of mind. However the *sumādhi* (perfect concentration) spoken of there, can also be attained by secondary devotional practices. Precisely for these reasons a devotee of God

is superior to those who tread the path of concentration, ceremonial rites or knowledge.

Śāṇḍilya has graded devotion into *purā* or supreme and *gaunī* or secondary. Actually it is the former alone that deserves to be named as *bhakti*. Since the latter leads to the rise of the former, it is also, called *bhakti*, but in a secondary (*gaunī*) sense.

In *Sū* 44 Śāṇḍilya gives a long list of the signs by which the maturity of devotion can be inferred. They are : *sammāna* (respect), *bahumāna* (high esteem) *prīti* (delight), *viraha* (forlornness), *itara-vicikitsā* (doubting other objects), *mūhimakhyāti* (praising His greatness), *tadārtha-prāṇasthāna* (holding the life for His sake), *tadīyatā* (considering everything as His), *sarva-tadbhāva* (regarding Him as existing in all beings) and *apratikūlya* (not resisting His will).

Though these are the signs by which supreme devotion expresses itself, they are also the means to attain supreme devotion when they are consciously practised<sup>19</sup>. In the latter case they become *gaunī bhakti*.

Other types of secondary devotion are those mentioned in the *Gīta* (9th chapter) such as *kīrtana* (praising Him) *namaskara* (obeisance), *ananyacintana* (thinking of none else but Him), *yajana*<sup>20</sup> (worshipping Him), *patrāṇḍi-dā* (offering of leaves, flowers etc.), *arpaṇa* (offering every thing one does or enjoys) etc.

All these purify the heart and facilitate the rise of supreme devotion. There is no rule that they

ould be practised all together or only some of them or in any particular order. Anyone when practised sincerely and intensely can please God and thus give rise to supreme devotion.

Most of these forms of secondary devotion are of the nature of actio; for instance, worshipping Him with all the accessories, singing His glories, repeating His names and so on. Among all forms of action these are the best, since they are actually the result of the meritorious acts of previous births and will now lead directly to supreme devotion. Another beauty of these is that they can produce either supreme devotion or fulfil any other desire of the aspirant depending upon his attitude and motive.

The scriptures contain elaborate and difficult expiations for various kinds of sins. They consume a lot of time and money as also cause a lot of physical pain. The doctrine of *bhakti* assures that remembrance of God, glorifying Him, hearing about His life and deeds etc., are also equally capable of destroying even great sins and can take the place of those difficult expiations. However a sincere repentance is a precondition and these practices must be continued till death. And for a sinner, the real practice of devotion will begin only after the destruction of his sins through remembrance etc.

Supreme devotion (*parā bhakti* or *parānurkti*) which rises in the final stages as a result of the practice of secondary devotion leads to infinite

beatitude. A very important characteristic of this devotion is *ekāntabhāva* or absolute one-pointedness. This devotion can be directed not only towards God but also towards any of His manifestation like Varāha, Nṛsinha, Vāmana, Rāma or Śiva.

Since all, irrespective of their birth or capacity, are entitled to the practice of devotion, it is likely that many of them will not have attained supreme devotion before they die. Such devotees are reborn in the world of God like the *Śvetadvīpa* where they will continue their devotional practices and finally attain it, and through it, liberation.

(d) Mukti :

It is the lack of this supreme devotion that is the real cause of bondage, of suffering and transmigration, and not lack of knowledge as some argue. The commentator does not subscribe to the Advaitic view of *anirvacanīya byatī* (logical indefinability of a particular type of knowledge) with the help of which the illusoriness of the world is sought to be proved. When a snake is seen in a rope it is a simple case of mistake technically called *anyathā hyātī* (mistaking one for another). Hence it is lack of devotion alone, and not knowledge, that is the cause of bondage. Consequently devotion destroys this bondage and gives liberation. That this liberation is of the nature of immortality and is obtained through devotion to God is confirmed by the śrutis also (*vide Ch.U. 2.23.2*).

Supreme devotion destroys the *upādhi* of the individual soul viz., the *buddhi* (understanding) or *antahkaraṇa* (the internal organ) thereby liberating it. The liberated soul lives as a *jīvanmukta* as long as the body lasts due to the momentum of his past karmas which have fructified giving him this body. Once the body falls, he is merged in God.

It has already been pointed out that this is like the merging of the reflected image of the sun in the real sun once the mirror is removed, and other non-liberated souls will continue to exist separately due to the *upādhis* being infinite in number.

Liberation can also take place in a gradual way. Those who are purified by the practice of lower forms of devotion but die before getting supreme devotion, will go by the *areirārdi-mārga* (the path of light leading to the world conditioned Brahman) and reach final beauty from there, later on. Thus, lower devotion gives gradual liberation whereas supreme devotion gives it immediately. However, it should not be forgotten that even lower devotion leads to liberation only through the production of supreme devotion whether in this world or in the higher region.

### Published Literature on Shandilya Sutras

We have so far come across the following printed works :

(1) The sūtras in *nāgarī* script, English translation and brief notes with an essay appended, by Sri K. S. Ramaswami Sastri (1925 A.D.)

(2) The sūtras in *nāgarī* script with English translation and more detailed notes by Sri Jadunath Mazoomdar, published by the Hindu Patrika Office, Jessore, Bengal, in 1918 A. D.

(3) The Sūtras with Svapneśvara's *bhāṣya*, original only in *nāgarī* script, originally edited by J. R. Ballantyne, subsequently by Sri Nandalal Sinha and published in the 'Shyamacharana Sanskrit Series' (No. IV), in 1925 A.D. By Major B. D. Basu at the Pāṇini Office, Allahabad.

(4) Svapneśvara Bhāṣya, original only in *nāgarī* script, published by the Oriental Research Institute of Mysore.

(5) E. B. Cowell's English translation of the Sūtras and Svapneśvara *bhāṣya* without the original, under the title 'The Aphorisms of Śāṅḍilya with the commentary of Svapneśvara OR The Hindu Doctrine of Faith' published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1878 A D., in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series.

(6) Manmathanath Pal's English translation of the Svapneśvara Bhāṣya published by the Pāṇini Office of Allahabad in 'The Sacred Books of the Hindus' series, in 1911 A.D., along with the Sūtras of Nārada and *Garuḍa Purāṇa*. In this edition, the original *Śāṅḍilya sūtras* are given in *nāgarī* script. This has been recently reprinted.

(7) The Sūtras with Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha's *Bhakticandrikā*, original only in nāgarī script, edited by Sri Baladeva Upadhyaya and published in the 'Sarasvati Bhavana Granthamala' series (No. 9), Second edition 1967 A. D. In this edition, Svapneśvara's bhāṣya also is given as an appendix.

Out of these, except (6 and 7) the rest are not in print.

Among these, the first work is too brief to be of any use to a serious student. The second one contains many mistakes, both in the *sūtras* and in the translation. Cowell's translation is very good and useful. We have derived a lot of help from it.

The seventh work is excellently got up and contains much additional information as appendices.

### The Present Work

Both the English translations of Svapneśvara's *Bhāṣya* have long been out of print. Hence the present work. It is a fresh translation with plenty of critical notes wherever necessary. The original *sūtras* and *bhāṣya* are also given in the nāgarī script to help students who have a working knowledge of Sanskrit. *Sūtrapāṭha* as also an index of the *sūtras* is appended at the end. The contents are cast in the form of a brief synopsis so as to be of greater use. This detailed introduction also, it is hoped, will enable serious students of this work to understand it better.



If such students and scholars welcome this work as a useful addition to the *Bhakti-sūtra* literature, we are satisfied.'

**Swami Harṣhananda**

### Notes

1. For further defence of this view see *Indian Philosophy* by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. I, pp. 499—502.
2. This aphorism is not found in Svapneśvara's version of the original.
3. The first and last names have been derived from the names of their source-books. Sātвата means a devotee of Kṛṣṇa. Ekāntika means single minded devotion.
4. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol.I. p.9.
5. See 4.6.1; 4.6.3; 6.5.4.
6. 3.14. The same passage is also found with slight variations in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 10. 63
7. *sū.* 83
8. *sū.s.* 37, 40, 42, 86, 87, 92 and 100.
9. *Bhāṣyam ābhāṣyate' dhunā* (from his introductory verse).
10. See *Bhakticandrikā* on 2.1.7.

11. See Dr. S. Radhakrishna's Indian Philosophy Vol. II, p. 255, footnotes 3.
12. *ibid*
13. See his commentary. on sū. 99.
14. Śrīmad-ramānujācāryāstu 'pibanti nāmaṣayam....' (Māntrikopaniṣat 6) iti śruter jivānam bahutvaṁ bhokṛtvam īśvarasyaikatvaṁ prayojakatvaṁ ca vāstavamicchantaḥ sūtradvayamidam anyathā yojayanti, tathāhi.
15. The sūtra 'prāguktañca' (16) is omitted. The three extra sūtras appear continuously between sū. 18 and sū. 19. See the footnote under the latter.
16. na hi nipuṇataradarśanenapy upādhiyoge sphaṭikalauhitya-bhrama-nivṛttirasti (Svapneśvara's introduction)
17. sū. 2 : sā parā'nuraktiriśvare.
18. The word samsthā in the statement of Chāndogya 'brahmasamsthō'mṛtatvameti' (2. 23.2) means, according to Śāṅḍilya, devotion. See sū. 3
19. c. f. with Śāṅkara's words : sarvatra eva hi adhyātmaśāstre kṛtārthalakṣaṇāni yāni tāni eva hi sādhanāni upadiśyante yatnasādhyatvāt; yāni yatnasādhyāni sadhanāni lakṣaṇāni ca bhavanti tāni (Gītā-bhāṣya 2. 55)
20. See sū. 66.

## **Acknowledgement**

We are grateful to Dr. Prabhushankara, former Director of Prasaranga, University of Mysore but for whose kindly interest this book would not have seen the light of the day. We are also thankful to Sri R. L. Anantharamiah, the present head of the Prasaranga, Sri D. K. Earegowda and to Sri R. Narasimha of the Samskrita Sahitya Sadana who have taken a personal interest in the printing and get-up of this book.

**Swami Harshananda**

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
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ABBREVIATIONS  
(SANSKRIT)

अभि. शा	अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तलम्
आप. श्रौ.	आपस्तम्बश्रौतसूत्रम्
आश्व. श्रौ.	आश्वलायनश्रौतसूत्रम्
ऋ. ०। ऋ. सं.	ऋग्वेदः, ऋग्वेदसंहिता
ऐ. उ.	ऐतरेयोपनिषत्
क. उ.	कठोपनिषत्
गीता	श्रीमद्भगवद्गीता
छा. उ.	छान्दोग्योपनिषत्
तै. आ.	तैत्तिरीय-आरण्यकम्
तै. उ.	तैत्तिरीयोपनिषत्
तै. सं.	तैत्तिरीयसंहिता
ना. प.	नारदपञ्चरात्रम्
नृ. ता. उ.	नृसिंहतापनीयोपनिषत्
नृ. पु.	नृसिंहपुराणम्
पू. मी.	पूर्वमीमांसासूत्रणि

प्र. उ.	प्रश्नोपनिषत्
बृ. उ.	बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत्
ब्र. पु.	ब्रह्मपुराणम्
ब्र. सू.	ब्रह्मसूत्राणि
म. ना. उ.	महानारायणोपनिषत्
म. भा. आ.	महाभारतम् — आनुशासनिकपर्व
म. भा. उ.	„ उद्योगपर्व
म. भा. द्रो.	„ द्रोणपर्व
म. भा. भी.	„ भीष्मपर्व
म. भा. व.	„ वनपर्व
म. भा. शा.	„ शान्तिपर्व
मु. उ.	मुण्डकोपनिषत्
यो. सू.	योगसूत्राणि
व. पु.	वराहपुराणम्
वा. रा. उ.	वाल्मीकिरामायणम् — उत्तरकाण्डः
वि. पु.	विष्णुपुराणम्
श्वे. उ.	श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषत्

**A B B R E V I A T I O N S**  
(ENGLISH)

aph.	Aphorism
Ai. U.	Aitereya Upaniṣad
Āp. Śr.	Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtras
Āś Śr.	Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtras
Br. P.	Brahma Purāṇa
Br. S.	Brahma Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa
Bṛ. U.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
Ch. U.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Gītā	Bhagavad Gītā
J.N.V.	Jaiminīya Nyāyamāla Vistara
Ka. U.	Kaṭha Upaniṣad
Mā. U.	Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad
Mbh.Ā.	Mahābhārata-Ānuśāsanika parva
Mbh.Bh.	„ -Bhīṣma Parva
Mbh. D.	„ -Droṇa Parva
Mbh. Ś	„ -Śānti Parva
Mbh. U.	„ -Udyoga Parva
Mbh. V.	„ -Vana Parva

M.N.U.	Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad
Mu. U	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
Nā. P.	Nārada Pañcarātra
Nā. U.	Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad
N.B.S.	Nārada Bhakti Sūtras
Nṛ. P.	Nṛsimha Purāṇa
Nṛ. U.	Nṛsimha-tāpanīya Upaniṣad
Pr.U.	Prasna Upaniṣad
Pū.M.	Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras
Rā.Uk.	Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa-Uttara Kāṇḍa
R. V.	Ṛg Veda
sū., sūs.	Sūtra, Sūtras
Śv. U.	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
Tai. Ā.	Tāittirīya Āraṇyaka
Tai.Br.	„ Brāhmaṇa
Tai. S.	„ Saṁhitā
Tai. U.	„ Upaniṣad
Var. P.	Varāha Purāṇa
V. P.	Viṣṇu Purāṇa
Y. S.	Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali

**ŚĀṄḌILYA BHAKTI SŪTRAS**  
**WITH**  
**SVAPNEŚVARA BHĀṢYA**



## FIRST CHAPTER

### SECTION I

—परमेश्वरो जयति—

प्रपद्य परमं देवं श्रीस्वप्नेश्वरसूरिणा ।  
शाण्डिल्यशतसूत्रीय भाष्यमाभाष्यतेऽधुना ॥  
गोविन्दचरणद्वन्द्वमधुनो महदद्भुतम् ।  
यत्पायिनो न मुह्यन्ति मुह्यन्ति यदपायिनः ॥

Victorious is the Supreme Lord !

Having taken refuge in the Supreme God, the learned Śrī Svapneśvara gives his commentary now on the hundred Aphorisms of the (sage Śrī) Śāṇḍilya.

Great is the marvel of the nectar of the two feet of Govinda ! Those who drink it, do not get deluded whereas those who do not, do get deluded !

This being a treatise on *bhakti* (devotion) it is but proper that the commentator begins his work on a devotional note.

Like the author Śāṇḍilya, very little is known of the commentator Svapneśvara also. Because he quotes from the

Bengali version of the drama *Abhijñāna Śākuntalam* in his commentary on the sixth Aphorism, E. B. Cowell concludes that he must have been a native of Bengal (Gauḍadeśa).

Delusion refers to being caught in the bondage of saṁsāra or the rounds of birth and death.

जीवानां ब्रह्मधावापत्तिर्भुक्तिरिति बक्ष्यते । जीवाश्च ब्रह्मणोऽभ्यन्तमभिन्ना इति तेषां संसारस्त्रिगुणात्मकान्तःकरणोपाधिकृतो न साहजिकः, स्फटिकस्यैव जपादिसन्निधिकृतं लौहित्यादिकम् । स चौपाधिकत्वादेव न ज्ञानेन निवर्तनीयः, किन्तूपाध्युपधेययोरन्यतरहानेन तत्सम्बन्धहानेन वा । न हि निपुणतरदर्शनेनाप्युपाधियोगे स्फटिकलौहित्यभ्रमनिवृत्तिरस्ति । तथेह न सर्वसत्तास्फुरणात्मनो हानिः सम्भवति ; न वा सम्बन्धस्य तदुभयम्बरूपानतिरेकात् । परिशेषादुपाधिहानादेव भ्रमनिवृत्तिर्नात्मज्ञानात् ॥

### COMMENTATOR'S INTRODUCTION

It will be declared later on that liberation is the attainment by the jīvas or individual souls, of the state of Brahman. Since the individual souls are absolutely identical with Brahman, their bondage is not natural to them. Just as the red colour etc., of a (colourless) crystal is caused by the proximity of a china-rose etc., their bondage also has been caused by the antaḥkaraṇa or the internal organ (the mind) made up of the three guṇas and acting as a limiting adjunct. Because this bondage has been caused by a limiting adjunct, for that very reason it cannot be removed by knowledge. On the other hand, it can be removed



(only) by the removal of either the object (e.g., the crystal) or the limiting adjunct (e.g., the china-rose) or the connection between them. Not even by the most skilful gazing at the crystal can the erroneous perception of redness in it be removed as long as the contact with the limiting adjunct (*viz.*, the china-rose) lasts! Now, by extending the same analogy here: It is not possible to destroy or remove the *ātman* (the soul) which is the very basis of all existence and manifestation. Nor can its connection (with the internal organ) be destroyed because it is not possible to transcend the nature of either of them.<sup>1</sup> Hence we are obliged to accept the last alternative only, *viz.*, by the destruction of the limiting adjunct alone can the erroneous perception be destroyed and *not* by the knowledge of the *ātman*.

<sup>1</sup> The *ātman* is all-pervading by nature. It is bound to pervade the internal organ (which by nature is limited and finite) wherever it is. Hence the connection between them will also be there as long as the latter has an existence of its own.

उपाधिदाने च कारणान्तरमन्वेष्टव्यम् । तच्चेश्वरभक्तिरेवालौकिकत्वात्  
श्रुतिस्मृतिसिद्धा । तथा (गीता १४.६-८) —

तत्र सत्त्वं निर्मलत्वात् प्रकाशकमनामयम् ।

सुखसङ्गेन बध्नाति ज्ञानसङ्गेन चानघ ॥

रजो रागात्मकं विद्धि तृष्णासङ्गसमुद्भवम् ।

तन्निबध्नाति कौन्तेय कर्मसङ्गेन देहिनम् ॥

तमस्त्वज्ञानजं विद्धि मोहनं सर्वदेहिनाम् ।  
प्रमादालस्यनिद्रामिस्तन्निवध्नाति भारत ॥

इत्युपक्रम्य, (गीता १४. २६)

मां च योऽत्र्यभिचारेण भक्तियोगेन सेवते ।  
स गुणान्समतीत्यैतान् ब्रह्मभूयाय कल्पते ॥

इत्युपसंहरन् भगवानेवात्मभवत्त्रैस्त्रिगुणाःप्रकान्तःकरणलयपूर्वकब्रह्मानंदा-  
वासिलक्षणमुक्तिहेतुतामाह ॥

And for the removal of this limiting adjunct, another cause<sup>2</sup> is to be sought; and this is none other than devotion to God. Being supra-mundane it is established by the Vedas and smṛtis (authoritative traditions or secondary scriptures).<sup>3</sup> For instance, in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, the Lord himself declares that devotion to Him destroys the internal organ consisting of the three guṇas and becomes the cause of the liberation which is characterised by the attainment of the bliss of Brahman, in the following words: 'Of these, *sattva*, luminous and free from evil, from its stainlessness, binds O sinless one, by attachment to happiness and knowledge. Know *rajas* to be of the nature of passion, giving rise to thirst and attachment; it binds fast O son of Kuntī, the embodied one, by attachment to action. And know that *tamas* is born of ignorance and that it deludes all embodied beings. O descendant of Bharata, it binds fast through careless-

ness, indolence and sleep' (14.6-8). He concludes: 'And he who serves Me with an unswerving devotion transcends the three guṇas and is fit to become Brahman' (*ibid* 26).

<sup>2</sup> Other than the knowledge of the ātman.

<sup>3</sup> And not by direct perception or inference.

न चात्मज्ञानवैयर्थ्यमश्रद्धामलक्ष्णानेन भक्तानुपयोगात् । न त्वपरो-  
क्षान्तःकरणरूपोपाधिधर्माध्यासनिराससमर्थं ज्ञानम् । अत एव (गीता १४.  
१९) गुणेभ्यश्च परं वेत्ति मद्भावं सोऽधिगच्छतीति, (४.४१) ज्ञानसंछिन्न-  
संशयमित्यादावयमर्थः स्फुट एव ॥

It should not (be thought) that the knowledge of the ātman is useless because it assists devotion by washing out impurities like lack of faith. However, knowledge of the ātman is incapable of removing the superimposition of the characteristics of the limiting adjunct—the internal organ—(on the ātman, since it is) directly connected with it.<sup>4</sup> That is why this has been clearly declared in such passages as, 'when he knows that which is higher than the guṇas, he attains to My being' (*Gītā* 14.19) and 'whose doubts are rent asunder by knowledge' (*ibid* 4.41).

<sup>4</sup> The knowledge that he has jaundice cannot and does not prevent the jaundice patient from seeing a white object as yellow !

न चाज्ञानकृतस्संसारो येन ज्ञानान्निवृत्तिरपि वक्तुं शक्या प्रमाणा-  
भावात् । रजतावयवादेः कारणस्याभावादज्ञातशुक्ति उत्पत्त्यसम्भवाच्च ।

अपि च ' कृतस्तु खलु सौम्यैवं म्यादसतः सज्जायेत' (छा. उ. ६.२.२)  
 इति श्रुतिः कार्यसत्तया कारणवत्तां बोधयन्ती संसारस्य सत्यत्वमेवाह नितरां  
 च सत्यसंकल्प (छा. उ. ३. १४.२) इत्यादिना परमेश्वरसर्गस्य । नापि  
 भगवान् बादरायणः क्वचिदपि सूत्रे संसारस्याज्ञानकल्पितत्वमुक्तवान् . प्रत्युत  
 स्वप्नसृष्टिनिराकरणेन जगत्सृष्टेः सत्यत्वम् । न च दृष्टान्तार्थं तत् .  
 मानाभावात् ।

And the bondage of the soul has not been caused (as the Advaitins say) by ignorance in which case it could be said that it could be removed by knowledge because there is no proof thereof. When an oyster shell is mistaken for silver, silver cannot certainly be produced out of the ignorance of the real nature of that shell; because, silver particles—the real cause—do not exist.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the Vedic text, 'O gentle youth! How could it be thus, that being be produced from non-being?' (*Ch. U. 6.2.2*) establishes the very reality of this world by declaring that a real effect can be produced only by a real cause. The reality of the Supreme Lord's creation has been well-established in such other texts like 'whose will is true' (*Ch. U. 3.14.2*) also. Nor has the venerable Bādarāyaṇa said anywhere in his sūtras that this world has been conjured up by ignorance. On the other hand, by rejecting the doctrine of a dream-creation, he has asserted the reality of the waking world.<sup>6</sup> Nor was it meant to be employed only as an illustration, for there is no proof for such an assumption.

<sup>5</sup> To prove the unreality of this created world, the Advaitins give the example of the oyster shell being mistaken for silver due to the ignorance of the real nature of the shell. Similarly they argue that due to the ignorance of the real nature of Brahman, this world is being seen in It. Svapneśvara's contention is that this world—which is being directly experienced—is real; and as such cannot be produced by ignorance which itself is unreal. A real effect must have a real cause. Since silver particles did not exist in the oyster shell no silver was really produced. Similarly if a real cause did not exist prior to creation, this real world could not have been produced.

<sup>6</sup> *Vide Brahma Sūtras* 2.2.28 & 29. While refuting the Bauddha idealists who hold that this world is unreal like a dream, Bādarāyaṇa comes to the conclusion that the external world is real.

सुखादिभ्रमाणां तु सादृजिह्वत्वं नोपपद्यते सुखादयो न साक्षादात्म-  
विकारा आत्मनि प्रतीयमानत्वादौरत्वादिवत् । सुखाद्युपलब्धिः सकरणिका  
क्रियात्वादित्यत्र लाघवात् समवायेनैव करणजन्यत्वं युज्यते श्रोत्रजन्यत्वमिव  
शब्दस्य । सुखादयः करणसमवेता अनादीन्द्रियग्राह्यगुणत्वाच्छब्दवदिति  
परमते । उभयमते स्पर्शशून्येन्द्रियग्राह्यगुणत्वात् । आत्मसिद्धिस्तु सर्व-  
सत्ताप्रकाशकतयेति । सर्वमेतद् द्वितीये तृतीये च स्फुटीभविष्यति ।  
तस्मात्पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वाद् धर्मस्यैव भक्तेर्मीमांसाविवित्सयेदं सूत्रम् ॥

But the theory (of the Advaitins) that bliss etc., (sat-cid-ānanda) are the natural characteristics of (or, in fact, *constitute* the) soul is not tenable; because, they are not direct modifications of the soul. Like whiteness etc., they are perceived (as reflected in) the

soul. Perception being an action which implies an instrument, it is simpler to suppose that the perception (or experience) of bliss, etc., takes place through an instrument (*i.e.*, the internal organ). Therefore bliss etc., are produced through the instrument (*i.e.*, the internal organ) in which they are inherent,<sup>7</sup> just as sound is produced by the internal ear.<sup>8</sup> Others (like the Naiyāyikas) hold that bliss, etc., are inherent in the instrument (*i.e.*, the mind) because they are qualities apprehensible by the uncreated organ (as they hold the mind to be) just as sound (is apprehensible by the uncreated internal ear). According to both the views the qualities (of bliss or sound) are apprehended by an intangible organ (the mind or the internal ear).<sup>9</sup> But the proof of the reality of the ātman is that it reveals all existence.<sup>10</sup> All this will be made clear in the second section of the third chapter. Therefore, like the desire to know more about dharma (as in the *pūrvamīmāṃsā*),<sup>11</sup> with a view to having a fuller discussion of bhakti or devotion—which is the cause of the attainment of the highest good of man—the following aphorism is being propounded.

<sup>7</sup> The idea is that bliss etc., are qualities which *inhere* in the internal organ and *so are not themselves the ātman*.

<sup>8</sup> What is meant here by the word śrotra is the ākāśa in the internal ear.

<sup>9</sup> And so are not themselves the organs.

<sup>10</sup> For, if there were no seer or knower, nothing could be seen or known.

<sup>11</sup> The first sūtra of Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* is :  
आथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा ।

Here a few words are required by way of explanation and a brief discussion on this introduction as a whole. Though Svapneśvara accepts the advaitic position that the individual souls are identical with Brahman he differs from the Advaitins on two counts : the cause of bondage and the means of attaining liberation from that bondage. He considers that bondage has been caused by the contact of the ātman with the antaḥkaraṇa which is disguising its true nature. After considering the various alternatives he concludes that this bondage can be removed only by the removal of the antaḥkaraṇa itself, through devotion to the Supreme Lord. This devotion helps the aspirant to transcend the three guṇas of which antaḥkaraṇa is also made, thereby transcending it also and attaining the state of Brahman. Since this is a treatise on devotion it is quite understandable that it has been given the primary place and that knowledge has been relegated to a secondary position.

However, when he begins to tackle the other doctrines of Advaita, he does not seem to be on very safe grounds. Let us first summarize his arguments : (1) Liberation can be got only by the removal of the antaḥkaraṇa through devotion to God and *not* by the knowledge of the ātman; (2) But knowledge of the ātman is not useless inasmuch as it cleanses the antaḥkaraṇa of impurities like lack of faith and assists devotion; (3) Bondage has not been caused by ignorance and hence it cannot be got rid of by knowledge ; (4) This created world is not unreal but real; (5) Existence, knowledge and bliss do not themselves constitute the ātman but are qualities inherent in the antaḥkaraṇa. After reading these arguments one wonders how Svapneśvara can yet stick to his 'advaitic' position, *viz.*, the absolute identity of the ātman with Brahman !

If this creation is real both the antaḥkaraṇa and the ātman as also their connection have also to be real. Since what is real can never be destroyed, neither the antaḥkaraṇa nor its connection with the ātman can ever be destroyed. Consequently the ātman will have to be in eternal bondage ! That is why Advaita takes up the position that this world including the body, the senses and the mind is only a myth, unreal appearance. *It is always possible to get rid of the unreal phenomena by knowing the truth behind them.* Seeing a snake in a rope or silver in oyster shells is certainly due to the ignorance of the real nature of the substratum. The former produces fear and the latter, a desire to possess, ending up in disappointment. It is this mental reaction leading to further actions and reactions, that is termed bondage, in Advaita philosophy. *Hence, once the truth regarding the substratum is clearly known, these reactions come to an end even though the false appearances themselves may persist. This is freedom.* Similarly, once the truth behind the limited individual personality (*viz.*, the ātman) and that behind the phenomenal world (*viz.*, Brahman) as also their identity are directly known there is no reason why the bondage caused by the false appearances should not disappear even though the world-appearances may continue to linger. Once this is understood and appreciated, the arguments of our commentator just fade away.

Svapneśvara has taken great pains to prove the reality of this world. So have Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara ! In fact, the very definition of Brahman that Bādarāyaṇa gives, is centred round the authorship of this creation. In consonance with the principle that we can conceive of the unseen and the unknown only in terms of the seen and the known, Śaṅkara also admits of the reality of this world and accepts the definition of



Brahman as the one and only cause from which creation, sustenance and destruction are proceeding. It is thus that they have countered the Buddhist Nihilism. But Śaṅkara does not stop with this. He goes a step further and posits a higher Brahman (based on the Vedas) which is beyond all names, forms, qualities etc., which can at best be defined only as 'Not this', 'Not this', *neti neti*, and whose essential characteristic is *sat-cit-ānanda*. From the standpoint of this Highest Brahman even the creation is only a myth, like the pictures projected on a screen, the screen alone being real. *But in the normal plane of consciousness for all practical purposes, reality is never denied to this world.* Though according to the latest theories of science everything that exists in the world is a bundle of electrical charges, things are taken at their face value for all practical purposes, including of course the atomic scientist himself! So also with Śaṅkara's Brahman and the world.

As regards the nature of ātman and Brahman it has been very clearly established by such statement of the scriptures as :  
 सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म (Tai. U. 2.1), आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् (Tai. U. 3.6)  
 यो वै भूमा तत्सुखम् (Ch. U. 7.23.1), प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म (Ai. U. 3.1.3.)  
 अ म त्मा ब्रह्म (Mā. U. 1.2)

### अथातो भक्तिजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥

1. Now, therefore, the desire to know about devotion (must be cultivated).

अथेत्यधिकारार्थो नानन्तर्यार्थः । आनन्तर्यं हि न स्वाध्यायाध्ययनस्य  
 आनिद्यगोन्धिकृतेर्बक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । नापि शमादिसम्पत्त्यर्थः मुमुक्षामात्रस्य  
 भक्त्यधिकारत्वात् । यथा मन्त्रवर्णः (श्वे. उ. ६.१८)

यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं  
 यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै ।  
 तं ह देवमात्मबुद्धिप्रकाशं  
 मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये ॥ इति ।

The word *atha* (translated as 'now') indicates *commencement* (of a new treatise) and should not be taken in the sense of 'afterwards'.<sup>12</sup> There is no necessary subsequence to any preliminary study of the Vedas<sup>13</sup> here since it will be declared later on that even beings of degraded births<sup>14</sup> are competent (to practise devotion). Nor does the word imply a subsequence to a previous acquisition of tranquillity etc.,<sup>15</sup> because the desire to get liberation alone is enough to qualify one to take to the path of devotion. This is (corroborated by the) following Vedic passage; 'To Him who at the beginning created Brahmā and who gave the Vedas to him—to Him the God who reveals the knowledge of Himself, do I, desirous of liberation, fly for refuge' (*Śv.U.* 6.8).

<sup>12</sup> The word *atha* is used in four senses : (1) afterwards ; (2) commencement of a new treatise; (3) connection with a previous passage; (4) benediction. Though the first meaning is more common, the second one is more appropriate in this context.

<sup>13</sup> The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras* begin with the words अथातो षर्मजिज्ञासा where the word *atha* indicates 'after studying the Vedas'.

<sup>14</sup> Even sub-human species are entitled to tread the path of devotion as instanced by the elephant king (Gajendra).

<sup>15</sup> The *Vedānta Sūtras* begin with the words आथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञास where *atha* is interpreted by the Advaitins as 'after the acquisition of the four requisites, viz., discrimination, dispassion, the six spiritual treasures of tranquillity etc., and the desire for liberation'.

न च मङ्गलार्थोऽपि तदुच्चारणमात्रस्य मङ्गलत्वात् । तथा च मुमुक्षुणा भक्तिविचारः कर्तव्य इत्यर्थः । जिज्ञासया विचार आक्षिप्यते ॥

Nor does the word indicate benediction because benediction is conferred by its very utterance.<sup>16</sup> Therefore (the correct interpretation of the word *atha*) is that one who is desirous of liberation must take to the inquiry into the nature of devotion. The word *jijñāsā* ('a wish to know') in the aphorism implies 'inquiry'.

<sup>16</sup> In the *Yoga Sūtras* which begins as अथ योगानुशासनम्, the word *atha* is taken to indicate benediction also along with the commencement of a new treatise. An ancient śloka gives the reason as to why *atha* indicates benediction: ओङ्कारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा । कण्ठं मित्वा विनिर्यातौ तेन माङ्गलिकवुभौ ॥ 'In the beginning, the two words *om* and *atha* burst out of the throat of Brahmā. Hence they both confer benediction.'

यद्यपि परमेश्वरानुरक्तिरूपाया भक्तेर्न धर्मवत् कृतिसाध्यत्वं न वा ब्रह्मवज्ज्ञेयत्वं तथापि स्याः स्वकारणपूर्वसुकृतैर्द्विकगौणभक्त्यादिसम्पन्नाया अपि नेयं नेयं भक्तिनिश्चयेयसार्था, नेममुत्तमविषयेत्यादिकुतर्ककबलनेन निवृत्तिरपि भवति, यथा पत्यौ पत्न्याः । तन्निरासमुखेनैव तन्मीमांसाया भक्त्यावुपयोग इति अतश्शब्देनोच्यते । यतः कुतर्कनिरासोऽपेक्षणीयः, अतस्तज्जिज्ञासेति । अत एव (वि.पु.१.२०.१६) —

नाथ योनिसहस्रेषु येषु येषु ब्रजाग्न्यहम् ।

तेषु तेष्वचला भक्ति च्युतास्तु सदा त्वयि ॥ इति ।

तद्विच्युतिप्रार्थनमपेक्षितत्वादिति । अत एव फलवद्भक्त्यङ्गमपि विचारः  
फलवानेवेति ॥ १ ॥

No doubt this devotion which is of the nature of love of God cannot be the result of works like *dharma* (duties, as in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā). Nor is it something to be known like Brahman (as in the Vedānta). And yet, even when it has been perfected by its proper antecedents like good works, mundane and inferior devotion etc, it is still liable to be destroyed by the weight of false objections such as ‘This is not devotion’, ‘This does not lead to the Highest Good’, ‘Its aim is not the Highest’, etc., just as a wife’s faith in her husband (is likely to be destroyed by unfounded calumnies). Hence the word *ataḥ* (‘therefore’) indicates the utility of such an inquiry in devotion inasmuch as it dispels such false objections. Because it is necessary to dispel false objections, *therefore*, an inquiry into devotion (must be undertaken)—this is the meaning of the aphorism. That is why it is said thus in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (1.20.16): ‘O Lord, even though I may have to pass through thousands of wombs, let there be in me for ever, O Acyuta, unshakable devotion to thee, in each of those births!’ This prayer (of Prahlāda) that his devotion may remain unshaken shows the necessity of (counteracting the attempts to topple it). Therefore, this inquiry into devotion, though ancillary to devotion

itself which bears the fruit (in the form of the Highest Good), is also fruitful.

अथ तस्या लौकिकाकारतामन्तरेण बुद्ध्यनारोहान्न विचारविषयत्वम्,  
अतस्तल्लक्षणमुच्यते—

Now, it may be objected that devotion without a practical form cannot be grasped by our intellect and as such, cannot be the subject of inquiry. To counter this, the definition of devotion is now given :

सा पराऽनुरक्तिरीश्वरे ॥ २ ॥

2. It is the highest love for God.

अत्र सा परेति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः । शेषं लक्षणम् । परेति गौणीं  
व्यावर्तयति ईश्वर इति प्रकृताभिप्रायम् । आराध्यविषयकरागत्वमेव सा ।  
इह तु परमेश्वरविषयकान्तःकरणवृत्तिविशेष एव भक्तिस्तद्वैशेष्यं च लौकिकानु-  
रागादौ सुग्रहम् । यथोक्तं परभक्तिमता प्रह्लादेन (वि. पु. १.२०.१७)

या प्रीतिर्ब्रिवेकानां विषयेष्वनपायिनी ।

त्वामनुस्मरतः सा मे हृदयान्माऽपसर्पतु ॥

Here by the words, 'It is the highest', the subject is indicated. The rest gives the characteristics.<sup>17</sup> The word 'highest' is used to exclude the lower forms. The phrase 'of God' refers to the topic of the present work. Devotion is nothing but the love to be cultivated towards the being who is to be propitiated. In this treatise the particular modification of the internal

organ towards God is itself devotion and its special character is easily grasped by examining worldly affections. For instance, Prahlāda who possessed the highest devotion said thus: 'The firm affection that the deluded feel towards the objects of the senses, such a firm affection (may I have towards thee and) may it never depart from my heart, remembering Thee!' (V.P. 1.20.17).

<sup>17</sup> The previous aphorism set forth the necessity of inquiry into the nature of devotion. As a natural corollary the question arises: 'what is this devotion?' This aphorism is giving the answer. It seems more natural to interpret that only the word *sā* referring to the devotion of the previous aphorism indicates the subject and all the other words including the word *parā* give the characteristics. Compare this with Nārada's definition also (N.B.S. 2): सा त्वस्मिन् परमप्रेमरूपा.

अत्र प्रीतिपदेन सुखनियतो राग एव लक्षितः । अन्यथा प्रीतेः सुखरूपाया निर्विषयत्वेन विषयसप्तमी न स्यात् । तस्याः सुखज्ञानरूपत्वेऽपि तज्ज्ञानस्य सुखविषयत्वाद्विषयविषयत्वासम्भवात् । तस्मादनुरक्तिरेव सविषयिणी लक्षिता ॥

In this verse, by the word *prīti* an affection (towards an object) inseparably connected with happiness, is indicated. Otherwise, if the word *prīti* were taken to mean happiness—and because this happiness could be without an external object <sup>18</sup>—the locative on the object (विषयेषु) would have been inappropriate. Same objection would hold good even if the word (*prīti*) were taken to mean 'perception of happiness'

because 'happiness' would then be the object of this perception and not the external object as such. Therefore an affection along with the object is indicated here.

<sup>18</sup> For instance, by remembering a previous experience of pleasure.

न च विषयजन्यप्रतिर्गर्थः, जनकसपनेभ्या अननुशासनात् । किञ्च अच्युतास्तु सदा त्वयीत्यत्र भक्तेरीश्वरवपयना सिद्धौ प्रीतिपदेनापि तदेकवाक्य-  
तया संबोध्यते । पूर्वं प्रतिजन्मभक्तिप्रार्थनमिह तु विषयरागदृष्टान्तेन तस्या  
एव सर्वथाप्यपरहायत्वप्रार्थनमिति विशेषः । विषयजन्यप्रीतिर्गपि रागं  
विना न सम्भवतीति रागावश्यकत्वम् । तथा च पातञ्जलसूत्रम्—' सुखा-  
नुशयी रागः ' (२.७) इति । तस्यैव वक्ष्यमाणलिङ्गेषु व्यापनारुलाधवाच्च  
भक्तित्वम् ।

Nor does the word (*prīti*) mean the happiness produced by the object because it has not been ordained (by the grammarians) that the locative case indicates the producer. And again, in the passage 'Let there be in me for ever, O Acyuta, unshakable devotion towards Thee', since devotion to God is established, by the word *prīti* also the same is meant since the two form a single sentence. The distinction between the two passages is this : whereas in the former, devotion in every life has been prayed for, in the latter under the example of an affection for a worldly object, there is the prayer for its preservation for ever. Since it is not possible to derive happiness from an object without a feeling of affection towards

it, the idea of 'affection' must necessarily be brought in here. The same idea has been reflected in the following aphorism of Patañjali also: 'Affection is what dwells on pleasure' (*Yogasūtras* 2.7). It is this affection that is to be taken as devotion because it is accompanied by all the characteristics mentioned later on (aphorisms 43, 44) and also because this is the simplest explanation.

न तु क्वचित्मरणस्य, क्वचित्कीर्तिनादेः, अननुगमात् । न च तज्ज्ञानस्य तत्त्वद्वेषादिमत्स्वपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । नाप्यागध्यत्वेन ज्ञानं सा पूजानमस्काराद्य राधनास्वननुगमात् । अपि च बलाद्ब्रयाद्वा नमस्कार्यत्वादि-ज्ञानवत्यपि भक्तोऽयमनुरक्तोऽयमाति व्यवहारापत्तेः । अनुरागादिसहिताराध्यत्वमिति चेत् । अनुराग एवास्तु । अत एव (गीता १०.९.१०)—

मच्छित्ता मद्गतप्राणा बोधयन्तः परस्परम् ।  
 कथयन्तश्च मां नित्यं तुष्यन्ति च रमन्ति च ॥  
 तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।  
 ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते ॥

इत्यादौ तद्गतचित्तप्राणादीनां भजनमुक्तं नाराध्यत्वेन ज्ञानवतामेव । अत एव च कृष्णस्य कमनीयाकृतिदर्शनेनानुरक्तानां गोपतरुणीनामपि भक्तिफलं मुक्तिः स्मर्यते । अनुस्तु न लक्षणांतर्गतः, किन्तु भगवन्महिमादिज्ञानादनुपश्चाज्जायमानत्वादनुरक्तिरित्युक्तम् ॥

To be engaged in remembering (God) sometimes and to sing (His glories) at other times—this also cannot (be described as devotion), because it is not necessarily



associated with these always. Nor again, devotion is knowledge of God since this knowledge might exist even in those who hate Him. Nor can it be defined as the knowledge of God as an object of veneration, because it is not always found in such external acts of veneration as worship, obeisance, etc. And in that case we would be obliged to use the expressions, 'He is a devotee', 'He has affection' even in the case of him who has the idea that God is to be bowed down, out of fear or compulsion! If it is said that devotion is the knowledge that God is to be propitiated, coupled with affection, then it is simpler to accept it as an affection (just as the aphorism declares)! That is why it is declared (in the *Gītā*): 'With their minds wholly in Me, with their senses absorbed in Me, mutually enlightening and always speaking of Me, they are satisfied and delighted. To them, ever steadfast and serving Me with affection, I give that *Buddhiyoga* by which they come unto Me' (10. 9-10). In these verses, the service of those whose thoughts and spirits are fixed on God, has been described and not of those who merely know Him as fit to be propitiated. That is why we read in the *smṛti* (*V.P.* 5.13) that even the milk-maids whose love was based on the attraction towards the lovely form of Kṛṣṇa, were liberated. The preposition *anu* (in the word *anurakti*) is not a mere affix whose meaning is merged in the definition but indicates subsequence; because it is produced *after* (*anu*=after) obtaining the knowledge of the greatness etc. of God, therefore is it called *anurakti*.

★

ननु पित्रादिगोचरानुरागस्यापि प्रकृतभक्तित्वं प्रसज्येत, (न) जगत एव परमेश्वरात्मत्वात् । अथ विकाराविशिष्ट एव तथात्वं वाच्यम् । तथापि गोपीप्रभृतीनां प्रादुर्भावावच्छिन्नेश्वरभक्तव्यापकम् । उच्यते-जीवोपाध्य-नवच्छिन्नचेतनवषयिणी अनुभक्तिरेव सेति । एवञ्च प्रादुर्भावावच्छिन्ने परिपूर्णं च भक्तिः स्मृहीता भवति ॥ २ ॥

**Objection :** In that case even the affection towards father etc., must be designated as devotion of the present type.<sup>19</sup>

**Reply :** (No); because it is only the world that is ensouled by God (and not any particular individual as such). In fact, such devotion (as described by the aphorism) is with respect to the unmodified Supreme Being only.

**Objection :** Then by this (definition of yours) the affection cherished by the milk-maids etc., towards God manifested (as a human being) is not included in (devotion) !

**Reply :** (No). Their affection was only towards the Being unconditioned by the limitation of the individual soul. Therefore the affection towards God both in His unmanifest and in His manifest forms, is included (under our definition of devotion).

<sup>19</sup> Since mother, father, preceptor and other elders are to be venerated even according to the scriptures, why not call the affection cherished towards them also as devotion ? — This is the contention of the objector.

### तत्संस्थस्यामृतत्वोपदेशात् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Because immortality has been predicated to him who abides in God (therefore the inquiry into devotion is to be undertaken).

तस्मिन्नीश्वरे संस्था भक्तियस्य स तथोक्तः । तस्यामृतत्वं फलमुपदिश्यते  
(छा. उ. २.२३.२.) 'ब्रह्मसंस्थोऽमृतत्वमेति' इति । तस्मान्निष्फलत्वगौण-  
फलत्वनिबन्धना तदजिज्ञासा परिहृता भवतीति ॥ ३ ॥

'To him who abides in God' means to him who has devotion to God. To such an one immortality has been predicated (in the following statement): 'He who abides in Brahman, attains immortality' (Ch.U. 2.23.2). Therefore, not undertaking the inquiry into devotion due to the fear that it is useless or that it gives an inferior result, is hereby precluded.

Even after accepting the definition of devotion as given by the author *in toto*, the pragmatic mind will naturally ask, 'Well, what is the use of cultivating such a devotion?' This aphorism is answering such a question by quoting the Veda which is the highest authority in supermundane things.

### ज्ञानमिति चन्न, द्विषतोऽपि ज्ञानस्य तदसंस्थितेः ॥ ४ ॥

4. If it is said that (the word *samsthā*, 'abiding') means knowledge, we deny it; because the knowledge of one who hates does not abide in him.

ननु ब्रह्मसंस्थाशब्देन ब्रह्मज्ञानमेवोच्यते न तु भक्तिः । तथा चामृतत्वफलं तस्यैवेति चेद् ब्रूषे । नैष दोषः । संस्था भक्तिरेव न ज्ञानं द्विषतस्तज्ज्ञानवतोऽपि तत्संस्थत्वव्यवहाराभावात् । राजाद्यनुरक्ताः स्वस्वमात्य-मित्रादयस्तत्संस्था इति व्यपदिश्यन्ते न पुनः प्रतिपक्षभूपालाः । शब्दार्थनिर्णयो हि लोकवदेव वेदेऽपीति । अत एव चिरकालिकोपाख्याने (म. भा. शा. २.६६. ४५-४६) —

विमृश्य तेन कालेन षत्नीसंस्थान्वयतिक्रमम् ।  
सोऽब्रवीच्च भृशं तप्तो दुःखेनाश्रूणि वर्तयन् ॥

इत्यनेन पतिभक्तयतिक्रम उक्तः । तस्मात्संस्था भक्तिरिति । एवञ्च 'तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात्' (ब्र. सू. १.१.७) इति बादरायणीयसूत्रस्याप्ययमेवार्थोऽव्यव-सेय इति ॥ ४ ॥

**Objection :** By the word *brahmasamsthā* ('abiding in Brahman') it is the knowledge of Brahman that is meant and not devotion. Hence you should say that the fruit of immortality accrues only to him.

**Reply :** There is nothing wrong in interpreting the word as devotion. In fact the word *samsthā* means devotion only and not knowledge ; because in practice, a person who hates another, even though he possesses a knowledge about the latter, is never said to 'abide' in him! Is it not true that it is only the ministers, friends etc., of a king who are devoted to him, that are described as abiding in him and not his rival kings? It should be remembered that the determination of the meaning of a word in the scriptures is

similar to that in the every-day world. That is why in the legend of *Cirakālikā*<sup>20</sup> (*Mbh. Ś. 266.45-46*) in the lines, 'During that time, having reflected on that failure of *saṁsthā* in his wife, the sage thus distressed and shedding tears in sorrow, spoke thus. By the phrase (*patnī-saṁsthāvyatikrama*) the failure of devotion on the part of the wife is meant. Therefore the word *saṁsthā* means devotion. And so too even in the aphorism of Bādarāyaṇa (*Br. S. 1.1.7*), 'Because liberation is declared to one who is abiding in that (*sat*)', this very same meaning (*viz.*, devotion) is to be given (to the word *niṣṭhā*).<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The sage Gautama was one day offended with his wife and went away to the forest leaving instructions to his son Cirakālika that he should kill her in his absence. The son however deliberated so long on the pros and cons of this command that the father had in the mean time second thoughts and returned in time to countermand it.

<sup>21</sup> The word *niṣṭhā* in the phrase *tanniṣṭhasya* and the word *saṁsthā* originate from the same root, *viz.*, *sthā*. Hence the words mean the same thing.

### तयोपक्षयाच्च ॥ ५ ॥

5. And because (knowledge) is weaker than that (*viz.*, devotion).

तथा भक्त्या मुक्तिं प्रति ज्ञानमुपक्षीणं यस्मात् । चकार उक्तयुक्ति-  
समुच्चयार्थः । 'देवान् देवयजो यान्ति मद्भक्ता यान्ति मामपि' इत्यादि  
(गीता ७.२३) । तथा प्रह्लादं प्रति भगवद्वाक्यम्—(वि. पु १.२०.२०)

यथा त निश्चलं चतो मयि भक्तिसमन्वितम् ।

तथा त्वं मत्प्रसादेन निर्वाणमापि यास्यसि ॥ इति स्थितम् ।

Because, with respect to the attainment of liberation, knowledge is weaker than devotion—(this is the purport of the aphorism). The particle *ca* ('and') signifies that this argument is in addition to those already given.<sup>22</sup> For instance it is said in the *Gītā* (7.23) : 'The worshippers of the gods go to the gods ; My devotees too come to Me.' Similar in purport are the Lord's words to Prahlāda : 'As thy mind endowed with devotion gets steady in Me, so shalt thou through My grace, attain liberation also' (*V.P.* 1.20 20).

<sup>22</sup> That to him who is established in devotion liberation has been assured and that he who is endowed with the knowledge of God need not necessarily abide in Him.

ननु 'तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति, नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय' (इत्रे. उ.३.८.) इत्यत्र वेदान्तफलं मुक्तिः श्रुता ; तद्विरोधेन स्मृतीनामन्यार्थत्वं स्यादिति चेन्न ; अत्रापि तयोपक्षयात् । तथा हि— अतिमृत्युदं न मुक्तौ रूढं किन्तु यस्यां सत्यां मृत्योरतिक्रम इति व्युत्पत्त्या तदपेक्षया यतो भक्तेर्मृत्यतिक्रम इति व्युत्पाद्य भक्तिमेवातिमृत्युपदेनाभिधत्ताम् । उपपद-विभक्त्यर्थपेक्षया कारकविभक्त्यर्थस्य बलवत्त्वात् ।

**Objection :** In the Vedic verse, 'Having known Him a man goes beyond death (*atimṛtyumeti*),—there is no other path going thither' (*Śv.U.*3.8) it has been declared that liberation is the result of knowledge. (Therefore) when a *smṛti* (secondary scripture) goes

against the Śruti (the Veda)<sup>23</sup> it has to be interpreted in a different way.

**Reply :** No; because even there (*i.e.*, in the passage quoted from the Veda) knowledge is weaker than (or inferior to) devotion. To explain: the word *atimṛtyu* is not conventionally used in the sense of 'liberation'. It should then<sup>24</sup> be etymologically derived as 'that the existence of which enables one to go beyond death'. From this standpoint, by arguing that 'because through devotion death is transcended therefore', it is devotion alone that is meant by the word *atimṛtyu*. (This meaning also results from the fact) that the meaning produced by a case-affix (*kāraṅka*) is stronger than that resulting from a complementary construction.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> The Śrutis or the Vedas are considered to be the highest authority in spiritual matters.

<sup>24</sup> A word can have a conventional meaning established by usage and also another by etymological derivation. When the former is not definite there is every justification to accept the latter meaning. The commentator's argument is that the word *atimṛtyu* does not conventionally mean liberation and hence he is free to derive its etymological meaning.

<sup>25</sup> The bone of contention here is whether the word *ati-mṛtyum* should be taken as a single word or should it be split up into two words: *ati* and *mṛtyum*. The commentator prefers the former and bases the etymological derivation on that. Here the verb *eti* governs the accusative case of the word *atimṛtyu* (*i.e.*, *atimṛtyum*). In the latter case, the preposition *ati* governs the word *mṛtyum* (in the accusative case)

and therefore forms a complementary part of the sentence. So either way the word *mṛtyum* assumes the accusative case. But according to Paṇini the former accusative case (*kāraka vibhakti*) is more powerful than the latter accusative case (*upapada-vibhakti*). cf. सहयुक्तप्रधाने (*Pāṇini* 2.3.19). Hence the former standpoint (of taking it as a single word) is preferable.

The way our commentator Svapneśvara has extracted the meaning of 'devotion' out of the word 'atimṛtyum' is indeed ingenious ! Let us examine that quotation from the Śvetāśvataropaniṣat putting it back in its proper context. After describing the Lord of the universe as the great Magician in the first six verses of the third chapter, the seventh verse ends with the words 'ईंशं ते ज्ञात्वाऽमृता भवन्ति' ('having *known* that Lord they become immortal'). Then begins our verse, the full text of which is : वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् । तमेष विदिःवाऽति मृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽथनाय ' ॥ ('I have *known* that great Person of the hue of the sun and who is beyond darkness...') Continuing, in the tenth-verse, the upaniṣad says again ; 'य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति ' ('Those who know that they become immortal.') So it is very clear that the upaniṣad says all through that immortality is attained by *knowing* God. Consequently, the simplest and most direct method would be to break the words *atimṛtyum eti* and reconstruct the sentence as : *mṛtyum atyeti* 'transcends death'.

तेषामहं समुद्धर्ता मृत्युसंसारसागरात् ।

भवामि न चिरात्पार्थ मय्यावेशितचेतसाम् ॥ (गीता १२.७)

इत्यादिना भक्तितो मृत्यतिक्रमप्राप्तेः मन्त्रश्च भवति—

व्यम्बकं यजामाहे सुगन्धि पुष्टिवर्धनम् ।

उर्वारुकमिव बन्धनान्मृत्योर्मुक्षीय माऽमृतात् ॥

(का.सं. ५.७.५९.१२ ; ते. सं. ८.६) इति ।



अत्र यजनं भक्तिः, तथैव तत्कल्पन्याख्यानात् । न चास्यां श्रुतौ भक्तेरस-  
न्निधानं मुक्तावपि तुल्यत्वात् । तस्मादनपायिश्रुत्या ज्ञानस्योपक्षय एव  
प्रतीयत इति ॥ ५ ॥

(There is also another reason for interpreting the word *atimṛtyu* as devotion): From the verse (in the *Gītā* wherein it is said), 'For those whose mind is set on Me, verily do I become ere long—O Pārtha—, the Saviour out of the ocean of deadly 'saṃsāra' (12.7), it is seen that death is transcended through devotion (to the Lord). To the same effect there is a Vedic hymn: 'We worship the Three-eyed One, of graceful fragrance, the augments of prosperity; like the cucumber from its stalk, may I be delivered from the bondage of death, but not from immortality' (*R.V.* 5.7. 59. 12; also *Tai. S.* 8 6). Here the word 'worship' (*yajana*) means devotion, because it has been interpreted that way in the *Kalpa*.<sup>26</sup> The non-occurrence of the word *bhakti* in this Vedic passage (should not raise any difficulty) because this applies equally to the word *mukti* (liberation) also (which is not found directly mentioned either). Therefore it is clearly seen that (even) from the eternal Veda itself, knowledge is inferior to devotion.

<sup>26</sup> 'Āpastamba's *kalpa* directs that priests, as they recite these words, are to toss the baked flour cakes into the air, and to wish aloud to receive them from Bhaga, the deity who presides over good fortune. Svapneśvara seems to connect *bhaga* with *bhakti*' (Quoted from E. B. Cowell's translation, P. 12.)

ननु तथाऽपि भक्ते रागरूपत्वे किं कारणम् ?— इत्यपेक्षायामाह—

It may still be asked, 'Why should devotion be defined as a form of affection?' To meet this objection (the author replies) :

द्वेषप्रतिपक्षभावाद्रसशब्दान्च रागः ॥ ६ ॥

6. (Devotion is a form of) affection because it is opposed to hatred and also because (the Veda uses) the expression *rasa* ('taste') (with regard to it).

भक्तिः खलु राग एव भवितुमर्हति । कुतः ? द्वेषविरोधित्वात् लोके हि द्वेष्टाऽयं भक्तोऽयामिति मिथो विरुद्धधर्मवति व्यवहियते । तत्र द्वेषविरोधी च राग एव प्रसिद्धो न ज्ञानादिः । एवञ्च वैष्णवे भगवति शिशुपालस्य द्वेषानुबन्धमभिधाय 'अयं हि भगवान् कीर्तितः संस्मृतश्च द्वेषानुबन्धेनापि अखिलसुरासुरदुर्लभं कलं प्रयच्छति किमुत सम्यग्भक्तिमताम् । (वि. पु. ४.१५.१२) इत्युक्तम् । तथा चात्रिस्मृतौ—

विद्वेषादपि गोविन्दं दमघोषात्मजः स्मरन् ।

शिशुपालो गतः स्वर्गं किं पुनस्तत्परायणः ॥ इति ॥

तत्रापि द्वेषविरोधित्वेन भक्तेरभिधानात् । तथा च गीतासु (१६.१८-१९)—

मामात्मपरदेहेषु प्रद्विष तोऽभ्यसूयकाः ॥

तानहं द्विषतः क्रूरान् संसारेषु नराधमन् ।

क्षिपाम्यजसमशुभानासुरीष्वेव योनिषु ।

आसुरीं योनिमापन्ना मूढा जन्मनि जन्मनि

मामाप्राप्यैव कौन्तेय ततो यान्त्यधमां गतिम् ॥ इति ।

Devotion deserves to be defined as an affection alone. Why? Because it is opposed to hatred. It is a well-known fact in the world that the two expressions 'He hates', 'He is devoted' are applied to persons of opposite temperaments. There, it is affection that is recognized as the opposite of hatred and not knowledge etc. That is why after describing Śiśupāla's uninterrupted hatred for Viṣṇu (*i.e.*, Śrīkṛṣṇa) the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* goes on to say: 'This Divine Lord, even if named or remembered with uninterrupted hatred, will confer the boon that is hard to be obtained even by gods and demons. How much more will He reward those who possess perfect devotion?' (4.15.12). This has been corroborated in the *Atrismṛti* also: 'Thinking of Govinda even out of hatred, Śiśupāla, the son of Damaghoṣa, attained heaven. Then, what to say about him who is devoted to Him?'<sup>27</sup> Even here it is devotion that is described as the opposite of hatred. Similarly we read in the *Gītā* (16.18-20) also: 'These malignant people who hate Me (the self within), in their own bodies and those of others—these malicious and cruel evildoers, most degraded of men, I hurl perpetually into the wombs of the demons only, in these worlds. Obtaining the demoniac wombs, and deluded birth after birth, not attaining Me, they thus fall, O son of Kunti, into a still lower condition.'

<sup>27</sup> A curious view is sometimes put forward that God is attained quicker through hating Him than through loving Him. Apparently such a view has been attributed to Nārada himself, another great authority on bhakti: 'यथा वैरानुबन्धेन मर्त्यस्तन्मयता-

मियात् । न तथा भक्तियोगेन ह्यिति मे निश्चिता मतिः ॥' ('It is my firm conviction that the deep absorption that a man obtains through uninterrupted hatred cannot be obtained even through the yoga of love') [*Bhāgavatam* 7.1.26]. And Śiśupāla is the stock example that is often quoted in support of this view. Actually the real motive behind Śiśupāla's apparent hatred was love itself. The story goes that he was the gate-keeper of Lord Viṣṇu at Vaikuṅṭha born as Śiśupāla due to a curse of some sages. Between seven births wherein he would love God and three births wherein he would hate Him and be killed by Him, he chose the latter because it was too much for him to bear separation from His Lord for seven long births ! All statements such as those from the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, *Bhāgavata* or *Aṭṭismṛti* are only negative eulogies. If hatred can do this much, how much more can be achieved through love ! That is what they try to arrive at. God being the inmost self of all, it is impossible to hate Him. Another reason for these scriptures making hatred of God also a virtue is that if at all anger has to be shown let it be towards God so that it is sublimated through that remembrance of God inevitably associated with such a hatred. The whole question has been discussed in a masterly way by Śrī Madhvācārya in his commentary on the *Gītā* 9.12. [See also *Nārada Bhakti Sūtras*, Tr. by Svāmi Tyāgīśānanda. pp. 36–39].

तद्विगोधिनी च भक्तिरीश्वरविषयैवानुक्तिरिति युज्य किञ्च 'रसं ह्यवायं लब्धवानन्दी भवति' (तै. उ. २ ७) इति शब्दाद्ब्रह्मानन्दाविर्भावमुक्तेर्ब्रह्मगोचरस्य रसस्य हेतुताऽवगम्यते । रसश्च रागः—'रसवर्जं रसोऽप्यस्य परं दृष्ट्वा निवर्तते' इत्यादौ (गीता २.५९) प्रसिद्धः । अत्र रसो विषय-रागः । अत एव च (वि.पु. ४.४.४) रामलक्ष्मणादीनां स्वर्लोकरोहण-

मुक्त्वा येऽपि तेषु भगवदंशेष्वनुगणिणः कोशलनगरजानपदास्तेऽपि तन्मन-  
सस्तत्सलोकतामापुरिति साक्षादेव भक्तावनुरागशब्दः प्रयुक्त इति । तस्मा-  
दपि न ज्ञानं किन्त्वनुरागरूपैव भक्तनिश्श्रेयसफलेति ॥

As opposed to this (hatred) it is but proper to describe devotion as an affection towards God. Again, from the Vedic passage, 'Having obtained *rasa*, he becomes full of bliss' (*Tai.U.* 2.7) it is clear that *rasa* is the cause for obtaining liberation which is of the nature of the manifestation of the bliss of Brahman. Actually *rasa* means *rāga* or affection. This is well-known in such verses as, 'But his longing (*rasa*) also ceases, who sees the Supreme' (*Gītā* 2.59). Here *rasa* means the affection or longing for worldly objects. That is why we find (in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*) the word *anurāga* directly used in place of *bhakti*. After describing the ascent to heaven of Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and others it goes on to say : 'The people also of that city of Kośala who had cherished a fervent affection (*anurāga*) for those incarnate aspects of the Lord, having their minds fixed thereon, attained the same world as they had' (4.4.4). For this reason also it is not knowledge but devotion in the form of affection that results in supreme bliss.

ननु द्वेषविरोधित्वं न रागत्वे लिङ्गम्, उदासीनत्वेनानैकान्त्यादिति चेत् । उच्यते—द्वेषकार्यं निवृत्तिस्तद्विरोधिनी प्रवृत्तिरिति । भवती च भक्तानां भजनीयानुवर्तनादौ प्रवृत्तिस्तद्विरोधिना तदनुवर्तनादौ निवृत्ति । एवञ्च कार्यमुखेन विरोधमभिप्रेत्य द्वेषविपक्षेत्युक्तम् । तथा च प्रयोक्तव्यं

भक्तिर्भजनीयगोचाराग्ररूपा तदनुवर्तनादिहेतुहितसाधनताधीभिन्नात्मविशेषगुण-  
त्वाद्यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा द्वेषः । रागोत्कर्षेण तदनुवर्तनाद्युत्कर्षस्य दृष्टत्वाच्च ॥

**Objection :** Opposition to hatred alone cannot be the characteristic of affection, because indifference also satisfies this condition ; and consequently the argument becomes too general.

**Reply :** We shall explain (how it is not so). The effect of hatred is cessation from acts (of kindness etc), whereas the direct opposite of this is action itself. It is seen that devotees engage themselves in action in order to follow the object of their devotion ; and those who are opposed to it cease from such action. That is why, having this opposition as manifested by their respective effects in view, it has been described (in the aphorism) as ‘the opposite of hatred’. Then the argument should be as follows : Devotion is of the form of affection towards its object, because it is a special quality of the soul different from the selfish feeling that this object is the means of attaining one’s own interest. And yet it results in the following of that object. Whatever is not like this, it cannot (be called ‘affection’). For instance, hatred.<sup>28</sup> It is also seen that this following increases in proportion to the increase of affection (for that object).

<sup>28</sup> These arguments can be clarified thus : Devotion is an emotion. It is of the form of love or affection towards its object which may be a person or a principle or even an inanimate object. And this love or affection is actually a

special quality of the soul. It is possible that selfishness may often be the motive force behind this so-called affection, goading him to use that object to further some personal interests. To preclude this possibility it is said that this affection is different from such selfish feeling. Since action normally results from selfish motives, it may be doubted how such an unselfish affection, (*viz.* devotion) will give rise to the following (*anuvartana*) of that object. But that is exactly the nature of such an affection : It is dynamic even though there is no goading force of selfishness behind it. Whatever does not conform to this description cannot be called devotion. That hatred is such, is very clear.

किञ्च यो यस्मिन् भक्तस्तत्र तस्यौदासीन्याभवेऽवगते भक्तिस्तादृ-  
 शानुवर्तनाद्यनुकूलद्वेषविरोधिगुणरूपा, अनुवर्तनहेत्वात्मविशेषगुणत्वाद्वि-  
 ताधीवदिति, हितसाधनताधीत्वबाधसहकारेण परिशेषाद्रागत्वसिद्धिः । किमुत  
 भक्तिमतामित्येतत्कैमुतिकन्यायो विरोधिन्येव द्रष्टव्यः । ‘मां हि पार्थ व्यपाश्रित्य  
 येऽपि स्युः पापयोनयः । किं पुनर्ब्राह्मणा पुण्याः...—’ (गीता ९.३२)  
 इत्यादौ च । एवं ‘मामात्मपरदेहेषु’ (गीता १६.१८) इत्यनेन द्वेषस्य  
 संसारहेतुत्वात् तद्विरोधिगुणो जीवोपाधिपरिहारेण परात्मगोचरो राग एव भक्ति-  
 रूपः संसारनाशहेतुः । एतदेवोक्तं मामप्राप्यैवेति । चक्रात् पुलकादिराग-  
 लिङ्गेनापि रागत्वम् । प्रसिद्धं हि ‘पुलकात्तेन कथयति मय्यनुगमं कपो-  
 लेन’ (अभि. शा. ३) इत्यादौ भक्तेर्गुणान्तरत्वे तु पृथग् लिङ्गताकल्पने  
 गौरवात् । स च रागः केषाञ्चिदिष्टसाधनगज्ञानजन्योऽपि यागादिवदिच्छा-  
 रूप एव । अस्माकं तु प्रीणाभ्यनुरज्यामि नेच्छामीत्यादिप्रतीते रागः पृथ-  
 गेव द्वेषवत् । इच्छया असिद्धमात्रविषयत्वाद्वागस्य सिद्धासिद्धविषयत्वाच्च ।  
 प्रत्युत तस्येच्छात्वादिभ्य प्यत्वकल्पनागौरवाच्चेति दिक् । तस्मान्न तल्लक्षणा-  
 सिद्धिरिति ॥ ६ ॥

And also : whoever is devoted to a particular object—the absence of his indifference towards that being clearly understood—in him will reside such devotion which must be the opposite of hatred and tend to produce a following of that object. This devotion is a special quality of the soul conducive to this following, just like the feeling that such and such an object will be a means of obtaining one's own interest. Thus we conclude that it is an affection but different from the feeling of promoting one's own interest. And again the argument *a fortiori*, 'How much more so, in the case of the devoted ?' can hold good only in the case of a quality opposed to hatred. So do we read (in the *Gītā*): 'For, taking refuge in Me, they also O Pārtha, who might be of inferior births.....(even) they attain to the Supreme Goal. What need to mention holy Brāhmaṇas.....'(9.32-33) etc. So also from the statement 'those who hate Me in their own bodies and those of others' (*Gītā* 16.18) etc., it is clear that hatred (of God) leads to transmigration; and love or devotion, which is its opposite quality, directed towards the Supreme Being effects the destruction of transmigration by eliminating the limiting adjunct (*viz.*, the internal organ) of the individual soul. It is this that has been expressed, in the words 'never finding me' (*Gītā* 16.20) etc. The word *ca* ('and') in the aphorism (gives an additional reason): Even by such signs of earthly love like horripilation etc., (devotion is) an affection. In such passages like '(She) reveals her affection for me through her cheek affected by horripilation' (*Abhi-*



*jñāna-śākuntalam*, Act III), the association of horri-  
pilation with earthly affection is well-known. If  
devotion is to be considered as another quality  
(different from affection) then there would be a need-  
less complication in having to assume a special set of  
characteristic signs for it. Some hold the opinion  
that affection is a kind of 'wish' born out of the  
knowledge that its object will produce a desired end,  
as in the case of a sacrifice etc. But according to us  
affection, like hatred, is a quality different from  
'wish'. This we perceive from such statements as, 'I  
love', 'I have an affection', 'I do not wish' etc.  
Actually 'wish' refers only to what has not been  
attained whereas affection refers to both what is  
attained and what is not. On the other hand to  
conceive of (devotion) as a 'wish' etc. (which are  
already included in its interpretation as 'affection') is  
a round-about way. This summarises our arguments.  
Therefore our definition has not been disproved.

ननु भक्तिः क्रियात्मिका सा च निश्चयसाय न क्षमते, न कर्मणा न  
प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेऽमृतत्वमानशुः' — (तै. आ. १०. १०. २१)  
इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्य इत्याशङ्कां परिहरन्नाह—

It may now be doubted that since devotion  
involves action it cannot lead to supreme bliss as  
instanced by such Vedic statements as : 'Not by action,  
not by progeny nor by wealth but by renunciation  
did some attain immortality' (*Tai. Ā.* 10. 10.21). To  
refute such a doubt the author proceeds to say—

★

### न क्रिया कृत्यनपेक्षणाज्ज्ञानवत् ॥७॥

7. (Devotion) is not an action; because like knowledge it does not depend upon effort.

सा भक्तिर्न क्रियात्क्रिया भवितुमर्हति प्रयत्नानुविधानाभावात् । यत्र प्रयत्नानुविधायि तत्र क्रियात्मकं यथा ज्ञानम् । तद्धि प्रमाणसम्पत्त्यर्थानं न पुरुषेण स्वेच्छया कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा कर्तुं शक्यते । तथा भक्तिरपि । न हि रागिणां प्रमदापुत्रादिविषयिणो पुंश्यापारेण तथा तथा भवति भक्तिः किन्तु पूर्वसुकृतगौणभक्त्यादिसाधनाधीनेति ॥ ७ ॥

This devotion cannot be an action because it does not follow an effort of will.<sup>29</sup> Whatever does not follow an effort of the will that will not be of the nature of action ; for instance, knowledge. Verily does knowledge depend upon the wealth of proper evidence. A man cannot at his pleasure produce it or not, nor can he alter it. Same is the case with devotion also. The affection felt by those in love with a beautiful woman, children etc., cannot be produced in its different manifestations by human exertions alone. But in the case of the devotion (which we are discussing) it depends upon the man's good deeds in his former births, inferior devotion<sup>30</sup> etc.

<sup>29</sup> In interpreting the word *kr̥ti* as an 'effort of the will' Cowell (p.16) quotes the following verse in support : ज्ञानजन्या भवेदिच्छा, इच्छाजन्या भवेत्कृतिः । कृतिजन्या भवेत्चेष्टा चेष्टाजन्या भवेत्क्रिया ॥ 'From knowledge arises desire, from desire volition, from volition conscious exertion of the muscles, and from this, action.'

<sup>30</sup> See the aphorisms from 56 onwards.

अत एव\* फलानन्त्यम् ॥ ८ ॥

8. Hence indeed, it is of inexhaustible result.

यतस्सा न क्रियात्मिकाऽत एव तत्फलस्य निश्श्रेयसस्यानन्तत्वमुपपद्यते ।  
अन्यथा—‘तद्यथेह कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः  
क्षीयते’ (छा उ. ८.१.६) इत्यनेनामृतत्वस्यापि क्षयित्वं प्रसज्येतेति ॥८॥

Because it (*viz.*, devotion) is *not* of the nature of action, for that very reason its result, beatitude, is rightly held to be inexhaustible. Otherwise even immortality would have to come to an end as seen from the statement : ‘Just as here the world gained by work perishes, so too hereafter the world gained, by merit perishes’ (*Ch. U. 8.1.6*).

Aphorism 3 referred to the statement in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* where immortality has been promised to one who is devoted to Brahman. If it is conceded that devotion is also a kind of action, then this result of immortality would also have to perish according to the later statement made in the same Upaniṣad ! This will however cut at the very root of our treatise. Hence devotion is not accepted as a kind of action.

तद्वतः प्रपत्तिशब्दाच्च न ज्ञानमितरप्रपत्तिवत् ॥ ९ ॥

9. And from the use of the word *prapatti* (‘devoted worship’) in the case of one who possesses knowledge, (devotion) is not knowledge ; just as

\* अत एव च (पा.)

(it is not so) in other cases (where the word) *prapatti* is used.

भवति हि भगवद्वाक्यम् (गीता ७.१९)

‘बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवामनां प्रपद्यते ।

वासुदेवस्सर्वमिति स महात्मा सुदुर्लभः ।’ इति ।

ज्ञानवतः प्रपत्तिरुक्ता । भक्तेर्ज्ञानहेतुत्वे नेदमुपपद्यते, इतरप्रपत्तिवदिति । यथा तदनन्तरं ‘कामैस्तैस्तैर्हृत्तज्ञानाः प्रपद्यन्तेऽन्यदेवताः’ (गीता ७. २०) इत्यनेन देवतान्तरप्रपत्तिनिन्दामुखेनैवेश्वरप्रपत्तिस्तूयते । तत्र देवताभक्तेरेव प्रपत्तिशब्देन कथनं न तज्ज्ञानस्य । तस्या एव प्रपत्तेरुभयत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञानादिति । चकाराज्ज्ञानानन्तर्यश्रवणमपि ज्ञानत्वाभावे निदानम् । यथा (गीता १५. १६)

‘यो मामेवमसम्भूढो जानाति पुरुषोत्तमम् ।

स सर्वविद्भूजति मां सर्वभावेन भारत ॥’ इति ।

तथा ‘भजन्त्यनन्यमनसो ज्ञात्वा भूतादिमव्ययम्’ । (९. १३) इति. ‘इति मत्वा भजन्ते मां बुद्धा भावसमन्विताः ॥’ (१०.८) इति च । तस्मान्न ज्ञानात्मिका । यद्यपि रागत्वेनैव ज्ञानभेदः सिद्धस्तथाऽपि भक्तिशब्दो ब्रह्मज्ञाने गौण इति शङ्कानिरासार्थमेतत् ॥

There is the Lord’s saying in support of this : ‘At the end of many births the man of knowledge becomes devoted to Me, realising that Vāsudeva is everything. Such a great soul is very rare to find (*Gītā* 7.19). Here ‘devoted worship’ (*prapatti*) has been attributed to a man of knowledge. This would not have been possible if devotion were the cause of

knowledge (as opposed to our standpoint), just as (we also see) in other cases (where the same word) *prapatti* is similarly used, For example, immediately after this verse, by the statement 'Others again, deprived of discrimination by various desires devote themselves to other gods' (*Gītā* 7.20), devoted worship to the Supreme God is praised through blaming devotion to other gods. Here, it is devotion to gods that is meant by the word *prapatti* and not knowledge pertaining to them ; because it is only this sense that can be recognized in the word *prapatti* used in both the places. By the use of the word *ca* ('and') (in the aphorism), it is indicated that the statement in the *Gītā* mentioning the subsequence of devotion to knowledge should also be taken as another reason for devotion not being knowledge. Thus we read (in the *Gītā*): 'He who, free from delusion, thus knows Me as the Supreme Puruṣa, he, knowing all, worships Me as the All-being, O descendant of Bharata' (15.19). And also : 'Knowing Me to be the origin of beings and immutable, worship Me with a single mind' (*ibid.*13); and again : 'Thus thinking, the wise worship Me filled with rapture' (*ibid.* 10.8). Therefore devotion is not of the nature of knowledge. Even though, from the very fact of its being an affection, its difference from knowledge is established, this discussion has been necessary to clear the doubt that the word 'devotion' may mean, in a secondary sense, the knowledge of Brahman.

इदं तु चिन्त्यते—मगवद्गीतावाक्यानि न शब्दविधया वेदवत्प्रमाणम् । किन्तु भारते स्मृतित्वेन । तथा च कथं शब्दादिति निर्देशः ?

अत्रैकेऽनुमितस्रब्दादिति व्याचक्षते । अत्रोच्यते — अदृष्टार्थं कृत्वा भगवद्वाक्य-  
त्वमेव वेदत्वं तच्च जीतास्वप्यविशिष्टम् । अत एव भगवद्गीतासूपनिष-  
त्स्विति दृश्यते । केवलं त एव श्लोका व्यासेन निबद्धाः । तथा च  
पुराणान्तरम्—

‘गीता सुगीता कर्तव्या किमन्यैः शास्त्रविस्तरैः ।  
या स्वयं पञ्चनामस्य मुखमन्नाद्विनिस्तृता ॥’

Here a little discussion is necessary. The state-  
ments in the *Bhagavadgītā* not being inspired (like the  
Vedas) cannot be taken as direct authority, but only  
as secondary authority since the *Gītā* is a part of the  
*Mahābhārata* which is a *smṛti* (a secondary scripture).  
This being the case, how can the aphorism declare  
*śabdāt*<sup>31</sup> (‘by the word’)? Here some explain it as  
‘by the inferred word’.<sup>32</sup> (We however have) this to  
say : Whatever is uttered by a divine being with  
respect to things unseen, that itself constitutes the  
Veda. And this characteristic is not wanting in the  
*Gītā* also. That is why the colophon of the *Gītā* is  
seen to run thus : *iti bhagavadgītāsu upaniṣatsu* (‘In  
the *Bhagavad Gītā* which is upaniṣad’) Those very  
verses (uttered by the Lord) have been recorded by  
Vyāsa.<sup>33</sup> And another purāṇa declares thus : ‘The  
*Gītā* which itself issued from the lotus-mouth of  
Padmanābha, is to be attentively recited. What need  
is there of other long compilations of śāstras?’

<sup>31</sup> The word *śabda* usually indicates the Veda. The  
use of this word with respect to the *Gītā* shows that Śaṅḍilya  
considers it as equal to the Veda. But it is not actually so.  
Hence the doubt.

<sup>32</sup> It is to be inferred that whatever is in an inspired book of tradition like the *Gītā* must be found somewhere in the *Veda*. This is their argument.

<sup>33</sup> *Manusmṛiti* (8. 255) uses the word 'mibadhāiyāt' to indicate recording in writing, what has been uttered by others.

न च शूद्राणामश्रवणप्रसङ्गः, भारतश्रवणाभ्यनुज्ञानेनैव तदुपपत्तेः  
प्रणवादिस्त्रुत्यादिवत् । तद्विहायेति चेन्न, लक्षताऽपरिपूर्तेः । तथा  
चोक्तमाचार्यैः

‘तानेव वैदिकान् मन्त्रान् भारतादिनिवेशितान् ।

स्वाध्यायनियमं हित्वा लोकबुद्ध्या प्रयुञ्जते ॥’ इति ॥९॥

इत्याचार्यस्वप्नेश्वरविरचिते शाण्डिल्यशतसूत्रीयभाष्ये प्रथमाध्यायस्य  
प्रथममाहिकम् ॥१॥

The contingency of the śūdras not being allowed to hear it <sup>34</sup> also does not arise, because that has been settled by the general permission (given to all castes) to hear the *Mahābhārata*, similar to the one with respect to the passages praising *Om* etc.

**Objection :** We say that the permission excludes the *Gītā* portion.

**Reply :** Not so, because without the *Gītā* the well-known sum-total of one lakh verses would not be completed. That is why the teachers have declared : ‘Those very mantras of the Vedas, inserted in the *Bhārata* etc., they use in a secular sense, omitting the rules of their private reading.’

*Thus ends the first section (āhnikā) of the first chapter of the commentary on the hundred Aphorisms of Śāṇḍilya composed by the most learned teacher Svapneśvara.*

<sup>34</sup> Titular brāhmaṇas, women and śūdras are prohibited from hearing the Vedas. If the Gītā is given the same status as the Vedas, then this prohibition would apply to it also. But it is an extremely important work on devotion ; and the sage Śāṇḍilya relies on it so much that its reading or hearing cannot be denied to the devotees. The sage himself says that in devotion there is no consideration of caste etc. Hence the discussion raised here is valid.



## SECTION II

एवममृतं प्रत्यन्वथासिद्धायां भक्तौ लक्ष्मिनायां ज्ञानयोगभक्तीनाम-  
ङ्गमथ नभावविवेकाय द्वितीयाहिकस्यारम्भः ॥

Having thus proved that devotion is the direct cause of immortality this second section is now begun to show that devotion is the prime means to which knowledge (*jñāna*) and concentration (*yoga*) are subservient.

सा मुख्येतरापेक्षितत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

10. This (devotion) is the principal means, because the others depend upon it.

आहिकसमाप्तावुक्तस्य पुनः स्मरणाय 'सा' इति निर्देशः । सा परा भक्तिर्मुख्या प्रधानम्, इतरैरात्मज्ञानयोगादिभिः स्वोपकार्यतयाऽपेक्षितत्वादित्यर्थः । छान्दोग्ये 'यो वै भूमा तत्सुखम्' (७. २३) इत्याद्युपक्रम्याम्नायते—'आत्मैवेदं सर्वमिति स वा एष एवं पश्यन्नेवं मन्वान एवं विजानन्नात्मरतिरात्कीड आत्ममिथुन आत्मनन्दः स स्वराड् भवति' (७. २५. २) इति, तदात्मरतिरूपायाः परभक्तेः पश्यन्निति दर्शनप्रियत्वादिभ्रमनिरासमुखेनाङ्गं भवति । यथा दण्डी प्रेषमन्वाह, प्राचीनावीती दोहयति, अभिजानन् जुहोति, धनवान् सुखवान् इत्यादौ दण्डाद्यङ्गं तथा दर्शनमपि रतेरङ्गं मनन-

विज्ञानयोरुक्तप्रदर्शनार्थतया न्यायप्राप्तयोरनुवादः । एवमात्मक्रीड दे गतिनैवत्या-  
दर्थप्राप्तोऽनुवाद एव, अन्यथा रत्युद्देशेन दर्शनादिविधौ दर्शनाद्युद्देशेन वा रत्या-  
दिविधौ वाक्यानि भिद्येरन् । तस्मात् 'शेषः परार्थत्वत्' (पू. मी. ३.१.२)  
इतिन्यायाद्दर्शनमङ्गमिति । अत एव भगवान्मनुरपि (म. भा. शा. १९४.४६)–

‘यस्त्यक्त्वा प्राकृतं कर्म नित्यमात्मरतिर्मुनि ।

सर्वभूतात्मभूतात्मा स्याच्चेत्परतमा गतिः ॥’ \*

इत्यनेनात्मरतेः प्राधान्यमाहेति ॥ १० ॥

The word ‘this’ has been used to remind the reader once again of what was mentioned at the close of the last section. This highest form of devotion is the principal means since others, viz., knowledge of the soul, concentration etc.’ need its assistance (in their fulfilment). After the statement ‘That which is limitless, is felicity’ (7.23) the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* proceeds thus : ‘The ātman is all this. Seeing thus, thinking thus, knowing thus, he becomes devoted to the ātman, rejoicing in the ātman, mated to the ātman, having his happiness in the atman, he becomes the lord of himself’ (7.25.2). Here the idea of ‘sight’ as expressed by the phrase ‘seeing thus’, becomes subsidiary to the ‘highest devotion’— which itself is of the nature of finding happiness in the ātman—removing the delusion that the ātman is not lovable etc. For instance, in such sentences as : ‘The staff-bearer (*i.e.* the ascetic) repeats the *praiṣa mantra*

\* सर्वभूतःत्मभूतस्मात्स गच्छेदुत्तमां गतिम् ॥ (पा.)

following his guru', Wearing the sacred thread reversed, he causes the cow to be milked', 'Knowing, he performs sacrifice', Being wealthy he is happy' etc., the words 'staff' etc., are subsidiary. So too here, 'seeing' is subsidiary to devotion (to the ātman). Since it was relevant to the context 'thinking' and 'knowing' have also been added to strengthen the (main point) already described. Similarly the repetition of 'rejoicing in the ātman' etc. is quite to the point, because wherever there is devotedness (*rati*), rejoicing (*krīḍā*) would also be there. Otherwise the sentence would have to be split up meaning either 'seeing for the sake of devotedness' or 'devotedness for the sake of seeing'.<sup>1</sup> Therefore 'seeing' is subsidiary (to 'devotedness') according to the well-known rule : '(It is) subsidiary because it subserves another thing as its end (*Pū. M.*, 3.1.2). That is why the venerable Manu also declares the excellence of one devoted to the ātman, in the following words : If a person gives up worldly duties and becomes a sage ever devoted to the ātman, becoming himself the soul of all beings, attains the Highest state.' (*Mbh. ś.* 194.46)

<sup>1</sup> According to the doctrine of this treatise, devotion is the main thing and other things are subsidiary to it. The commentator has tried to prove this with the support of the statement from the Chāndogya. Any interpretation other than what is given by him would necessitate the splitting up of the original sentence whereby the clauses would not be consecutive attributes of one and the same subject. Or it may even result

in the opposite of what the treatise wants to prove, as in the case of the second alternative !

प्रकरणाच्च\* ॥ ११ ॥

11. And from the subject-matter also.

प्रकरणं रतेरेव, फलवत्त्वात्, तस्यास्तत्प्रकरणस्थं दर्शनमङ्ग  
भवितुमर्हताति ॥११॥

And the subject-matter is devotedness (or devotion) because it has been presented as the result (*phala*). Therefore 'seeing' which is included in this context has to be only subsidiary.

दर्शनफलमिति चेन्न, तेन व्यवधानात् ॥ १२ ॥

12. If it is objected that (immortality) is the result of 'seeing' we refute it, because the pronoun *tad* ('he') is interposed.

अथ दर्शनस्यैव फलं स्वाराज्यलक्षणममृतत्वम्; तथा च तस्यैव प्रकरणमिति, वैपरीत्यमिति चेत्; न, 'तेन' तच्छब्देन व्यवधानात् । 'स स्वराड् भवति' इत्यत्र तच्छब्देन सन्निकृष्टात्मरतिमानेवोपस्थाप्यते न विप्रकृष्टः पश्यन्निति, व्यवहितोपस्थितौ कारणाभावात् । प्रकरणमेव कारणमिति चेत् : न, अन्योन्याश्रयात् ॥१२॥

**Objection :** But then, immortality defined as being 'the lord of himself' is the result of 'seeing'

\* प्रकरणात् (पा.)

only. Therefore that itself is the subject-matter ; and consequently things are exactly the opposite of what you maintain !

**Reply :** Not so, because the pronoun *tad* ('he') is interposed in between. 'He becomes the lord of himself.' Here by the word 'he', it is the person 'who is devoted to the ātman' that is represented because of proximity and not the one who is 'seeing' because he is remote. There is no reason why the remote one should be brought into close contiguity.

**Objection :** The context itself is the reason !

**Reply :** No, because in that case the logical fault of mutual dependence <sup>2</sup> (*i.e.*, reasoning in a circle) would result !

<sup>2</sup> The objector tries at first to prove that the context belongs to 'seeing' as the subject matter because being 'the lord of himself' is only its result. When this argument is refuted by the theory of proximity, he now tries to wriggle out by stating that the reason for connecting the word *sah* with the distant word *paśyan* is that the subject-matter is 'seeing' which itself has not been proved but disputed ! This would result in the well-known fallacy of 'mutual dependence' or 'reasoning in a circle', thus : (1) Since his becoming 'the lord of himself' (which is the same as attainment of immortality) is due to 'seeing', the topic under discussion is 'seeing'. (2) Because the topic under discussion is 'seeing' the word *sat* is to be connected with 'seeing'.

## दृष्टत्वाच्च ॥ १३ ॥

13. Since it is seen so in the world also.

दृष्टं हि लोके सौन्दर्यादिज्ञानस्य तरुण्यास्तरुणे रतिहेतुत्वं न तु स्तेर्ज्ञानहेतुत्वमिति दृष्टोपकारकत्वादप्यङ्गत्वमवसीयते । दृष्टञ्च प्रकृते-  
र्निष्करणत्वारूपमहिमत्वाप्रियत्वादिज्ञानं मनोमालिन्यकारणं मृतेषु करुणाबहुला-  
व्याहृतैश्वर्यातिशयितरूपाश्रय आत्मेति ज्ञानान्मालिन्यनिवृत्तिस्ततः परा भक्ति-  
रिति । अत एव गीयते (गीता ५. १७) —

तद्बुद्धयस्तदात्मानस्तन्निष्ठास्तत्परायणाः ।

मच्छून्यपुनरावृत्तिं ज्ञाननिर्धृतकरुमषाः ॥ इति ।

तथाऽऽयुर्वेदेऽपि 'धीर्नैर्यात्मादिविज्ञानं मनोदोषौषधं परम्' (अष्टाङ्गहृदयम्  
१.२३) इति ॥१३॥

It is seen in the world also that the knowledge of a young man's beauty, causes love for him in a woman's mind<sup>3</sup> But love does not cause knowledge. Hence we conclude that knowledge is subsidiary (to affection) as it is seen to aid the latter. And again it is seen that the knowledge that 'nature' is merciless, of limited power, unpleasant etc., causes corruption in the minds of beings whereas the knowledge that the ātman is the repository of infinite mercy, unlimited power, beauty *par excellence* etc., destroys that corruption. And from that arises the highest devotion. That is why the *Gītā* says : 'Those who think of the Supreme, whose souls are bound up in Him, who abide in Him, who find their refuge in Him— they go thither

from where there is no return, having all their sins removed by knowledge' (5.17). Similarly the Āyurveda also says : 'Thought, courage and knowledge of the ātman etc.,—these are the best medicine for the mind's ailings' (*Aṣṭāṅgahrdayam* 1.23).

<sup>3</sup> It is wellknown that Damayanti's love for Nala was produced this way.

अत एव तदभावाद्बलवीनाम् ॥ १४ ॥

14. For that very reason (the liberation) of the milk-maids, (even) without the help of knowledge, (has been declared).

यत एव ज्ञानं दृष्टोपकारकमङ्गमत एव दृष्टोपकारं निरस्य मनोमालि-  
न्यादिबाधात् प्रधानभगवदनुरागमात्रेण बलवीनां मुक्तिः स्मर्यते । यथा  
(वि. पु. ५.१३.१४-१५)

तच्चिन्ताविपुलाह्लादक्षीणपुण्यचाया सती ।

तदप्राप्तमहादुःखविलीनाशेषपातका ॥

चिन्तयन्ती जगत्सूति परब्रह्मस्वरूपिणम् ।

निरुच्छ्वासतया मुक्तिं गताऽन्या गोपकन्यका ॥ इति ।

Because knowledge is seen to be a subsidiary aim, for that very reason the smṛti rejecting all visible aids declares that the milk-maids attained liberation solely by devotion to the Supreme Lord which destroyed their impurities of the mind. We read : One milk-

\* अत एव तद्भावाद् (पा.)

maid, having all her merits cancelled<sup>4</sup> by the intense rapture of thinking about Him and all her sins expiated by the agony of not obtaining Him,—meditating on Him, the cause of the world, identical with the Supreme Brahman, — ceasing to breathe, obtained liberation' (V.P. 5.13 14-15).

<sup>4</sup> Like sins, merits also cause bondage by forcing the soul to take birth, to exhaust them. Hence anyone desirous of liberation must get rid of both.

अत्र सुखदुःखलिङ्गेनानुरागोऽनुमीयते तेन मुक्तिरिति वाक्यार्थः ।  
द्वारबाधादनवहतकृष्णलेनापि कर्मता फलसिद्धिरिव तासां रागान्मुक्तिस्त-  
दप्यवगम्यते ज्ञानमङ्गमेव । प्रधानत्वे तु तदभावे फलं न स्यात् । चिन्ता च न  
ब्रह्मात्मैक्यज्ञानं तत्कारणश्रवणमननाद्यसम्भवात् । किन्वनुरागनियतानुस्मृतिरेव  
न चायमर्थवादः, अपूर्वार्थत्वात् सन्निधौ विध्यभावाच्चेति ॥ १४ ॥

Here (the presence) of devotion<sup>5</sup> is to be inferred from the signs of pleasure and pain ; and through that devotion, liberation. This is the purport of the passage. Just as the fruit of the sacrifice is obtained by offering unhusked golden berries thus obviating all need for any intermediate operation, so in the case of the milk-maids also liberation is produced directly from devotion.<sup>6</sup> Hence it is understood that knowledge is only a subsidiary means. If knowledge were the chief means, the result (of liberation) could not have been produced in its absence.<sup>7</sup> Neither can it be said that the milk-maid's intense thinking (*cintā*) about Him should be taken as the knowledge of the



identity of ātman and Brahman; because hearing (*śravaṇa*), pondering (*manana*) etc. the (well-known) causes of such knowledge were impossible in this case.<sup>8</sup> Hence it (*cintā*) should be interpreted only as 'remembrance bound up with affection'. Nor can this be explained as a case of eulogy (*arthavāda*);<sup>9</sup> since the subject is new and also since there is no direct 'injunction' (*vidhi*) nearby.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>5</sup> And not knowledge.

<sup>6</sup> Knowledge removes impurities in the mind causing devotion which in turn gives liberation. But devotion cultivated directly—as happened in the case of the milk-maids—will also burn up these impurities and give the fruit of liberation directly. When the latter is there, there is no need for the former. To illustrate this there is an allusion to the statement in the work *Nyāyamālavistara* 10.1.1). In a certain Vedic rite an oblation of boiled rice is made, for which dehusking is first necessary. But if an offering of golden berries is made instead the result is obtained immediately without the intermediate trouble of dehusking.

<sup>7</sup> Because these milk-maids did not have knowledge and yet attained liberation.

<sup>8</sup> According to the *śāstras* on knowledge it can come *only* through the three steps of *śravaṇa* (hearing), *manana* (pondering) and *nididhyāsana* (meditation).

<sup>9</sup> The contention of the objector is that even though knowledge is really intended, devotion has been brought in only to illustrate it. Statements of high praise whose aim is

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persuasive enforcement of a previous injunction are called technically *arthavāda*.

<sup>10</sup> Arthavāda will follow only when that particular topic is already introduced or when there is a direct injunction near-by whose enforcement is necessary. In this case neither the topic of knowledge nor an injunction enforcing it are near at hand. Hence the argument fails.

इदानीं श्रुतिविरोधेन प्रकरणस्थानलिङ्गबाधामाक्षिप्य समाधीयते ।

Now an objection is raised that the proofs so far adduced based on 'subject matter', 'relative position' and 'sign' are nullified because they go against the *śruti*, and then refuted (in the following aphorism)—

भक्त्या जानातीति चेन्नाभिज्ञप्त्या\* साहाय्यात् ॥१५॥

15. If it is said that he knows through devotion we deny it ; because it is through 're-cognition' aided by (devotion that he knows).

यथा श्रुतम् (गीता १८. ५५)—

‘भक्त्या मामभिजानाति यावान् यश्चास्मि तत्त्वतः ।

ततो मां तत्त्वतो ज्ञात्वा विशते तदनन्तरम् ॥ इति ।

तत्र 'ऐन्द्र्या गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठते' (तै सं. १.५.८) इतिवत् कारकश्रुत्या बलीयस्या भक्तेर्ज्ञानहेतुत्वमवसीयते । यद्यपि दृष्टत्वादित्यनेन दृष्टोपकारे प्रत्यक्षगभ्ये न श्रुतेरवकाशः, तथाऽपि ब्रह्मविषयिण्या रतेर्ब्रह्मविषयज्ञानोपकार्यत्वं

\* चेन्नाभिज्ञया (पा.)

न प्रत्यक्षगम्यम् । किन्तु तरुण्यादे रतौ तथा दर्शनेन ब्रह्मगोचरायामप्यनुमा-  
तव्यम् । तथा च लिङ्गत्वे पर्यवसानादिति चेत् ; न दोषः । तथा हि  
यदि केवलं जानातीति वदेत्, न त्वेवम् । किन्त्वभिजानातीति । अभिज्ञा  
पूर्वज्ञातज्ञानमुच्यते । — तथा भक्त्युपकारि पूर्वज्ञानं तत्फलरूपभक्तिप्रवर्तकम् ।  
अनन्तरं यावत् तद्दार्ढ्यं भक्त्यैवाभिज्ञप्तिभावेनापेक्ष्यते व्रीह्यववहननेनावघातव-  
दिति । कार्यसाहाय्यमुक्तं ततो ज्ञानदार्ढ्येन भक्तिदार्ढ्ये सति विशत इति ।  
तस्मान्नेयं श्रुतिः किन्तु न्यायप्राप्तानुवाद इति ॥ १५ ॥

**Objection :** It is declared (*śrutam*) (in the *Gītā*) thus : ‘By devotion he really knows (*abhi-jānāti*) Me, how great and what I am. Then, having known Me in reality, he forthwith enters into Me’ (18.55). Just as in the sentence ‘he draws near to the *gārha-patya* fire with an *Aindrī* Verse’<sup>11</sup> (*Tai. S.* 1.5.8) here also by the rule that the meaning produced by a case-ending is more powerful, (whether in Vedas or in secular writings), it is to be decided that devotion causes knowledge. Of course, the aphorism ‘since it is seen so in the world also’ (13), (was adduced as a proof that knowledge leads to affection). Since it was a case of direct perception due to visible experience, there was no need to refer to the *śruti*. But here perception fails to enlighten us how far devotion to Brahman is to be aided by knowledge. [Hence we have to depend upon the statement of the *śruti* (*i.e.*, the *Gītā*) and arrive at the above-mentioned conclusion.]<sup>12</sup>

**Counter Objection :**<sup>13</sup> Since it has been seen so in the case of the young woman’s love, why not infer similarly in the case of Brahman also ?

**Objector's reply :** In that case all your arguments would end in a 'sign' (*liṅga*) leading to an inference (which would be nullified by a direct statement of the *Gītā* quoted above !)

**Reply :** There is nothing wrong in our arguments. Your objections would have been valid if the *Gītā* had simply declared 'cognises', 'knows' (*jānāti*) But it is not so. On the other hand, it uses the term 're-cognises' (*abhi-jānāti*). By the word *abhijñā* it is the knowledge of something already known that is implied. Therefore, the first knowledge which was conducive to devotion, resulted in the promotion of devotion. Then onwards devotion seeks to aid knowledge through repetition in the form of *abhijñā* ('re-cognition' or 'revised knowledge') until it becomes firmly rooted. This process is similar to the repeated acts of shelling to separate grains of rice. (The latter part of the) quotation (from the *Gītā*) elucidates this help (rendered by devotion to knowledge) : 'then' means 'after devotion has been strengthened through the strengthening of knowledge', 'he enters.' Therefore this cannot be called a *Śruti* but only a confirmatory repetition (*anuvāda*)<sup>14</sup> of what is got as a corollary.

<sup>11</sup> The word *aindryā* is in the instrumental case thereby implying that its repetition is subservient to the action of moving near the fire.

<sup>12</sup> To determine which is *pradhāna* (primary) and which is *aṅga* (subsidiary), *Mīmāṃsā* arranges the proofs in the following order wherein each is of superior force to the succeeding

one : (1) *Śruti*—a definite statement of the text ; (2) *Liṅga*—a 'sign' or the sense of the words leading to an inference ; (3) *Vākya*—'the being mentioned in the same sentence thereby establishing connection ; (4) *Prakaraṇa*—context or subject-matter ; (5) *Sthāna*—relative position or order and (6) *Samākhyā*—'title.' (*Vide Pū. M.* 3.3.1 to 14).

The objector's contention is that the siddhāntin is trying to establish his position based only on *prakaraṇa* (*aph.* 11) *sthāna* (*aph.* 12) and *liṅga* (*aph.* 14) whereas from the direct statement of the *śruti* it is clear that devotion leads to knowledge and hence is subsidiary to it.

<sup>13</sup> This is from the siddhāntin's side.

<sup>14</sup> *Anuvāda* literally means repetition. Technically, it is an explanatory repetition or reference to what has already been mentioned. It applies particularly to any portion of the *Brāhmaṇas* (of the Vedas) which comments on, illustrates or explains a *vidhi* ('injuction') previously laid down and which does not itself lay down any directions.

एतमेवार्थं स्फुटीकारोति—

The same is further elucidated :

प्रागुक्तं च॥ १६ ॥

16. Moreover this has been declared before.

भक्त्या मामित्यस्य पूर्वं 'ब्रह्मभूयाय कल्पते' (गीता १८.५३)  
इत्यभिधाय,

ब्रह्मभूतः प्रसन्नात्मा न शोचति न ऋह्वति ।  
समस्सर्वेषु भूतेषु मद्भक्तिं लभते पराम् ॥

इत्युक्तम् (गीता. १८.५४)। तस्य तु ज्ञातब्रह्मणो ज्ञानप्रयोजनाभावाद्युक्त-  
मनुवादत्वमिति ॥ १६ ॥

Before the words 'through devotion he recognises me' (*Gītā* 18.53), having declared that he becomes fit for becoming Brahman' (*ibid.* 53), it is further said: 'Having become Brahman, attaining peace of mind, he neither grieves nor desires. Feeling perfect equanimity towards all beings he obtains supreme devotion unto Me' (*ibid.* 54). For such an one, who has already known Brahman, there is no need of any assistance from knowledge. Hence our interpretation that it is only an illustrative repetition (*anuvāda*) (and not a fresh declaration of the (*śruti*) is in order.

एतेन विकल्पोऽपि प्रत्युक्तः ॥ १७ ॥

17. By this even the theory of alternatives is rejected.

एतेन ज्ञानस्याङ्गत्वनिर्णयेन ज्ञानभक्तयोरत्र विकल्पपक्षोऽपि प्रत्युक्तो  
निराकृत इति मन्तव्यम् । न ह्यङ्गाङ्गिनोरेकत्र विकल्पो भवतीति । अपि-  
शब्दात्समुच्चयोऽपीति ॥ १७ ॥

\* This aphorism is not found in the text commented upon by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (*Bhakticandrikā*).

By thus setting that knowledge is subservient as a means (to devotion) the view that either of them can possibly be the end, is also refuted. With reference to a single goal the means and the end cannot become alternatives ! By the word *api* ('even'), the theory that both of them can be ends is also (refuted).

देवभक्तिरितरस्मिन् साहचर्यात् ॥ १८ ॥

18. 'Devotion to god' applies to a god other than (the Supreme Being) because of its close association (with the devotion to the teacher).

क्वचिदेवं श्रूयते (श्वे. उ. २३) —

यस्य देवे परा भक्तिर्यथा देवे तथ गुरौ ।

तस्यैते कथिता ह्यर्थाः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः ॥ इति ॥

अत्र देवभक्तिरीश्वरेतरस्मिन् देवे मन्तव्या । कुतः ? गुरुभक्तिसाहचर्यात् । साहचर्यं हि नामृतफलायां भक्तौ घटते । इन्द्रादिदेवतास्त्वाराधिताः शुभवज्ज्ञानफलाय\* भवन्तीति साहचर्यमपि निर्णायकम् । साहचर्यादुल्लङ्घ्यं शब्दबहुक्तयुक्तेरुपष्टम्भकमेतत् ॥ १८ ॥

Somewhere the śruti says : 'He who has supreme devotion towards god, and as towards god, so towards a teacher, to such a great one, all these things so far declared, reveal themselves' (Śv. U. 6.23). Here by the word 'devotion to god' (*deve bhaktih.*),

\* श्रुतफलवज्ज्ञानफलाय (पा.)

the devotion to a god other than the Supreme Lord is meant. Why? Because it is closely associated with the devotion to the teacher. Such close association would be improper in the case of the highest devotion which results in immortality. Gods like Indra when worshipped, will give the fruit of knowledge, just as they give good fortune. (With such an interpretation) the close association (mentioned above) can also become a deciding factor. This is what the close association proves just as the meaning of the word *ulūka*<sup>15</sup> (is proved by the connection of the context). This is just to strengthen the arguments already adduced.

So far it has been proved that *parābhakti* (highest devotion) is with reference to the Supreme Lord only, that it gives immortality as its fruit and that knowledge is always ancillary to it. All arguments against this were also refuted effectively. But now here is a statement from the śruti (quoted above) which seems to contradict this position of the siddhāntin. It appears from this śruti that (1) the highest devotion need not necessarily be towards the Supreme Being but can exist towards a human being like the teacher also, in which case it gets degraded into an ordinary human affection; (2) such a devotion can give a comparatively insignificant result like the revelation of the meanings of certain scriptural passages; in other words devotion can lead to knowledge also! That is why it has become necessary to take this passage in particular and reinterpret it, to fit in with the philosophy of devotion. Here close association or co-existence (*sāhacarya*) with the devotion to the teacher (*gurubhakti*) has become the deciding factor in interpreting the word *deva* as



a god like Indra etc., and *not* the Supreme God. Since *gurubhakti* is ordinary devotion towards a human teacher and since the *parā bhakti* in the text is equated with this, the object of that *parā bhakti* has necessarily to be a minor god like Indra and not the Supreme Being. In this case the predication of an ordinary result for such a devotion (*viz.*, the revelation of the meanings of the scriptural passages) would also be not improper. This is the gist of the whole argument.

This verse occurs towards the end of the sixth chapter of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. Even a cursory glance at the earlier verses will convince anybody that it is the Highest God that is the subject matter and that there is no hope of immortality without knowing Him (*vide* verses 7 to 20). It is strange that the commentator quotes verse 19 (Aph. 1) in support of the doctrine of devotion earlier, wherein the deity is taken to be Supreme Being and interpret a succeeding verse in the same context in a different way! Reading verses 22 to 23 together it occurs that the verse 23 is a eulogy of *gurubhakti*. In that case all this discussion becomes meaningless. Even without this particular aphorism the original thought current will not be disturbed.

<sup>15</sup> *Ulūka* means an owl. It is also the nickname of Kaṇāda, the founder of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Which one of the interpretations is to be given to this word depends upon the context. Similarly whether the word *deva* means the Supreme *Īśvara* or any of the minor gods, also depends upon the *sāhacarya*.

*Bhakticandrikā* gives another interpretation for *ulūkavat*: Even though the owl may be mentioned along with the crow in the group of birds, it represents a different species of birds. Similarly here also the two devotions are different.

### योगस्तूभयार्थमपेक्षणात् प्रयाजवत् ॥ १९ ॥

19. However yoga (concentration) is for both ; because, like the prayāja ceremony it is needed by both.

योगः पुनर्ज्ञानार्थं भक्त्यर्थं च भवति । समाहितमनस्कताया उभाभ्यामपेक्षणात् । ननु 'गुणानां च परार्थत्वादसम्बन्धः समत्वात्स्यात्' (पू. मी. ३.१.२१) इति न्यायात् प्रयानाङ्गं योगः कथमङ्गाङ्गमित्यत आह प्रयाजवदिति । यथा प्रयाजो वाजपेयम्याङ्गं तदीयदीक्षणीयादेरप्यङ्गं तद्वत् । तदङ्गताबोधकप्रमाणाविशेषात् । केवलं ज्ञानार्थं योगानुष्ठानं प्रसङ्गेन भक्तिमुपकरोतीति । एवं विषयवैराग्यमप्युभयार्थं मन्तव्यम् ॥ १९ ॥

Yoga on the other hand is useful to both knowledge and devotion ; because concentration of mind is necessary in both.

\* Prior to this aphorism, the *Bhakticandrikā* text contains three additional ones :

भक्तिः प्रमेया श्रुतिभ्यः ॥९॥

9. Devotion is to be known from the Vedas.

पुराणेतिहासाभ्यांचेति ॥१०॥

10. And also from the *purāṇas* like (*Bhāgavatam*) and *Itihāsas* (like *Mahābhāratam*).

पृथुघ्नवप्रहादाम्बरीषशुकसनकनारदभजनाचाराच्च ॥११॥

11. And also from the worship and conduct of (the sages like) Pṛthu, Prahlāda, Ambariṣa, Śuka, Sanaka and Nāranda.

**Objection :** There is a well-known dictum that ‘subsidiary portions of a sacrifice stand as such on the same level and so cannot be connected with each other’ (*Pū. M.* 3.1.21.) Therefore how can yoga which is subsidiary to the end (devotion) be a subsidiary to another means (knowledge) ?

**Reply :** (It is possible) like the *Prayāja*. The *Prayāja* ceremony is subsidiary to the *Vājapeya* sacrifice as also to the *Dikṣaṇīyā* which is its part.<sup>16</sup> Similarly here also, because the proof which establishes yoga as subsidiary is common to both. Or we may even say that the practice of yoga which was originally undertaken as conducive to knowledge, incidentally aids devotion also. Renunciation of worldly objects must similarly be understood as helpful to both.

<sup>16</sup> *Prayāja* is a fore-offering made before the principal offering. *Dikṣaṇīyā* is a preliminary sacrifice done before commencing the major sacrifice and the sacrificer obtains the competence to observe the vows (*dikṣā*) after this. *Vājapeya* is a major *Somayāga*. It is supposed to give the sacrificer plenty of food (*vāja*) and drink (*peya*.)

ननु ‘ईश्वरप्रणिधानात्’ (यो. सू. १. २३) इति पतञ्जलिस्मरणं  
दुरपह्वं तत्र प्रणिधानाभिधेयस्य भगवद्भजनस्य समाधिसिद्धयर्थत्वमिति कथं  
भक्तेः प्राधान्यमित्यत आह —

**Objection :** Now, there is this traditional teaching of Patañjali which is hard to counteract : ‘Or by devotion to God (*samādhi* is obtained)’ (*Y. S.* 1.23). Here it is meant that devotion, termed as *pranidhāna*,

is conducive to the attainment of *samādhi* (i.e., perfect concentration). Hence how can devotion be the principal thing ?

To answer such an objection, it is now stated :

गौण्या तु समाधिसिद्धिः ॥ २० ॥

20. However, it is by lower form of devotion that perfect concentration is attained.

तत्र प्राणिधानं गौणभक्तिरेव न प्रधानं तथा समाधिसिद्धिरिति स्मृतिविरोधोऽपीति । भवति च वाक्यशेषस्तत्रैव — ‘तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः’ (यो. सू. १.२७), ‘तज्जपस्तदर्थभावनम्’ (यो सू. १.२८) इति । २० ॥

**Reply :** There *praṇidhāna* means the lower form of devotion. That perfect concentration is produced by this does not at all go against the *smṛti* (i.e., the *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali). There itself we have these succeeding aphorisms (which support this interpretation) : ‘His manifesting word is *Om*’ (*Y.S.* 1.27), ‘The repetition of this (*Om*) and meditating on its meaning (is the way)’ (*ibid* 1.28).

*Parābhakti* or the highest devotion is actually the devotion that arises after the realisation of God. *Aparābhakti* or lower devotion, also known as *gaṇṇībhakti* is the means thereof. This latter is of the form of chanting the Lord’s name, singing His glories etc. It is clear that in the sūtras of Patañjali, it is this latter that is meant.

हेया रागत्वादिति चेन्नोत्तमास्पदत्वात् सङ्गवत् ॥२१॥

21. It may be said that (devotion) being an affection must be given up. Not so, because it has the Highest for its object. (The case is) similar to that of company.

योगशास्त्रप्रस्तावादिदं सूत्रम् । योगशास्त्रोक्तरागत्वाविशेषाद्भक्तिरपि मुमुक्षुणा हेयैव । तथा च सूत्रम्— रागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः' (यो. सू. २.३) इति । एवं चेदुच्यते—नैव वाच्यम् । उत्तमास्पदत्वाद्भक्ते परमेश्वरविषयत्वादिति यावत् । न हि रागत्वमात्रेण हेयत्वं किन्तु संसारानुबन्धरागत्वेनैव । यथा सङ्गत्वमात्रेण न त्याज्यता किन्त्वसत्सङ्गत्वेन तद्वत् । तथा चेश्वरभक्तिर्हेया रागत्वादित्यत्र संसारानुबन्धत्वं मोक्षाननुगुणत्वं चोपाधिः । न चासात्त्विकी सा 'यजन्ते सात्त्विका देवान्' (गीता १७.४.) इत्यादिना सात्त्विकत्वकार्तनादिति ॥ २१॥

Since the *yogaśāstra* has been incidentally brought in, this aphorism is being introduced. It may be said that devotion also has to be given up by one seeking liberation since it is non-different from the affection mentioned in the *yogaśāstra*. For instance, the particular aphorism runs thus : '..... attachment, aversion and clinging to life—these are afflictions' (Y.S. 2.3). This is countered thus : This is not a valid objection, because devotion has the highest as its abode. In other words, it has God as its object. It does not become fit to be given up only because it is an affection. Only when that affection becomes connected with mundane existence,

does it become fit to be abandoned. A company need not be given up just because it is a company, but only when it is bad company. Similarly here also. Therefore in the statement, 'Devotion to God must be given up since it is a form of affection' we have to supply the limiting conditions (to make its implications less comprehensive) thus : (when it is) connected with mundane existence or (when it is) not conducive to liberation. However this devotion is not devoid of the quality of goodness as seen from the statement of the *Gītā* : 'Those with the quality of goodness worship the gods' (17.4) etc.

तदेव कर्मिजनियोगिभ्य आधिक्यशब्दात् ॥ २२ ॥

22. This (devotion) is indeed (the highest), because of the declaration of the *śruti* (*i e.*, the *Gītā*) that the (devotee) is superior to the performers of sacrificial acts, the followers of the path of knowledge as also those who practise concentration.

तदेव भजनं मुख्यं तस्या भक्तेर्वा मुख्यत्वम् । एतत्सर्वथैव निश्चितं  
यस्मादेवं शब्द्यते (गीता. ६.४६-४७)—

“तपस्विभ्योऽधिको योगी ज्ञानिभ्योऽपि मतोऽधिकः ।

कर्मिभ्यश्चाधिको योगी तस्माद्योगी भवार्जुन ॥

योगिनामपि सर्वेषां मद्गतेनान्तरात्मना ।

श्रद्धावान्भजते यो मां स मे युक्ततमो मतः ॥ इति ।

अत्र विशेषणानां तत्रादीनामाधिक्यनिबन्धनं विशेष्याणामाधिक्यं क्रमादिति  
मन्तव्यम् न खल्वङ्गस्य मुख्यादाधिक्यमुपपद्यते ; तस्माद्भक्तिः प्रधान-  
मिति ॥ २२ ॥

This devoted service is the highest; or this devotion is the highest. By all means this has been determined to be so, because it has been declared thus : ' The yogi is regarded as superior to the ascetics, also to those who follow the path of knowledge He is also superior to the performers of Vedic rites. Therefore O Arjuna, be thou a yogin ! And of all the yogis, he who with his soul intent on Me, in full belief worships Me, he is considered by Me as the most devoted' (*Gītā* 6. 46,47). Here, it is to be understood that the successive superiority of the subjects caused by the successive superiority of the characteristics like asceticism etc. But, of course, it is impossible that a subsidiary can be superior to the chief. Hence devotion is the principal.

श्रुत्यर्थेनापि तदुत्पत्तिपरिहारार्थं पठति—

In order to counteract the possibility of objections being raised, based even on the (supposed) purport of the śruti, he (now) quotes a passage :

प्रश्ननिरूपणाभ्यामाधिक्यसिद्धेः ॥ २३ ॥

23. Because, the superiority of devotion has been established by question and answer.

अत्र कृत्स्नोऽपि द्वादशाध्याय उदाहरणम् । एवं सततयुक्ता ये  
भक्तास्त्वा पर्युपासते । ये चाप्यक्षरमव्यक्तं तेषां के योगवित्तमाः ॥'  
(गीता १२.१) इति प्रश्न ।

मय्यावेश्य मनो ये मां नित्ययुक्ता उपासते ।  
श्रद्धया परयोपेतास्ते मे युक्ततमा मताः ॥

ये त्वक्षरमनिर्देश्यमव्यक्तं पर्युपासते ।  
सर्वत्रगमचिन्त्यञ्च कूटस्थमचलं ध्रुवम् ॥

सन्नियम्येन्द्रियग्रामं सर्वत्र समबुद्धयः ।  
ते प्राप्नुवन्ति मामेव सर्वभूतहिते रताः ॥

क्लेशोऽधिकतरस्तेषामव्यक्तासत्चेतसाम् ।  
अव्यक्ता हि गतिर्दुःखं देहवद्भिरवाप्यते ॥

ये तु सर्वाणि कर्माणि मयि संन्यस्य मत्पराः ।  
अनन्येनैव योगेन मां ध्यायन्त उपासते ॥

तेषामहं समुद्धर्ता मृत्युसंसारसागरात् ।  
भवामि न चिरात्पार्थ मय्यावेशितचेतसाम् ॥ (गीता १२.२-७)

इति निरूपणम् । ताभ्यां भक्तेः प्राधान्यसिद्धेः नार्थवादत्वमायाति ।  
प्रश्ननिरूपणं हि निर्णयार्थं प्रसिद्धं न स्तुत्यर्थमिति । केवलाङ्गानुष्ठानेन  
क्लेशाधिक्यमेवेति ॥ २३ ॥

Here the whole of the twelfth chapter of the *Gītā*  
is an example in point. The question is : 'Those  
devotees, who, ever steadfast, thus worship Thee,



and those also who worship the Imperishable, the Unmanifested—which of them are better versed in yoga ?' (12.1).

The answer follows : Those who, fixing their mind on Me, worship Me, ever steadfast, and endowed with supreme faith, they in My view, are the best versed in yoga. But those also, who worship the Imperishable, the Indefinable, the Unmanifested, the Omnipresent, the Unthinkable, the Unchangeable, the Immovable, the Eternal ;—having subdued all the senses, even-minded everywhere, engaged in the welfare of all beings,—verily, they reach only Myself. Greater is their trouble whose minds are set on the Unmanifested ; for the goal of the Unmanifested is very hard for the embodied to reach. But those who worship Me, resigning all actions in Me, regarding Me, as the supreme Goal, meditating on Me with single-minded yoga ;—for these whose mind is set on Me, verily I become ere long, O Pārtha, the Saviour out of the ocean of the mortal saṁsāra' (*ibid* verses 2–7). Since the superiority of devotion to (knowledge) is thus established by this question and the answer thereof, the passage cannot be considered as a mere eulogy (*arthavāda*). It is wellknown that a dialogue in the form of question and answer is aimed at setting a doubt aside and not for mere eulogy (of anything). The point to be noted here is that the practice of the subsidiary (knowledge) only (without the primary *i. e.*, devotion) entails greater hardship.

श्रद्धाप्रसङ्गाद्भक्तेः श्रद्धारूपत्वशाङ्कापिशार्ची निराकरोति—

★

Since, incidentally, faith (*śraddhā*) has been mentioned, the demon of doubt may now arise insisting that devotion is also a kind of faith. This is now slain thus :

नैव श्रद्धा तु\* माधारण्यात् ॥ २४ ॥

24. But it can never be faith, because it is more universal.

भक्तिर्न सर्वथा श्रद्धात्वेन शङ्कनीया, श्रद्धायाः कर्ममात्राङ्गत्वात् । न चैवमीश्वरभक्तिरिति ॥ २४ ॥

Devotion should never be doubted to be of the form of faith, because faith is subsidiary only to ceremonial works. Devotion to God is not of this type.

तस्यां तच्चे चानवस्थानात् ॥ २५ ॥

25. And if devotion were the same as faith, then a *regressus ad infinitum* would result.

‘श्रद्धावान् भजते यो मां स मे युक्ततमो मतः’ (गीता ६.४७) इति हि श्रुतम् । तत्र भक्तौ श्रद्धारूपायां श्रद्धाङ्गत्वे प्रतीतेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् श्रद्धाया अनङ्गत्वात् । अन्यथा तस्यामपि श्रद्धान्तरमित्यनवस्थैव । तस्मादात्मभणीयारम्भे आरम्भणीयवदाचमने चाचमनवद्भक्तौ श्रद्धा नाङ्गं स्यात् । श्रद्धाभक्तिसमन्वित इति भेदेन कथनाच्च ॥ २५ ॥

\* Certain texts omit this तु.

This passage of śruti (*i.e.*, the *Gītā*) is well known : ‘He who with faith devotes himself to Me, is considered by Me as the most devoted’ (5.47). Here, if devotion were taken as a mode of faith, then since it is seen from this verse that faith is subsidiary to devotion, a *regressus ad infinitum*<sup>17</sup> (an endless series of cause and effect) would result, though faith has no subsidiaries. Otherwise another faith has to be assumed as part of this faith and so on ; thus an infinite regress alone will result. Therefore, just as an opening verse cannot have another opening verse or the preliminary ceremony of rinsing the mount (*ācamana*) cannot have another preliminary rinsing, so here also if devotion were the same as faith, it would not require another faith<sup>18</sup> as its subsidiary. And also there is the common phrase, ‘endowed with faith and devotion’ which directly speaks of them as separate.

<sup>17</sup> That which characterizes the agent is a subsidiary part of the ceremony performed. In the verse of the *Gītā* quoted above, faith being the characteristic of the agent, is subsidiary to devoted worship (*bhajate*). If devotion also is a faith, then one faith has become subsidiary to another faith. The first faith being the same as devotion (according to this contention), should have another faith as its subsidiary and so on. This series will thus go on endlessly.

<sup>18</sup> Because the devotion of *Gītā* requires a faith as a subsidiary and this would not be so if both were identical.

ब्रह्मकाण्डं तु भक्तौ तस्यानुज्ञानाय सामान्यात् ॥ २६ ॥

26. But the *Brahma-kāṇḍa* ends in devotion ; because with respect to the production of subsequent knowledge of (devotion) it is similar (to the *pūrva-kāṇḍa*).

ज्ञानाप्रधान्ये ज्ञानकाण्डमित्युत्तरकाण्डप्रसिद्धिर्न स्यादिति मन्वानं प्रत्युच्यते । भक्त्यर्थं ब्रह्मकाण्डं श्रुयते न ज्ञानार्थम् । अज्ञातार्थज्ञापनभ्य काण्डद्वयासामान्यात्\* । अन्यथा धर्मज्ञानार्थं पूर्वकाण्डान्नातमपि ज्ञानकाण्डं स्यात् । न च ज्ञानविधिस्सम्भवति येन तत्राधान्यादपि ज्ञानकाण्डं भवेदिति । तस्माज्ज्ञानकाण्डमिति भ्रमः । किन्तु ब्रह्मकाण्डमेव । अत एव 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' (ब्र. सू. १.१.१) इति सूत्रितम् । तत्र भक्त्यर्थत्वाद्भक्तिकाण्डमपीति ॥ २६ ॥

इत्याचार्यस्वप्नेश्वरविद्वद्भिरचिते शाण्डिल्यशतसूत्रीये भाष्ये प्रथमा-  
ध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ॥ २ ॥

समाप्तश्च प्रथमोऽध्यायः ॥ १ ॥

This is in reply to an objector who thinks that the *Uttara-kāṇḍa* (i.e., the *Uttara mīmāṃsā* or the *Vedānta*) would not have been famous as the *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* if *jñāna* or knowledge were not its principal subject matter. (The reply is that) the *Brahma-kāṇḍa* (the portion of the Veda which treats of Brahman)

\* The reading given in some books does not seem to fit in, since the aphorism itself uses the word सामान्यात् ।

is revealed for the sake of devotion and not for the sake of knowledge, since revealing what was not previously known is a trait common to both. Otherwise the *Pūrva-kāṇḍa* (i e., the *pūrva-mīmāṃsā*) which declared the 'knowledge' of the Vedic rites should also have become a *Jñāna-kāṇḍa*! Moreover, there is no positive injunction with regard to knowledge by the strength of which it should have been possible to declare that 'this *kāṇḍa* is *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* because of the predominance of knowledge.' Therefore (to call it as) *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* is a mistake. That is why the aphorism has been composed thus : 'Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman' (*Br. S. I.I.1*). Since it is also for the sake of devotion to this Brahman, it is also a *Bhakti kāṇḍa*

The gist of the argument is that the object of the *Pūrva kāṇḍa* is to reveal the 'knowledge' of the Vedic rites whereas that of the *Uttara kāṇḍa* is to reveal the 'knowledge' of Brahman. The argument hinges round the word *jijñāsa* which has been used by both the treatises in their very first aphorism. This word literally means 'the desire to know'. Knowledge being thus the common factor of both, it is really superfluous to designate only the *Uttara-kāṇḍa* as *Jñāna-kāṇḍa*. The correct way is to call them as *Dharma-kāṇḍa* and *Brahma-kāṇḍa* respectively since they deal with Dharma and Brahman in that order.

*Thus ends the second section of the first chapter of the commentary on the hundred Aphorisms of Śaṅḍilya, composed by the most learned teacher Svapneśvara.*

THE FIRST CHAPTER ENDS HERE

## SECOND CHAPTER

### SECTION I

तस्मा भक्तेः साक्षात्प्रयत्नानिष्पाद्यत्वेन निष्पत्त्यर्थं साधनान्तरापेक्षा ।  
तत्रान्तरङ्गसाधनं ज्ञानम् । बहिरङ्गसाधनान्यपरभक्तिप्रभृतीनि । तेषां विवेकाय  
द्वितीयाध्यायारम्भः ॥

As this devotion cannot be produced by direct effort, there is need of other means to produce it. Among these, knowledge is the internal means. Lower devotion etc., are the external means. This second chapter is begun with a view to investigating them.

बुद्धिहेतुप्रवृत्तिर्गविशुद्धेरवघातवत् ॥ २७ ॥

27. The practice of the means of knowledge must be continued until purity (of devotion) is attained, as shelling the rice (is continued until it is dehusked).

बुद्धिर्ब्रह्मप्रमितिः । सा यद्यपि कृत्यानिष्पाद्या यथाऽपि तद्धेतूनां  
श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनदीनां तन्निष्पत्तयेऽनुष्ठानमावश्यकम् । तर्हि 'सकृत्कृते  
कृतशशास्त्रार्थः' इति न्यायात् सकृत्प्रवर्तते, उत यावद्भक्तिदाढ्यम् । तत्रोच्यते

भक्तिपरिशुद्धिर्भयन्तं तत्रवृत्तिगवश्यकी यथा ब्रह्मीनवहन्तीत्यनेन विहितव्रीह्य-  
वघातस्य यावद्वैतुष्यमनुष्ठानं शास्त्रार्थः, तथा दृष्टोपकारकत्वान्मनोमालिन्य-  
निगसपर्यन्तं ज्ञानाद्यनुष्ठाने यतनीयमिति ॥ २७ ॥

‘Buddhi’ means an accurate knowledge of Brahman. Though this is not something which can be produced by effort,<sup>1</sup> yet, the practice of *śravana* (‘hearing’), *manana* (‘cogitating’) and *nididhyāsna* (‘meditating’) which are the means thereof, is necessary in order to attain it. Now the question arises whether it is to be practised only once<sup>2</sup> since there is this dictum, ‘The meaning of the śāstra is fulfilled when once it is performed’; or, should it be practised until devotion becomes well-established? (The aphorism is actually in) reply to this doubt. The practice of the means of knowledge is necessary until devotion becomes pure. When the śāstra says, ‘He shells the rice’ it actually means that the shelling is to be continued until the grains are dehusked. Similarly from the analogy of this visible example, (it is clear) that one has to strive to practise knowledge etc., until one’s mind is cleansed of its dross.

<sup>1</sup> Knowledge being a mental revelation cannot be produced by physical effort.

<sup>2</sup> *c.f. Brahma Sūtras* 4.1.1. : ‘आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात्’—‘The repetition of (hearing etc., is necessary), on account of the repeated instruction by the scriptures.’ The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* repeats the sentence तत्रवमसि श्वेतकेतो ‘O Śvetaketu! you are That!’) nine times (6.8.7 to 6.16.3).

तेषामङ्गानां यान्यङ्गानि तदनुष्ठानं तु न प्रसज्यत इत्यत्रोत्तरम्—

It may now be suggested that the practice of the subordinate means of the aforesaid means (like 'hearing' etc.) has not been ordained! Here is the answer :

तदङ्गानां च ॥ २८ ॥

28. Their means also (must be practised).

तदङ्गानां गुर्वनुगमनवेदाविरोधितकानुसन्धानशमादीनामप्यनुष्ठानं युक्तम् ।  
न ह्यङ्गविकलान्यङ्गानि सैन्यसेनापतिवत् प्रषानोपकाराय क्षमन्ते ॥ २८ ॥

It is but proper that their means also like approaching the teacher,<sup>3</sup> reasoning in such way that it does not contradict the Vedas,<sup>4</sup> tranquillity<sup>5</sup> etc. must be practised. The primary means *sans* the subordinate ones are unable to assist the principal end, just as a general is unable to achieve anything without his army.

<sup>3</sup> The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* says : तद्विज्ञानर्थं स गुरुमेवाभिगच्छेत् .....श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम्, 'In order to know that, he has to reverentially approach a preceptor who is well-versed in the Vedas and established in Brahman'. (1.2.12)

<sup>4</sup> *c. f. Brahma Sūtras* (2.1.11) : तर्कप्रतिष्ठानादपि..... 'Also because reasoning has no sure basis (it cannot upset the conclusions of the *Vedānta*)'. And also *Manusmṛti* (12.106) : आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना । यस्तर्केणानुसन्धत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः ॥ 'He alone knows the *dharma*, who has scrutinized the *dharma*



*śāstras* of the *ṛṣis* through a reasoning which is not opposed to the spirit of the Vedas and other authoritative scriptures’.

<sup>5</sup> The cultivation of the following group of virtues is indispensable in the path of knowledge : *sama* (tranquillity), *dama* (control of the senses), *uparati* (withdrawal of the senses from their objects and preventing them from going after them), *titikṣā* (forbearance), *śraddhā* (ardent faith) and *samādhāna* (concentration of mind).

c. f. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.4.23) : तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतिस्तिष्ठतिः समाहितो भूत्वाऽऽत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति, ‘Therefore he who knows thus, having become tranquil & self-controlled, withdrawing himself from desires, forbearing all pairs of opposites, gaining concentration of mind, sees the ātman in himself.’

इदानीं बुद्धिविषयपरिशुद्धिश्चिन्त्यते—

The purification of understanding is now discussed :

तामैश्वर्यपरां काश्यपः परत्वात् ॥ २९ ॥

29. Kāśyapa (holds) that the understanding must be intent on the omnipotence (of the supreme Lord) ; because He is the highest.<sup>6</sup>

तां बुद्धिं परमेश्वरश्र्वर्यादिमद्विषयिणीं निश्श्रेयसफलां काश्यप आचार्यो मन्यते । कुतः ? जीवात्मभ्यः परत्वात्तैः स्वज्ञानाय परज्ञानस्यापेक्षितत्वात् । एतन्मते जीवब्रह्मणोरत्यन्तं भेद इति ॥ २९ ॥

The teacher Kāśyapa holds that this understanding gives supreme bliss when it has as its object, the omnipotence etc, of the Supreme Lord. Why so? Because He is far superior to the individual souls and the latter need knowledge of Him in order to know themselves. According to this view there is absolute difference between the individual soul and Brahman.

<sup>6</sup> Cowell translates the phrase परत्वात् as 'from its being other'. The word *para* has several senses, the chief ones being 'the highest' and 'the other'. The former sense seems to be more apt because, the fact of the Supreme Lord merely being 'the other' (*viz.*, different from the individual souls) does not add weight to the statement that the understanding be engrossed in His omnipotence etc. His 'greatness' is the real justification for doing so. This sense is obvious in such usages as *parā bhakti*, *parā vidyā* etc. The meaning that the two (the supreme Lord and the individual souls) are different, is of course implied even in this interpretation and hence does not contradict the last sentence of the commentary.

आत्मैकपरं बादरायणः ॥ ३० ॥

30. Badarāyaṇa (holds) that it must be intent on the ātman alone.

बादरायण आचार्यः पुनः शुद्धात्मविषयिणीमेव मनुते । तथा च सूत्रम् — 'आत्मेति त्ववगच्छन्ति\* ग्राहयन्ति च' (ब्र. सू. ४. १. ३) इति ।

\* त्ववगच्छन्ति (वा.)

एतन्मते जीवब्रह्मत्वकल्पनाया मिथ्यात्वाच्छुद्धिदाशममात्रबुद्धेस्तस्त्वज्ञानत्वात्  
तदेव मुक्तिफलायेति ॥ ३० ॥

However the teacher Bādarāyaṇa holds that the understanding must have purely the ātman (soul) as its object. So does the sūtra say : 'But they recognize and declare it as the ātman (soul)' (*Br. S.* 4.1.3). According to this view even the conception that the jīva (individual soul) is Brahman, is false ;<sup>7</sup> realization of truth comes through the understanding being intent on the ātman as pure consciousness ; this itself gives the fruit of liberation.

<sup>7</sup> since Brahman (=ātman) alone exists and nothing else, even to say that the jīva is Brahman, which presupposes some sort of difference between them, is ridiculous.

उभयपरां शाण्डिल्यः शब्दोपपत्तिभ्याम् ॥ ३१ ॥

31. Sāṅḍilya (holds) that it should be intent on both ;<sup>8</sup> because (this is proved by) both the Veda and reasoning.

<sup>8</sup> *i.e.*, the powers of the supreme Lord like omnipotence etc. and the nature of the ātman.

शाण्डिल्य आचार्यस्तूभयपरामेव मन्यते । कुतः ? शब्दो हि वेदस्तथा  
ब्रते—'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म, तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत' (छा.उ.३.१४.१)  
इत्युपक्रम्य, 'एष म आत्माऽन्तर्हृदयमेतद्ब्रह्मैतमितः प्रेत्याभिसम्भवितास्मीति  
यस्य स्यादद्धा न विचिकित्साऽस्तीति ह स्माह शाण्डिल्यः शाण्डिल्यः'  
(३.१४.४) इति विचिकित्स्य, तदुभयविषयविदो ब्रह्माभिप्रायलक्षणप्रेमभक्ति-

जन्यब्रह्मसम्भवकृत्वमाह । 'ब्रह्मः प्रावाहणिकामयत' (तै. सं. ७.१.१०. २) इतिवत् पूर्वशाण्डिल्यार्थत्वान्न नित्यानित्यसंयोगविरोधः । वस्तुतो वेदस्य भगवत्कर्तृकत्वमेव । श्रुतेरपि—'तस्माद्यज्ञात्सर्वहुतः । ऋचस्सामानि जज्ञिरे । छन्दांसि जज्ञिरे तस्मात् । यजुस्तस्मादजायत ॥' (तै.आ.११.४) इति ॥

The teacher Śāṅḍilya however holds the view that the understanding must be intent upon both. Why? Because *śabda* or Veda declares so. At first it begins thus : 'All this is verily Brahman, from thence doth it proceed, therein doth it merge and therein doth it live.'<sup>9</sup> So one should meditate upon It with a tranquil mind' (*Ch. U.* 3.14.1). Proceeding further it says : 'this is my soul within my heart, this is Brahman, this shall I obtain, having passed from here. He who is sure of this and had no doubt (he becomes Brahman). Thus saith the (teacher) Śāṅḍilya, thus doth Śāṅḍilya say' (*ibid.* 3.14.4). Having thus discussed the point it predicates the result of becoming Brahman to him, who knows both objects ; and this result is brought about by love and devotion directed towards Brahman. No contradiction is involved here due to the mixing up of the eternal and the non-eternal ; because, just as in the well-known passage 'Babara Prāvāhaṇi desired' (*Tai. S.* 7.1.10.2), here also it is an ancient Śāṅḍilya that is referred to.<sup>10</sup> The authorship of the Vedas is in reality attributed to God. This is known from the Vedas also: 'From that universal sacrifice sprang the Ṛk and Sāman verses, the meters sprang from it, from it the Yajus arose' (*R. V.* 5. 10. 90 ; *Tai. Ā.* 3. 12. 4).

<sup>9</sup> The word used in the original is तज्जलान् । It is broken up as तज्जम् , तल्लम् and तदनम् . The first refers to the production of the world from Brahman, the second to its dissolution in Brahman and the third to its living in Brahman.

<sup>10</sup> The followers of the *Mīmāṃsā* hold that the Vedas are eternal in the sense that they have existed from eternity. They also consider that it is the *Pūrvakāṇḍa* that is the real Veda and that the *Uttarakāṇḍa* is authoritative only in so far as it supports the former. It is relegated to a secondary status. In this particular statement quoted from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, the eternal words like सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म etc. are juxtaposed with the noneternal words of an individual human being Śāṇḍilya. Hence the passage cannot be taken as very authoritative and it does not support the theory of the author of this treatise. This is the argument of the objector.

This objection is now met by the commentator on the following lines : First of all, the Vedas are *not eternal in the sense of time*, but only because of the eternal truths contained in them. They are in fact *created by God at the beginning of every cycle of creation*. In support of this a Vedic quotation taken from the *Saṁhitā* and *Āraṇyaka* portion (whose authority cannot be refuted even by the Mīmāṃsist !) is given.

As regards the Śāṇḍilya mentioned in the Upaniṣad, it refers to another ancient Śāṇḍilya, of a previous cycle of creation. After realizing the truth of सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म etc., this Śāṇḍilya gave out his experiences out of joy and also to help future aspirants. Hence this statement of his was included in the Veda of the next cycle of creation. There is nothing

wrong in this. In fact we have such a statement (Babara etc.) even in the *Pūrvakāṇḍa* (considered by the Mimāṃsists as supremely authoritative) wherein it is accepted that the name Prāvāhaṇi refers to another ancient individual.

उपपत्तिश्च भवति ब्रह्म खलु परमैश्वर्यवत्तया श्रुतं जीवस्वरूपतया च ।  
तथा च श्रुतिः—यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति,  
यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति, तद्विजिज्ञासस्व' (तै. उ. ३ १) तथा 'ममैवांशो  
जीवलोके जीवभून्स्सनातनः' (गीता १५.७) इति । तत्र किं कस्योपमर्दकम्,  
तस्मात् तत्त्वमस्यादिव, क्येनोभयबोधनमेवोपपत्तिमदिति ॥ ३१ ॥

The same view can be established by reasoning also. Indeed, Brahman has been described in the Vedas as possessing of the supreme power and also as being identical with the individual soul. For instance the śruti says: 'From whom verily these beings are born, by whom when born they live, whom they approach, whom they enter,—him do thou seek to know' (*Tai. U.* 3.1). And so (in the *Gītā*): 'An eternal portion of Myself, having become a living soul in the world of life .....' (15.7).<sup>11</sup> Between these two which can cancel which?<sup>12</sup> Therefore, on the strength of such statement as 'That thou art!' (*Ch. U.* 6.8.7) it is reasonable to conclude that both should be known.

<sup>11</sup> There are several statements in the śruti describing the greatness of Brahman as also Its becoming the individual soul :

(1) एष सर्वेश्वरः, एष भूनाधिपतिः, एष भूतपालः, एष सेतुर्विधरण एषां लोकानामसम्मेदाय — 'He is the Lord of all, the King of all beings,

the Protector of beings ; He is the supporting bridge preventing the mixing up of the worlds' (*Br.U.* 4.4.22) ; एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि यावापृथिव्यौ विधृते तिष्ठतः—'O Gārgi, it is by the order of this Akṣara (Brahman) that this earth and the sky are standing supported' (*ibid.* 3.8.9) ; भीषाऽस्माद्वातः पवतोऽभी षोदेति सूर्यः । भीषाऽस्मादग्निश्चेन्द्रश्च । मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चमः । — 'Fearing Him the wind blows, fearing Him the sun rises, fearing Him Agni and Indra (perform their respective duties), (fearing Him) Death the fifth runs about !' (*Tai. U.* 2.8.1) See also : *Mu. U.* 1.2.1, *Ka. U.* 5 15 etc.

(2) स एतमेव सीमानं विदार्यैतया द्वारा प्रापद्यत — 'He (the Lord) split this skull and entered through this hole (*brahmarandhra*)' (*Ai. U.* 1.3.12) ; स एष इह प्रावेष्ट आ नखाग्नेभ्यः — 'He has entered into this (body), right up to the end of the nails' (*Br.U.* 1.4.7.) ; यथाऽग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्ति, एवमेवास्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे देवाः सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति— 'Like little sparks from the fire, all these senses, all these worlds, all these gods, all these beings—have sprung up' (*ibid.* 2.1.20) etc.

<sup>12</sup> In other words, both are equally important.

**वैषम्यादसिद्धमिति चेन्नाभिज्ञानवदवैशिष्ट्यात्\* ॥ ३२ ॥**

32. If it be said that (the understanding being intent on both) cannot be proved because of incompatibility, we reply : 'No, since, like recognition, this is also possible by neglecting the distinguishing characteristics.'

\*.....चेन्न प्रत्यभिज्ञानवदवैशिष्ट्यात् (पा.)

ननूभयविषयत्वमेव न सिद्धयति वैषम्यात् । विषमं हि जगत्कर्तृत्वा-  
 विशिष्टे तदकर्तृत्वादिविशिष्टज्ञानमिति चेत् ; न, यतः 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः ,'  
 'सोऽहम्' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञावदेकविशिष्टेऽपरवैशिष्ट्यमन्तरेण सामानाधिकरण्यस्य  
 स्वरूपगभेदांशगोचरकत्वेन तदुपपत्तेः । विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यबुद्धेर्गौ तर्गिकत्वात् ।  
 अथविशेष्यमात्रलक्षणया स्वरूपस्थितिरिति मतम् : तन्न, लक्षणया बोधस्य  
 जवन्यत्वात् लक्ष्योपस्थितौ तदवच्छेदकोपस्थितिहेतुसत्त्वाच्च । अन्यथा  
 कदाचिच्छक्यतावच्छेदकमन्तरेणापि शक्यस्मृतिर्भवेत् इत्यास्ता तावत् ॥३२॥

**Objection :** That the understanding can have both as its objects, cannot be proved because of incompatibility. To think of the Being endowed with the power to create the world etc., as (the being who is) without such creative powers etc., is indeed incompatible.

**Reply :** Not so ; because just as in recognitions like 'this is that Devadatta,' 'That is I'—where in one of the objects a general identity with the other is seen due to the substratum being the same, after overlooking its incidental characteristics—it is possible here also. The knowledge of the special characteristics of a given object can be overlooked (under certain circumstances).

**Objection :** So you hold that there can be the knowledge of the identity by means of the indirect (or secondary) mention only of an object !

**Reply :** Not exactly, since the knowledge obtained by means of indirect or secondary mention is of an inferior kind ; and because in the knowledge of the object indicated thus, there is also the knowledge of



the existence of the limiting factor which caused it. Otherwise we might sometimes have the recollection of the thing directly denoted by a word (*śakya*) without the limiting factor. Therefore you now stop arguing and sit quiet !

In the previous sūtra Śāṅḍilya has stated his view that the understanding can be intent on both the Supreme Being and the individual soul, because it is the same Supreme Being that has become the individual soul also. The objector's view point is that the two are of opposite characteristics like omnipotence and the lack of it etc. Hence it is incompatible for the same understanding to be intent on such diametrically opposite things and yet hope to attain immortality.

The line of argument adopted by the author of the sūtras and elucidated by the commentator is very much reminiscent of the one resorted to by the pure Advaitins while interpreting what are called the *Mahākāvya*s of the Vedānta, like *Tat tvam asi etc.* That is because they are also Advaitins though not of the Śāṅkara type.

Before explaining the reply to the objection it is necessary to have a knowledge of the way a sentence is interpreted in Indian logic. The direct meaning of a word or a sentence is known as *abhidhā* or *śakya* and the indirect or secondary meaning is called *lakṣaṇā*. Normally it is the direct meaning that is preferred and accepted. However when that leads to absurdity, a search has to be made for the indirect meaning or meaning by *lakṣaṇā*. This *lakṣaṇā* is of three kinds : (1) *Jahallakṣaṇa* when the direct meaning is totally discarded (*jahad*=to give up) in favour of the indirect meaning. For

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example गङ्गायां घोषः, which literally means ‘the village of the cowherds *in* the Ganges’. Since a village cannot exist inside the waters of a river, the secondary meaning ‘on the banks of the Ganges’ is to be adopted ; (2) *Ajahallakṣaṇa* when the direct meaning is not given up (ajahad=without giving up) but the secondary meaning is added on to complete the sense. For example, शोणः धावति (‘Red colour-is running’). Here a ‘red horse’ is added to complete the sense, without giving up the ‘red’ ; (3) *Jahad-ajahallakṣaṇa* or *bhāṅgalakṣaṇa* where a part of the direct meaning is discarded and another part is retained. For example सोऽयं देवदत्तः (‘this is that Devadatta’). The Devadatta seen yesterday in the market place is recognized as ‘this is that Devadatta’ when he comes to my house this morning. The two Devadattas are not absolutely identical because there is difference in time, place and dress etc. And yet the recognition is there. This recognition has been arrived at by overlooking the time, place, dress etc., associated with the ‘two’ Devadattas and grasping only the person \* who is common to both the situations. The word *abhijñānavad* in the aphorism actually refers to this recognition.

Now, the identity between Brahman and the Jīva is also to be derived by adopting the last-mentioned method of *Jahad-ajahallakṣaṇa*. The special characteristics of Brahman like the ability to create this world etc., as also the special limitations of the jīva as being bound in a body and suffering all its consequences etc., are to be overlooked in favour of the

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\* Known technically as *samāna-adhikaraṇa*, ‘common substratum.’

general characteristic, *viz.*, Pure Consciousness which is the essential nature of *both* and with regard to which *there is absolutely no difference*. Though a clay elephant and a clay mouse are not absolutely identical, they are identical from the point of view of 'clayness,' similarly here also. Hence by adopting the same technique as in recognition, we conclude that there is no incompatibility in the original statement of Śāṅḍilya.

न च क्लिष्टः परः स्यादनन्तरं विशेषात् ॥ ३३ ॥

33. The Supreme Being is not subject to affliction, because of the special (ascertainment that comes) after (the realization of the identity).

न चैवं सति जीवोपाधिक्लेशादिमत्त्वमपि परमेश्वरे प्रसज्येतेति वक्तुं शक्यम् । उक्ताभेदबुद्ध्यनन्तरं क्लेशादेरात्मासम्बन्धित्वरूपविशेषनिर्णयादिति ॥ ३३ ॥

Nor should it be said that, if such (an identity were accepted), there would arise the possibility of the Supreme Lord (also) being subject to the afflictions caused by the limiting adjunct (*i.e.*, the internal organ) of the individual soul; because after the realization of the aforesaid identity there will arise the special ascertainment that the afflictions etc., have no connection with the individual soul.

ऐश्वर्यं तथेति चेन्न स्वाभाव्यात् ॥ ३४ ॥

34. If it be said that the same (argument) holds good with respect to 'power' also, we deny it, because it is natural (to Him).

नन्वेवं क्लेशादिवदैश्वर्यं कर्तृत्वादिलक्षणं परमेश्वरस्य बाध्यते वैभवं त्वात्मानि प्रतीतत्वान्न क्लेशादिवदिति चेत् ; न, कर्तृत्वादेः परमेश्वरस्य स्वाभाव्यात् । न हि बहुरूपणस्वाभाव्यमन्यथा भवति । तस्मादस्वाभाविकत्वमुपाधिरिति । अत एव दर्पणादिप्रतिफलितबिम्बे भास्वति माहिन्यादि बाधेऽपि वृत्तिप्राकाश्यादिस्वभावस्याबाध एवेति ॥ ३४ ॥

**Objection :** It would then follow that like afflictions etc., power of the Supreme Lord also characterised by the ability to create this world etc., would have to be excluded ! On the other hand, since the abstract quality of greatness is viewed as residing in the soul, it need not be excluded from it like affliction etc. !<sup>13</sup>

**Reply :** No, because the power to create etc., is natural to the Supreme Being. The natural capacity of fire to give heat cannot be altered. Is it not so ? Therefore it is non-naturalness that constitutes the limiting adjunct. That is why, even though dirt etc., as found in the reflection in a mirror etc., can be excluded from the (real) sun, other natural (qualities like) roundness, brightness and so on, cannot be excluded.

<sup>13</sup> The contention of the objector is that the 'power' (*aiśvarya*) of the Supreme Being depends upon an action like

creating the world and hence, is incidental and not natural. Consequently there is every possibility of its being excluded, whereas the greatness (*vaibhava*) of the individual soul being natural to it, will not be excluded.

ननु परमेश्वरस्य सत्यमैश्वर्यं जीवानां तु कथमागन्तुकः क्लेशादिरित्यत्र हेतुमाह—

The question now arises : If the power of the Supreme Being is real, how then can you say that afflictions etc., are incidental to the individual souls only? The reason for this is now expounded :

अप्रतिषिद्धं परैश्वर्यं तद्भावाच्च नैवमितरेषाम् ॥ ३५ ॥

35. The power of the Supreme Being is not disputed. Not so is the case with the others because they have His nature.

न हि कस्यामपि श्रुतौ परमेश्वरस्यैश्वर्यं प्रतिषिद्धमस्ति येन प्रतिपन्नमपि बाधितं स्यात् । प्रत्युत 'सत्यसङ्कल्पः' इत्यादिना (छा. उ. ८.७.१) तस्य स्वाभाव्यमवगम्यते । न च जीवस्येव प्रतीतधर्मत्यागे कारणमस्ति सदैवेश्वरत्वात् सदैव मुक्तत्वात् । तदितरेषां तु जीवानां नैव स्वाभाविक-क्लेशादिः । कस्मात् ? तद्भावात् : श्रयते हि 'परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्यते स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते' (छा. उ. ८.३.४) इत्यादिभिः । तच्च स्वभावत्वे नोपपद्यते । उपपद्येतापि यदि परस्य क्लेशादिस्वभावः स्यात् । न चैवम् । तस्माद्ब्रह्मभावलक्षणमुक्त्यन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्याऽपि जीवानामौपाधिकी संसृतिरिति । यद्यपि परस्यापि मायोपाधिकमैश्वर्यं तथापि तदुपाधेः कदाचिदपि नात्य-

न्तलयः । जीवोपाधिबुद्धीनां तु परभक्तौ सत्यामत्यन्तलय एव । न हि भगवतो मायाशक्तिः क्षीयते जीवानामनन्तत्वेन तत्संसारतद्भ्रजनाद्यर्थं भगवतः प्रवृत्तेरावश्यकत्वादिति । एवञ्च 'ध्यायतीव, लेलायतीव' (वृ. उ. ४. ३. ७) इत्यादिश्रुतिः, 'अथात आदेशो नेति नेति' (वृ. उ. २. ३. ६) इत्यादि श्रुतिश्च जीवविषयिण्येवेति ॥ ३५ ॥

In no Vedic statement is the power of the Supreme Being disputed whereby even if it obtains elsewhere, it becomes nullified.<sup>14</sup> Rather, it is known to be natural to Him, from such statements as, 'He whose will is truth' (*Ch. U. 8.7.1*). Contrary to the case of the individual soul, there is no reason in His case, for giving up the attributes once known to be His ; because He is always the Lord and is eternally free. But, in the case of individual souls who are different from Him<sup>15</sup> afflictions etc., are never natural to them. Why ? 'Because they have His nature. This is proved from such Vedic statements as : 'He attains to the Supreme Light and appears in his own nature' (*Ch.U. 8.3.4*) etc. This would be impossible if (afflictions etc.) were natural. It would indeed be possible if afflictions etc., were natural to the Supreme Being.<sup>16</sup> But it is not so. Therefore we have to conclude that transmigratory existence is only accidental from the additional reason that liberation, which is defined as attaining to the state of Brahman, would otherwise be impossible.<sup>17</sup> Even though the power of the Lord is due to the limiting adjunct *Māyā*, this latter will never undergo absolute dissolution. *Per Contra*, the internal organ—

the limiting adjunct of the individual soul—will be absolutely dissolved on the rise of supreme devotion. The *Māyā*-power of the Lord never ceases because the souls are infinite in number,<sup>18</sup> and its use by Him is ever necessary for their mundane existence as also manifold service. And therefore such statements as ‘He as it were meditates, he as it were moves’ (*Br. U.* 4.3.7) etc., and ‘Hence there is this definition, “he is not this, he is not this”, (*ibid.* 2.3.6.) refer to the individual soul only.

<sup>14</sup> Suppose there is one Vedic statement ascribing omnipotence etc., to the Supreme Being and another statement denying this, then they cancel each other because both are equally authoritative. But such a negative statement is not found.

<sup>15</sup> This difference is only in the state of bondage.

<sup>16</sup> Even if afflictions were not natural to the soul, if they were natural to the Supreme Being, then, since the soul attains identity with it in the state of liberation, the latter’s afflictions would accrue to the former also !

<sup>17</sup> This automatically follows from note 16.

<sup>18</sup> This statement also is made from the standpoint of mundane existence.

सर्वानृते\* किमिति चेन्नैवम्बुद्धयानन्त्यात् ॥ ३६ ॥

36 If it be said, ‘What (becomes of God’s power) without all the souls?’ we reply that it will

\* सर्वामृते (पा.)

never be thus, since the internal organs are infinite in number.

अथ क्रमशो मुक्तावपि यदा सर्वबुद्धीनां विलयस्तदा परोपाधेः स्थितौ प्रयोजनाभावात् तस्याप्यत्यन्तलये किं कृतमैश्वर्यं स्वभाव इति चेन्नैवं भवति । जीवोपाधिबुद्धीनामनन्तत्वात् तादृशकाल एव नास्तीती युक्तं स्वाभाविकमैश्वर्यम् । न च प्रागभावाः प्रतियोगिजनकास्तस्त्वादित्येतावताऽपि कालस्तथा-मृतः सिद्ध्यति । अथैकदा सर्वे जनितप्रतियोगिन इति चेत्; न. अप्रयोजकत्वात् ! सर्वकार्यशून्यकालानुमान त्वत्यन्ततर्कशून्यम् । अन्यथा सर्वे प्रागभावा कदाचिदजनितप्रतियोगिन इत्यनुमानेन ध्वंसानधिकरणः प्राक्काल सिद्ध्येत् । अथाहमेवामुक्तः स्यामिति धिया मुक्तावयत्नप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् फलानिश्चयेऽप्युपायतानिश्चयेन तत्साधने प्रवृत्तिरस्तु । प्रत्युत सर्वमुक्तिनिश्चये तत एवाप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ ३६ ॥

**Objection :** But then, even if the liberation (of the individual souls) be only gradual, still, when all the internal organs get dissolved there being no purpose for the Māyā-power of God, it will also necessarily be dissolved. What is the use of your telling that the power is natural (to God) ?

**Reply :** This will never happen. Because the limiting adjuncts of the souls, *viz.*, internal organs are infinite in number, such a time will never come ; and therefore (our statement that) this power is natural to God, is but proper. Nor can it be proved that such a time will ever come, basing this argument on the maxim 'All antecedent non-existences



produce their opposites from the very fact of their being so.<sup>19</sup>

**Objection :** We say that eventually all antecedent non-existences will have produced their opposites.

**Reply :** No ; because no purpose would be served. To infer that a time will come when there would be no effects at all, is absolutely devoid of logic ! Otherwise you might as well prove that there was a time when there was no substratum for destruction, based on the argument that there was a time when no antecedent non-existence had as yet produced its opposite.<sup>20</sup>

**Objection :** Thinking that ‘I alone will be the (unfortunate) soul who may never be liberated’ one may never try for liberation !<sup>21</sup>

**Reply :** Rather, why not accept that the means of liberation being definitely known, one will try to practise it even though there may be uncertainty regarding the fruit ?<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, if it is assured that all will get liberation, there is every possibility of no effort being ever made for that very reason !

<sup>19</sup> *Prāgabha* is non-existence of an object *before* it is brought into being. It is destroyed the moment that thing is brought into being. One of the views is that it is this *prāgabhāva* that produces the *pratiyogin* (its opposite).

<sup>20</sup> If you can accept that a time *will* come when all the *prāgabhāvas* will have produced their opposites, why not also

accept that there was a time when none of the *prāgabhāvas* had as yet produced their opposites ? At that time there was no substratum for destruction ; i.e., no object had been produced which could be destroyed. Now, applying this argument to the particular case under discussion it would follow that there was a time when no internal organ had as yet been produced ! That means there was already liberation and all this discussion would have been useless !

<sup>21</sup> The argument of the objector is interesting : If the internal organs are infinite in number and liberation is an eternal process then what guarantee is there that I would be liberated in the near future ? In fact it may be eternally postponed ! Hence, what is the use of my trying for it ?

<sup>22</sup> In the uncertainty of the fruit there is *every possibility* of getting it. And the means is *definitely* known. Hence one will certainly try. Naturally no one needs to be in the 'waiting list'!

अथोपादानकर्तृत्वलक्षणमैश्वर्यं यदि परस्य साहजिकं तदा विकारित्वमेव प्राप्तं मृदादिवदित्यत उच्यते.—

If it is accepted that the power of the Supreme Being—which is of the nature of the productive capacity of the material cause—is natural to Him, then it follows that like clay etc., He is also subject to modification. This doubt is now cleared :

प्रकृत्यन्तरालादवैकार्यं चित्सत्त्वेनानुवर्तमानात्\*

37. (Brahman) is changeless because matter is interposed in between. (His power manifesting as

\* चित्सत्त्वेनानुवर्तमानात् (पा.)

the authorship of this world etc, really depends upon) the existence of thought and the consequent working (upon matter).

प्रकृतिर्नाम जडकार्यमात्रोपादानम् । सा विकार्या । न तु ब्रह्म ;  
स्फुरणरूपसत्तया प्रकृत्यनुगतत्वेन च परस्य कर्तृत्वादि । न च प्रकृतिरेव  
सत्तेति वक्तुं शक्यते जीवानामसत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । तेषां प्रकृतेः परत्वात् ।  
तस्मात् प्रकृतिलक्षणा मायाशक्तिमन्तरालीकृत्य परस्य कर्तृत्वादिस्वभाव्यमिति  
न विशयता । न हि मायया सृजन् मायावी मायाकार्यो\* भवतीति ।  
यद्यपि तादात्म्येन कार्यत्वमेव विकार्यत्वं तच्च वर्तत एव तथाऽपि क्षीरादिवन्न  
स्वरूपपरवर्तनेन विकारत्वम् । यद्वा स्वाधिकविकाराहेतुत्वेन घटं प्रति  
दण्डदिवदविकार्यत्वमस्ति । तदेवोक्तं प्रकृत्यन्तरालादिति ॥ ३७ ॥

Actually matter (*prakṛti*) is the material cause for inanimate effects only. (Hence) it is subject to change. But Brahman is not so. His creative power etc., is due to the existence of thought and the consequent follow-up action on matter.<sup>23</sup> And it is not possible to say that matter alone is existence, because this supposition will lead to the contingency of the non-existence of the individual souls who are superior to matter. Therefore the creative power etc., of the Supreme Being which accrues to Him through the intermediary *Māyā-śakti*<sup>24</sup>, defined as matter, is natural to Him; and consequently He is changless. The magician who creates through his power of

\* मायाविकार्यो (पा.)

illusion does not certainly become the subject of his own illusion! No doubt, being an effect means being changed because the cause and the effect are identical in substance. Yet, this change (with respect to the Supreme Being) is not a change in the form itself, as is the case with the milk becoming curds. Or again it may be said that (He) is not subject to change any more than the potter's stick is, in reference to the jar,<sup>25</sup> since the stick does not effect any change in itself besides that produced in the jar. It is this which is described in the sūtra as 'because matter is interposed in between.'

<sup>23</sup> The idea is that at first He conceives of creation in the mind and then acts upon matter according to that. *c. f.* स ईक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा इति । स इमँल्लोक नसृजत— 'He thought, "I shall create the worlds"; He created these Worlds' (*Ai. U.* 1.1.1-2); प्रजाकामो वै प्रजापतिः स तपोऽतप्यत ; स तपस्तप्त्वा स मिथुनमुत्पादयते, रथिं च प्राणं च— 'The Lord of beings, desirous of progeny, thought over deeply. Having thus thought over deeply He created the pair : matter and spirit' (*Pr. U.* 1.4).

<sup>24</sup> The *Svetasvatara Upaniṣad* says :

—It is to be known that *prakṛti* is *māyā* and the Lord is the weilder of this *māyā*' (4. 10).

<sup>25</sup> Here the Supreme Being is considered as the 'efficient' or instrumental cause, *nimitta-kāraṇa*.

ननु मायोपादानत्वे मायायामेव जगत्प्रतिष्ठितं तर्हि कथं तस्मिन् सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितम्' (म. ना. उ. ३०) इति श्रुत्या ब्रह्मप्रतिष्ठा प्रतिपाद्यत इत्यत्रोत्तरम्—

If *Māyā* (the power of illusion) is the material cause of this world, then this world is established in *māyā* only. How can then the śruti advocate that it is established on Brahman through the statement 'In Him is every thing established' (*M.N.U.* 30)? This question is now answered :

तत्प्रतिष्ठा गृहपीठवत् ॥ ३८ ॥

38. Establishment in Him (Brahman) is like (establishment) on a stool inside a house.

तस्मिन् ब्रह्मण्यपि विकारप्रतिष्ठानमविरुद्धं गृहपीठवत् । यथा गृह-  
मध्यस्यपीठे स्थितोऽपि गृहे तिष्ठति पीठे तिष्ठतीति व्यपदिश्यते तद्वत्  
॥ ३८ ॥

There is no contradiction involved in saying that the modifications (of illusory power) are also established in Him, (*i.e.*) Brahman, 'as in the case of a stool inside a house.' For instance, even though one is established in a seat kept inside a house, he is said equally to be established in the seat as well as in the house. Same is the case here also.

ननु तर्हि प्रकृत्यैव ब्रह्मान्यथासिद्धमस्तु, नेत्युच्यते

But then, by the assumption of the primeval matter (*prakṛti*) does not the causality of Brahman stand disproved? This is now denied ;

### मिथोऽपेक्षणादुभयम् ॥ ३९ ॥

39. Both (are needed) because of their mutual dependence.

ब्रह्म प्रकृतिश्चोभयमिति कारणम् । परस्परं चेतनाचेतनाभ्यां स्वज्ञानय  
स्वशक्तिविषयाय चापेक्षितत्वात् किं कस्योपेक्षकमिति ॥ ३९ ॥

Both Brahman and *prakṛti* are the causes ; since the conscious and the non-conscious entities depend upon each other, the conscious for attaining self-knowledge and the non-conscious for attaining an object for its potentiality.<sup>26</sup> Hence, which of them can ignore the other ?

<sup>26</sup> c. f. *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* (21)

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।  
पद्मबन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥

‘This union of the *pradhāna* with the *puruṣa* is like the association of a blind man with a lame man and it serves a dual purpose of the *pradhāna* being contemplated upon by the *puruṣa* and the consequent attainment of *kaivalya* (release) by the latter. Thus creation has come out of their union.’

इदानीं स्वशास्त्रे व्यवहारलाभाय पदार्थसङ्कलनमुच्यते—

In order to facilitate the usage of terms in his treatise, he now proceeds to enumerate the categories :

\* किं कस्यापेक्षकमिति (पा.)

### चेत्याचितोर्न तृतीयम् ॥ ४० ॥

40. There is no third object besidee the 'knowable' and the 'knower'.

चेत्या प्रकृतिः, चिद्ब्रह्म, तयोर्न तृतीयमर्थान्तरमत्रेत्यर्थः । ननु न तृतीयस्य सिद्धयसिद्धिभ्यां चोद्यत इति चेत् । अयमर्थः—ब्रह्मभिन्ने ज्ञातृत्वं प्रकृतिभिन्ने च ज्ञेयत्वं निषिध्यत इति ॥ ४० ॥

The 'knowable' means matter (*prakṛti*) and the 'knower' means the Brahman. Besides these two there is no third substance (in this treatise). This is the idea.

**Objection :** Since a 'third' one can neither be proved nor disproved, why raise the topic at all ?

**Reply :** What the aphorism actually means is this,—that the capacity to know resides in none but Brahman and the capacity of being knowable resides in nothing but matter.

अथ प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरसम्बन्धे सर्वकार्यविलोपः । सम्बन्धे तु स एव तृतीय इत्यत आह—

Now, if there is no connection between matter and soul, then all effects will be abolished. If there is connection, that itself will be the 'third' ! This objection is now met.

### युक्तौ च सम्परायात् ॥ ४१ ॥

41. And (these two) are joined, because they are beginningless.

मिथ इत्यनुवर्तते । तौ प्रकृतिपुरुषौ बुद्धिस्थौ परस्परं प्रतिसम्बन्धरूपौ न त्वागन्तुकः कश्चित् । कस्मात्? सम्परायात् अनादित्वादेव । तथा च गीतायाम् (१३.१९) 'प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्वद्यनादी उभावपि' इति । अथानादिरेव सम्बन्धान्तरमस्तु इति चेत् ; न जडाजडविकल्पेन तयोरनन्यत्वादिति ॥ ४१ ॥

The word 'mutually' must be supplied from the previous aphorism (39), (before the word 'joined'). These two, matter and soul, which reside in the internal organ, themselves constitute the mutual connection ; hence no extraneous (connection) need be assumed. Why ? Because of the very fact that both are beginningless. And so does the *Gītā* declare : 'Know that both matter and soul are beginningless' (13.19).

**Objection :** Well then, let this 'beginningless' itself form the extraneous connection !

**Reply :** No ; since the alternative lies between the conscious and the non-conscious only, there can be no (third thing) apart from them.

ननु प्रकृतिर्मिथ्यैव मायारूपत्वात्तस्याः, 'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्' (श्वे. उ. ४.१०) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः । तथा च कथं वेद्यं पदार्थ इत्यत आह—



According such statements in the Vedas as 'It is to be known that *prakṛti* is *māyā* (illusion) and that the Lord is the weilder of this *māyā*' (*Śv. U.* 4.10), *prakṛti* (matter) is verily false, since it is of the form of illusion. And so, how can you say that it is a category (an object) which is 'knowable'? The reply is now given :

शक्तित्वान्नानृतं वेद्यम्\* ॥ ४२ ॥

42. The 'knowable' (*i.e.*, matter) cannot be false because it is a power.

वेद्यं प्रधानं नानृतं न मिथ्या भवितुमर्हति ; कृतः ? शक्तित्वादेव । न हि मायावी मायाशक्तिं विना विहितागन्तुकसृष्टये प्रभवति । किंच 'कृतस्तु खलु सौम्यैवं स्यादसतः सज्जायेत' (छा. उ ३.२.२) इति श्रुतिः कार्यसत्त्वेन कारणसत्तां वदन्ती सर्वसत्तामाह नानृतत्वम् । अस्ति तु सर्वदा भागवति सृष्टिः सादृश्यसहकार्यपेक्षा चेतनकृतसृष्टित्वान्मायिकसृष्टिवदिति । न चादृष्टादिभिरर्थान्तरम्, एक शक्त्यपेक्षायां लाघवाद्भोगतत्माघनेतरेष्वदृष्ट-हेतुतायां मानाभावात् । एवं सर्वकार्येषु मिथो व्यभिचारादेकनित्यसहकारिशक्तिसिद्धिः । तदवान्तरानेककल्पनं तु फलमुखमिति न गौरवायेति । विस्तरोऽस्यैव तृतीय इति ॥ ४२ ॥

The 'knowable' *i.e.*, the *pradhāna* (also known as *prakṛti* or matter), cannot be false, cannot be an illusion. Why? From the very fact of its being a power. It is well-known that the magician will be

\*.....चेत्यन् (पा.)

unable to produce the required extraneous object without the power of illusion. Also, the Veda which declares the reality of the effects through the reality of the causes thus, 'But how, O gentle youth, could the existent thing be produced out of the non-existent?' (*Ch. U.* 6.2.2), is really advocating the reality of everything and not their falseness. The divine creation always depends upon a corresponding con-comitant cause because it is the product of an intelligent being, like the creation of a magician.<sup>27</sup> Nor should a new object be posited through the assumption of *adr̥ṣṭa* ('the unseen' effect of a work) etc., because it is simpler to assume one power (like *pradhāna*, than two or more like *adr̥ṣṭa* etc.). Also, there is no proof that *adr̥ṣṭa* can cause anything except experience (the effect of past work) and its means. Again, since (the assumption of several equally powerful causes leads to) their getting mixed up in all the effects<sup>28</sup> the existence of one eternal power concomitant (to Brahman) is established. Even if several subordinate causes are assumed, since this aids in the attainment of the fruit (by the primary cause) it cannot be considered as a cumbersome assumption. This very discussion will be carried out at length in the third chapter.

<sup>27</sup> The idea is that this world resembles the *māyā* power of God.

<sup>28</sup> Hence we will not know which cause has produced which effect !

गता प्रासङ्गिकी चर्चा प्रकृतमनुसरति—

The incidental discussion being thus finished, he now resumes his original topic :

तत्परिशुद्धिश्च\* गम्या लोकावल्लिङ्गेभ्यः ॥ ४३ ॥

43. The purity of devotion is to be inferred from signs as in common life.

यद्यपि जानामीच्छामीत्यादिवदहं भज अनुरज्ये इत्येवमादिना प्रत्यक्ष-  
गम्यैव भक्तिस्तथाऽपि दृढतरसंस्कारवैशिष्ट्यलक्षणा परिशुद्धिर्न प्रत्यक्षतो निर्णा  
शक्यते ज्ञानप्रामाण्यवत् । तस्मात् तन्निर्णयो लोकवज्जातलिङ्गेभ्य एव । यथ  
लोकेऽनुरागतारतम्य तत्कथादावश्रुपु ऋकादिविकारैरनुमीयते तद्वदिति ॥ ४३ ॥

Just like the cognitions 'I know', 'I wish' etc., devotion also is no doubt, directly experienced as instanced by such cognitions 'I love (him)', 'I am devoted (to him)' etc. But still, its purity characterised by very strong special impressions, cannot be ascertained by direct perception as is the case with the authenticity of knowledge.<sup>29</sup> Therefore it is to be ascertained through the manifested signs only just as we see in common life. Just as in the world the degree of love in a person is to be inferred from his reaction to the talk (about the beloved) manifesting as shedding tears, horripilation and other signs of emotion so here also (it is to be inferred from external signs of reaction).

\*तत्परिशुद्धिस्तु (पा.)

<sup>29</sup> From the examples of cognition quoted above, it is clear that knowledge is an object of direct perception. But the development, maturity and purity of devotion are not so.

न केवलं लोकवल्लिङ्गानि भवन्ति, महर्षीणां स्मृतिभ्योऽपि तानि  
लङ्गानि बाहुल्येन लक्ष्यन्त इत्याह—

Not that there are only signs analagous to those found in common life; even by the authoritative traditions (*smṛtis*) of the great sages these signs have been abundantly defined. So he declares :

सम्मानबहुमानप्रीतिविरहेतरविचिकित्सामहिमख्यातितदर्थप्राण-  
स्थानतदीयतासर्वतद्भावाप्रतिकूल्यादीनि च स्मरणेभ्यो बाहुल्यात्  
॥ ४४ ॥

44. (And these are the signs) described in abundance in the *smṛtis* : respect, high esteem, delight forlornness, doubting other objects, praising His greatness, holding the life for His sake, considering everything as His, regarding Him as existing in all beings and not resisting His will etc.

यथाऽर्जुनस्य समानम<sup>f</sup>—

प्रत्युत्थानं तु कृष्णस्य सर्वावस्थो धनञ्जयः ।

न लङ्घयति धर्मात्मा भक्त्या प्रेम्णा च सर्वदा ॥

(म. भा. द्रो.)

Respect as was shown by Arjuna : 'Arjuna, the righteous and the winner of wealth, in whatever posture he may be, never fails to get up to greet Kṛṣṇa, out of devotion and love for him' (*Mbh. D.*)

बहुमानं यथेक्षवाकोः—

पक्षपातेन तन्नाम्नि मृगे पद्मे च तादृशि ।

बभार मेघे तद्वर्णे बहुमानमर्ति नृपः ॥

(नृ. पु. २५. २२)

High esteem as that shown by Ikṣvāku : 'Through fondness for him and for the deer and the lotus which resembled him,<sup>30</sup> the king showed high esteem even towards the cloud which was of the same hue (as Kṛṣṇa),' (*Nr. P. 25. 22*)

<sup>30</sup> The eyes of Kṛṣṇa resembled the eyes of a deer as also a lotus. That is why he is often called हरिणाक्ष and पुण्डरीकाक्ष.

प्रीतिर्यथा विदुरस्य—

या प्रीतिः पुण्डरीकाक्ष तवागमनकारणात्\* ।

सा किमाख्यायते तुभ्यमन्तरात्माऽसि देहिनाम् ॥

(म. भा. उ. ८९.२४)

Delight as expressed by Vidura : O Lotus-eyed One ! The delight (that has been welling up in my

\*या मे प्रीतिः पुण्डरीकाक्ष त्वद्दर्शनसमुद्भवा (पा.) ।

heart) due to your arrival here, how can that be described to you? You are verily the indwelling soul of all embodied beings!' (*Mbh U. 89. 24*)

विरहो यथा गोपीनाम्—

गुरुणामग्रतो वक्तुं किं ब्रवीमि न नः क्षमम् ।

गुरवः किं करिष्यन्ति दग्धानां विरहाम्निना ॥

(वि.पु. ५. १८. २२)

Forlornness as exhibited by the milk-maids (of Vṛndāvan): 'It is not possible for us to speak before our parents,—what can I say? What can parents do for us, scorched as we are in the fire of separation?' (*V.P. 5. 18. 22*)

इतरविचिकित्सा यथा श्वेतद्वीपनिवासिनाम् । नाग्ददर्शनेऽपि विघ्न-  
बुद्धिः । यथा चोपमन्योः—

अपि कीटः पतङ्गो वा भवेयं शङ्कराज्ञया ।

न तु शक त्वया दत्तं त्रैलोक्यमपि कामये ॥

(म. मा. आ. १४. १८६)

Doubting other objects, as for instance the feeling of hindrance that arose in the minds of the denizens of Śvetadvīpa.<sup>31</sup> Or as that of Upamanyu : 'At Śaṅkara's command I am prepared to become even a worm or a grasshopper. But O Indra, I desire not even the three worlds that you may give me !' (*Mbh.Ā. 14.186*)

<sup>31</sup> Śvetadvīpa was a region inhabited by great devotees of Viṣṇu, who never brooked any hindrance to their meditation on Him. When Nārada, another great devotee of Viṣṇu, went there, the Lord Himself appeared before him and bid him to depart for home so that their meditation was not disturbed !

महिमवृद्धौ यथा यमस्य—

नरके पच्यमानस्तु यमेन परिभाषितः ।

किं त्वया नाचिंतो देवः केशवः क्लेशनाशनः ।

(नृ. पु' ८.२१)

स्वपुरुषमभिवीक्ष्य पाशहस्तम्

वदति यमः किल तस्य कर्णमूले ।

परिहर मधुसूदन प्रपन्नान्

प्रभुरहमन्यनृणां न वैष्णवानाम् ॥

(वि. पु. ३.७.१४)

Praising His greatness as done by Yama : ‘The guilty one, tormented in hell, was thus addressed by Yama, “Why did you not worship the Lord Keśava, who is the destroyer of afflictions ?” (*Nr. P.* 8. 21), Or again, ‘Having seen his emissary with the noose in hand, Yama thus whispers in his ear : “Spare those who take refuge in Thee, Madhusūdana! I am the lord of other men, but not of the devotees of Viṣṇu!” (*V.P.* 3. 7. 14)

तदर्थप्राणस्थितिर्यथा हनूमतः । तेनैवोक्तम्—

यावत्तव कथा लोके विचरिष्यति पावनी ।

तावत् स्थास्यामि मेदिन्यां तवाज्ञामनुपालयन् ॥

(वा. रा. उ. १०७. ३१)

Holding the life for His sake, as seen in the case of Hanumān. He himself has said it thus : 'As long as Thy purifying story circulates through the world, so long will I reside there, obeying Thy command' (*Rā. Uk.* 107. 31).

अथवा कृतकृत्यानामपि नारदादीनां तदेकाराधनार्थं प्राणधारणम् ।  
अत एव श्रुतिः—

यं सर्वे देवा नमन्ति मुमुक्षवो ब्रह्मवादि (नृ. ता. उ. ६) इति ।

Or, there is the instance of Nārada and others who, though they had reached the goal, still continued to live solely for worshipping Him. That is why the Veda says : 'He whom all the gods worship desiring liberation, as also the knowers of Brahman' (*Nr.* U 6)

तदीयताभावस्तु वसोरुपरिचरस्य—

आत्मराज्यं धनं चैव कलत्रं वाहनं तथा ।

एतद्भागवतं सर्वमिति तत्प्रेक्षते सदा\* ॥

(म. भ. शा. ३३५.२३) इति ॥

\* यत्तद्भागवतं सर्वमिति तत्प्रेक्षितं सदा (पा)



Considering every thing as His, as did Vasu Uparicara : ‘His kingdom, wealth, wife and chariot—all this, he regarded as belonging to the Lord’ (*Mbh. Ś 335. 23*).

सर्वभूतेषु तद्भावो यथा प्रह्लादस्य प्रसिद्धः । उक्तञ्च तेनैव—

एवं सर्वेषु भूतेषु भक्तिख्याभिचारिणी ।

कर्तव्या पण्डितैर्ज्ञात्वा सर्वभूतमयं हरिम् ॥

(वि.पु. १.१९.९)

Regarding Him as existing in all beings—as is well-known in the case of Prahlāda. He himself has expressed it thus : ‘The sages, having known that Hari exists in all beings, must thus cherish unwavering love towards all beings.’ (*V P.1.19.9*)

तस्मिन्नप्रातिकूल्यं यथा हन्तुमागतेऽपि भगवति भीष्मस्य ।  
तेनैवोक्तम्—

एह्येहि देवेश जगन्निवास

नमोऽस्तु ते शङ्खगदासिपाणे ।

प्रसह्य मां पातय लोकनाथ

रथादुदग्राद्भुतशौर्यसङ्घे

(म. भा. मी. ५९. ९६, ९७)

Not resisting His will, as did Bhīṣma even when the Lord was advancing towards him to kill him ! This has been told by Bhīṣma himself : ‘Come ! O Lord of gods ! Come, O refuge of this world !

Obeisance to Thee, armed with Your bow, mace and sword ! Kill me in this vast wondersul and fierce battle by forcibly felling me from my chariot !' (Mbh. B. 59. 96, 97)

आदिशब्दादुद्धवाकूरादिचेष्टितान्यपि द्रष्टव्यानि । यद्यपि द्वेषविपक्ष-  
भावादित्यत्रेदमुक्तं तथाऽपि तत्र रागलिङ्गत्वेनात्र च बहुभक्तिपरिशुद्धिलिङ्गतयेति  
विशेष इति ॥ ४४ ॥

By the word *ādī* ('etc.),' the actions of Uddhava, Akrūra etc., must also be taken into account. Even though in the aphorism (6) '(Devotion is a form of affection) because it is opposed to hatred' this<sup>32</sup> has been described, but still, there is a difference: there it was described as a sign of affection, but here it is given as a sign of purity of devotion.

<sup>32</sup> 'Not resisting His will' (*aprātikūlya*) of this aphorism is practically the same as 'it is opposed to hatred' (*dveṣapratipakṣabhāva*) of the sixth aphorism.

ननु स्वामिन्यनुरागिणां तदनुग्रहतारतम्यवत्सु द्वेषेर्ष्यादयो भवन्ति  
तेऽपि किं लिङ्गानि ? नेत्याह—

Among those who are devoutly attached to their lord, it is seen that hatred, jealousy etc., exist due to the difference in the favours shown by him.<sup>33</sup> Should they also be considered as 'signs'? No. Therefore he says :

<sup>33</sup> Those who have received lesser favours naturally cherish hatred and jealousy towards those who are favoured more.

द्वेषादयस्तु नैवम् ॥ ४५ ॥

45. But hatred etc., are not so (*i. e.*, they are not 'signs' of devotion).

तदसम्भवादेव । यथोक्तं भगवता द्वैपायनेन—

न क्रोधो न च मात्सर्यं न लोभो नाशुभा मतिः ।

भवन्ति कृतपुण्यानां भक्तानां पुरुषोत्तमे ॥

(म. भ. आ. १४९.१३३) इति ।

शिशुपालस्य तु द्वेषात्स्मरणं ततः परा भक्तिस्ततो मुक्तिरित्येव क्रम इति ॥ ४५ ॥

Because of the very fact they are impossible, as has been said by the venerable Dvaipāyana: 'Neither anger nor envy, neither greed nor impure thought can exist in the merited ones, who are devoted to Puruṣottama' (*Mbh. Ā.* 139. 133)

In the case of Śiśupāla the following steps are to be traced: hatred led to continuous remembrance, from this arose supreme devotion and from that resulted liberation.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> This point has been emphasised once again so that Śiśupāla's case need not be taken as an exception to the general rule, but can be explained within its scope. See note 27 under aphorism 6.

अथ प्रायशो भगवदवतारविषयाण्येव तानि लिङ्गानि स्मर्यन्ते  
ब्रह्मज्ञानजन्यत्वात् पूर्णविषयता च भक्त्युक्तेष्वत्र सिद्धान्तमाह—

Well, all these signs have been described in the smṛtis mostly with reference to the incarnations of God. However, since devotion according to you has sprung up as a result of the knowledge of Brahman, it must have reference to that Perfect Being! To meet this objection, he declares the true view :

तद्वाक्यशेषात् प्रादुर्भावेष्वपि सा ॥ ४६ ॥

46. That (devotion) even when directed towards manifestations (is really the highest) ; because (this is known) from the remainder of the sentence.

सा परा भक्तिः प्रादुर्भावात्मविषयाऽपि भवति । कस्मादिदं ज्ञायते ?  
वाक्यशेषात् (गीता. ७.२३) — 'देवान्देवयजो यान्ति मद्भक्ता यान्ति ।  
मामपि' इति । प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्थिरीकरणाय देवतान्तरभक्तिनिन्दायां वाक्यशेषो  
भवति (गीता. ७. २१) —

यो यो यां यां तनुं भक्तः श्रद्धयाऽर्चिषुमिच्छति ।  
तस्य तस्याचलां श्रद्धां तामेव विदधाम्यहम् ॥

तत्र 'यो यो यां यां भक्तः' इत्येतावदुक्तार्थसिद्धौ तनुपर्यन्तनिर्देशाद्भक्तेस्तस्वा-  
त्मविषयत्वे तात्पर्यमुनीयते । प्रकरणञ्च भक्तेरेवेति ॥ ४६ ॥

That highest devotion can have as its subject even the manifested forms of the Lord (*i.e.*, incarnations). How is this known? From the remainder of the sentence: 'The worshippers of the gods go to gods and My devotees attain Me likewise' (*Gītā* 7.23). In order to strengthen the declared doctrine (of devotion to Himself, the Supreme being) this remainder of the sentence implies the censure of devotion to other gods. (And now the original passage): 'Whatever form anyone devoted wishes to worship with faith to him I make that very faith unwavering' (*Gītā* 5.21) Here, even though the intended sense would have, been complete by saying 'Whatever anyone etc.' The specific use of the word 'form' (*tanu*) leans us to the conclusion that that devotion has Him (the *avatāra*) as its object. And of course, the whole topic is of devotion only.

जन्मकर्मविदश्चाजन्मशब्दात्\* ॥ ४७ ॥

47. And through the revealed word (it is known that) the knower of the Lord's births and actions has no more births.

जन्म शरीराविनाभूतवेदप्रणयनदैत्यवधभक्तदर्शनादिकार्याय भगवतः शरीरपरिम्रहः । कर्म च वेदप्रणयनादि । तद्वेदिनो जन्माभावफलाय भवति । यथाऽह (गीता ४.९)—

\*जन्मकर्मविदश्चाजन्मने शब्दात् (पा.)

जन्म कर्म च मे दिव्यमेवं यो वेत्ति तत्त्वतः ।

त्यक्त्वा देहं पुनर्जन्म नैति मामेति सोऽर्जुन ॥ इति ॥

न च जन्मकर्मवेदनस्य साक्षादमृतत्वफलमुपपद्यते । किन्तु तद्गुणमनोमालिन्य-  
निवृत्तिद्वारा तद्विशिष्टपद्मेश्वरगोचरपरभक्तिं जनयित्वा जन्माभावफलाय भवति ।  
तस्मात्प्रादुर्भावापन्नगोचरत्वं परभक्तेः शब्दादेवावगम्यत इति ॥ ४७ ॥

(His) 'birth'—The Lord accepts a body in order to effect such deeds as producing the Veda, destroying the demons, appearing before (His) devotees etc. which are indispensably connected with the body, (His) 'work' is the production of the Veda etc. To him who knows these, (this knowledge) gives the fruit of freedom from future births. (The Lord Himself) has declared thus: 'My birth and My action are divine. Whosoever knows thus in truth, he, on giving up the body, is born no more, but attains to Me O Arjuna!' (*Gītā* 4. 9). This does not prove that immortality is the direct fruit of the knowledge of His birth and actions. But through removing the impurities of his mind, it produces the highest devotion having that particular incarnation of the Lord as its object (and it is this devotion) that gives the result of freedom from future births. Therefore that the highest devotion can have the manifestation of the Lord also as its object, is thus known from the revealed word (*i.e.*, the *Gītā*) itself.

तच्च दिव्यं स्वशक्तिमात्रोद्भवात् ॥ ४८ ॥

48. And that birth (in a body) is divine, because it is produced solely from His own power.

‘जन्म कर्म च मे दिव्यम्’ (गीता ४.९) इत्यत्र किं दिव्यत्वम् ? न धर्मजत्वं, धर्मयोगाभवात्तस्मिन्नदृष्टासिद्धे । नापि दिवि भवत्वं भूलोक-जन्मन्यन्याप्तेः । किन्तु जीवशरीरवन्न भूतोपादानकत्वम् ; अपि तु स्वमाया-शक्तिकृतत्वम् । अत एव मोक्षधर्मे नारदं प्रति भगवद्वाक्यम्—‘मायैषा हि मया सृष्टा यन्मां पश्यसि नारद’ (म.भा शां. ३३९.४५, ४६) इति । तथा च गीयते (गीता ४.६)—

अजोऽपि सन्नव्ययात्मा भूतानामीश्वरोऽपि सन् ।

प्रकृतिं स्वामधिष्ठाय सम्भवामि युगे युगे\* ॥ इति ॥

‘My birth and My action are divine’ (*Gītā* 4.9) : Here what (exactly) is this divinity? It cannot be due to previous merit because He has no contact with merit due to the absence of any ‘unseen consequences of actions’ (*adr̥ṣṭa*) in Him. Nor can it mean ‘being produced in heaven’ (*divi*=in *dyuloka* or heaven) since in that case it cannot apply to births in this world. Rather, it means that His body is not produced out of the (five) gross elements as the bodies of ordinary mortals, but out of his own *māyā*-power. That is why we have this statement of the Lord Himself addressed to Nārada, in the *Mokṣadharmā* : ‘All this is a *māyā* created by Me, that thou seest Me at all O Nārada!’ (*Mbh. ś.* 339.45, 46). And so too in the *Gītā* (4.6) : ‘Though I am unborn, of changeless nature, and Lord of all beings, yet subjugating My *prakṛti*, I come into being in every age.’

\* The regular text of the *Gītā* reads : सम्भावाम्यात्ममायया ।

न चाभौतिकत्वे शरीरत्वव्याघातः, भोगायतने भौतिकत्वनियमात् ।  
अथ भोगायतनत्वमेव शरीरत्वमिति चेत्; न, चेष्टाश्रयत्वस्य तत्त्वे लाघवात् :  
चेष्टात्वं तु क्रियागतो जातिविशेषः । न च क्रियैव चेष्टा मृतशरीरक्रियायां  
सद्व्यवहारापत्तेः । नापि साक्षात् प्रयत्नजक्रियात्वमेव चेष्टात्वं घटादावपि  
चेष्टत इति व्यवहृतिप्रसङ्गात् । सर्वक्रियायाः साक्षात् परमेश्वरयत्नजन्यत्वात् ।  
एवञ्च परमेश्वरशरीरबोधकमानेन तच्छरीरचेष्टासिद्धिरित्यास्तां तावदिति ।

न च तत्त्वाधिक्यं तच्छरीरस्य ब्रह्माण्डानुपादानतया घटादिवदतत्त्वभावात्,  
इन्द्रियाप्रकृतित्वाच्च ॥ ४८ ॥

It should not be thought that its quality of being body would disappear just because it is not composed of the gross elements ; because this rule that it should consist of the gross elements holds good only when it is to be the seat of experience (of the previous deeds).

**Objection :** Why not then hold, that 'being the seat of experience' itself is 'being a body' ?

**Reply :** No. Rather, it is simpler to hold that 'being the seat of voluntary effort (*ceṣṭā*)' is itself 'being a body'. *Ceṣṭā* is actually a special species of action. It should not be said that action itself is *ceṣṭā*, because in that case we should have to apply the term to the movements of a dead body also (under the influence of magic) ! Nor should it be held that any action born out of direct effort is itself *ceṣṭā*, because (we will then have to) apply that word with respect to pot etc., also (when it is holding



boiling water) since, (after all), all actions are born out of the effort of God ! Therefore the same argument that enlightens us as to acceptance of a body by the Supreme Lord can also prove the efforts produced by that body. Hence let this discussion stop here.

Nor does it follow that by accepting such a body (for the Supreme Lord), the number of principles (*tattva*) will be raised (from 26 to 27), because this body is not the material cause of the world like pot etc., nor is it the cause of the senses.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>35</sup> The Vedānta adopts the Sāṅkhyan theory of principles with certain modifications. These principles are twenty six in number, as follows : Īśvara, jīva, primordial matter, intellect, egoism, the five subtle elements (earth, water, fire, air and ether) the five gross elements, the five organs of cognition (eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin), the five organs of action (hands, feet, speech, organs of generation and excretion) and the mind. Out of these the subtle elements produce the gross elements, as also the sense-organs. The gross elements are the material cause of this gross world. The Lord's body is not the material cause of this world like the gross elements, nor is it the cause of the sense organs like the subtle elements. Like a pot (which is never considered as a primary principle) the Lord's body also is not a 'principle'.

ननु स्वतः प्रयोजनाभावे कथं प्रवर्तत इत्यपेक्षायामाह—

Since He has nothing to gain for Himself, how does He engage in action ? This question is now answered.

मुख्यं तस्य हि कारुण्यम् ॥ ४९ ॥

49. The chief reason (for His taking birth) is indeed His compassion.

लोके हि निरुपाधिपरदुःखहानाय प्रवृत्तेषु कारुणिकव्यपदेशः । न चासौ तेषु मुख्यः, कृपाजन्यदुःखहानाय पुण्यार्थं वाऽप्यन्ततः प्रवृत्तेर्न निरुपाधित्वं सम्भवति । नापि परदुःखप्रहाणमात्रप्रवृत्ते तथा धनाद्युपाधियुक्ते तदव्यवहृतेः । किन्तु निरुपाधिपरक्लेशनाशिनो भगवत एव मुख्यं कारुण्यम् । तत्कृत एवान्यप्रयोजनार्थेषु कारुण्यव्यवहारो गौण इति । तस्माज्जननीयादृष्टमपेक्ष्य स्वकारुण्यात्प्रवृत्तिरिति ॥ ४९ ॥

In this world, the term 'compassionate' is applied to those who are disinterestedly engaged in the removal of others' sorrows. But this is not the highest sense of the word, when applied with respect to such people ; because, ultimately, their effort is motivated by either the alleviation of their own sorrow born out of pity or the acquisition of merit, and hence their compassion cannot be unconditioned. Nor is this highest sense applicable with respect to him who merely acts to remove others' sorrows,<sup>36</sup> because it cannot be applied to him who is conditioned by monetary gain etc. However the compassion of the Lord who destroys the afflictions of others unconditionally, is the highest. When we use the word 'compassionate' with respect to those who seek other benefits (when they work for the removal of others' sorrows), we use it only in a secondary

sense because of His sake.<sup>37</sup> Hence we say that men act from their feeling of compassion, having an eye at the same time, on the merit which will thus be produced.

<sup>36</sup> If you take merely the working for the removal of others' sorrows without specifying any preconditions, as the guide for the application of this word the contingency of having to apply it to those who work with ulterior motives, will also arise !

<sup>37</sup> Because it can have the highest sense only in His case.

ननु 'नराणाञ्च नराधिप' (गीता १०.२७) इत्यादिना विभूतीनामपि भगवद्रूपत्वकथनाद्राजादिभक्तेरपि मुक्तिः स्यादित्यत आह—

By such statements as ('I am) the king among human beings' (*Gītā* 10.27), it is declared that even the pre-eminent manifestations of the Lord's power are His own forms. Hence liberation can be got even through devotion to a king etc. This contention is now refuted :

प्राणित्वान्न विभूतिषु ॥ ५० ॥

50. (Devotion directed) towards the manifestations cannot (lead to liberation); because they are ordinary living beings.

जीवोपाध्यनवच्छिन्नविषयैव परा भक्तिर्न तु प्राणादिजीवोपाधियुक्तेषु राजादिषु रक्तिर्मुक्तिफलेति ॥ ५० ॥

Supreme devotion can have only that Being who is free from the limiting adjuncts of an individual soul, as its object. The affection shown towards kings etc., who are bound by the limiting adjuncts of an individual soul like the vital airs etc., cannot give the fruit of liberation.

द्यूतराजसेवयोः प्रतिषेधाच्च ॥ ५१ ॥

51. And because gambling as well as the service to a king has been prohibited.

धर्मशास्त्रेषु द्यूतराजसेवयोः प्रतिषेधः स्मर्यते परमेश्वरत्वे तु तन्न स्यादिति ॥ ५१ ॥

In the *Dharmaśāstras* we read that gambling and service to a king have been prohibited. If the king were God Himself, this would not have been so.

वासुदेवेऽपीति चेन्नाकारमात्रत्वात् ॥ ५२ ॥

52. If it be said that this (prohibition) applies to Vāsudeva also, it is not so ; because he is only the form of (Brahman).

ननु 'वृष्णीनां वासुदेवोऽस्मि' (गीता १०.३७) इति विभूतिषु श्रुतिस्तथा च राजादिवत् सोऽप्यभजनीय एव स्यादिति चेत् ; न, परब्रह्मण एव कृष्णाकारमात्रत्वात् । यथा पराशर आह (वि. पु. ४. ११.२) --

यदोर्वशं नरः श्रुत्वा सर्वपापैः प्रमुच्यते ।

यत्रावतीर्णं विष्ण्वारूढं परब्रह्म नराकृति ॥ इति ॥

जीवत्वे तन्न स्यादिति ॥ ५२ ॥

**Objection :** When the śruti mentions that Vāsudeva also is one of the manifestations, by the words 'I am Vāsudeva among the Vṛṣṇis' (*Gītā* 10.37), does he not also—like the king etc—become unfit to be an object of meditation ?

**Reply :** No ; because though the form is of Kṛṣṇa, He is really the Highest Brahman (existing in that form). So does Parāśara say : 'By hearing of the race of the Yadus, where the Highest Brahman taking the form of a man, was born as Viṣṇu (or Kṛṣṇa) a man is freed from all sins. (*V, P.* 4.11.2). This would not have been so if (Kṛṣṇa) were only an individual soul.

प्रत्यभिज्ञानाच्च ॥ ५३ ॥

53. And from His being recognized as such.

वासुदेवविषये परब्रह्मप्रत्यभिज्ञा च श्रूयते (नारायणोपनिषत्—अथर्व-  
शिरसि—६.९)—

ब्रह्मण्यो देवकीपुत्रो ब्रह्मण्यो मधुसूदनः ।

सर्वभूतस्थमेकं नारायणम् ।

कारणरूपमकारणं परब्रह्मस्वरूपम् ॥ इति ।

स्मर्यते च प्रत्यभिज्ञा । यथा प्रलये दृष्टानुभावेन युधिष्ठिरं प्रति मार्कण्डेये  
नोक्तम् (म. भा. व. १८९.५२) —

यस्स देवो मया दृष्टः पुरा पद्मायतेक्षणः ।

स एव पुरुषव्याघ्रः सम्बन्धी ते जनार्दनः ॥ इति ॥

तथा (म. भा. शा. मोक्षधर्म—३४३.२२) 'तपोभिरप्यदृश्यो हि  
भगवान्' इति श्रुत्वा, जनमेजयेनाभिहितम्—

तपसाऽप्यसुदृश्यो हि भगवान् लोकपूजितः ।

तं दृष्टवन्तस्ते साक्षात् श्रीवत्साङ्गविभूषणम् ॥ इति ॥

चकारात् तद्भक्तेषु फलस्मरणलिङ्गात् ॥ ५३ ॥

A recognition pertaining to Vāsudeva that He is the Highest Brahman, is found in the following śruti : 'The son of Devakī is related to Brahman. The destroyer of Madhu is related to Brahman. There is one form of Supreme Brahman belonging to Nārāyaṇa, pervading all beings, existing as the cause (of all), itself uncaused' (*Nā. U. Atharvaśiras* 6.9). This recognition is also found in the smṛti. For instance, Mārkaṇḍeya who had had the experience of seeing a mundane dissolution (*pralaya*), tells Yudhiṣṭhira thus : 'The lotus-eyed God who was seen by me once upon a time, He verily is your relative Janārdana, a tiger among men' (*Mbh. V.* 189.52).

So also, Janamejaya says after hearing that the Lord cannot be seen even by austerity : 'The Lord

adored by the world, who is invisible even to the power of austerity, has been directly seen as adorned with śrīvatsa mark by them' (*Mbh. ś. Mokṣadharmā* 343.22).

By the word 'and' an additional reason is implied, because the smṛtis speak of rewards to His devotees.

तर्हि कथं विभूतिषु तत्कीर्तनम् ? तत्राह —

How then can He (Vāsudeva) be described among the pre-eminent manifestations ? He answers this question :

बृष्णिषु श्रेष्ठेन तत् ॥ ५४ ॥

54. That is due to His being the best among the Vṛṣṇis.

'आदिस्थानामहं विष्णुः' (गीता १०.२१) इत्यादौ तेषु श्रेष्ठत्वं परमेश्वरस्यैवेति दृष्टिमात्रार्थं विभूतिकथनम्; तच्च वासुदेवोऽपि बृष्णिषु-श्रेष्ठोऽयमित्येतावन्मात्रदृष्टिविधानार्थं विभूतिषु वासुदेवकीर्तनमिति ॥ ५४ ॥

In such passages as 'I am Viṣṇu among the Ādityas' (*Gītā* 10.21), the enumeration is only to inculcate the attitude that whatever is best among them, that really belongs to the Supreme Lord. Similarly the mention of Vāsudeva among the pre-eminent manifestations is to inculcate the attitude that He is the best among the Vṛṣṇis.

एवं प्रसिद्धेषु च ॥ ५५ ॥

55. And similarly (devotion towards) the well-known (manifestations of the Lord will give liberation).

एवमनेनप्र कारेणव नुदेववद्ब्रह्मलिङ्गवत्तया प्रसिद्धेषु वराहनृसिंहवामन रामभद्रादिषु भक्तिरपि मुक्तिफलाच्चेति बोध्यम् । यद्वा--एवं ब्रह्मलिङ्गवत्तया प्रसिद्धेषु 'रुद्राणां शङ्करश्चास्मि' (गीता १०.१३) इत्यदिविभूत्यात्मसु श्रेष्ठ्यमात्रदृष्टिमन्तव्या । उक्तं हि स्कान्दे (काशीखण्डः—पूर्व.— २७.१८१)—

विष्णुरुद्रान्तरं ब्रूयाद्यः श्रीगौर्यन्तरं तथा ।

तद्भ्रान्तकस्य मूर्खस्य वाक्यं शास्त्रविगर्हितम् ॥ इति ॥

शङ्करस्य ब्रह्मलिङ्गप्रसिद्धिः स्मृत्यादौ बहुलमुपलभ्यत इति ॥ ५५ ॥

इत्याचार्यस्वप्नेश्वरविद्वद्भिरविरचिते शण्डिल्यशतसूत्रीयभाष्ये द्वितीयाध्यायस्य प्रथममाहिकम् । १ ॥

In this way, it is to be known that devotion towards the other well-known manifestations like Varāha, Narasimha, Vāmana, Śri Rāma etc., who also like Vāsudeva, possess the characteristics of Brahman, will certainly give liberation. Or, it may mean that an attitude of mere superiority has to be cultivated towards the pre-eminent manifestations which are well-known to possess the characteristics of Brahman ; as for instance (towards Śaṅkara because the Lord says) : 'I am Śaṅkara among the



Rudras' (*Gītā* 10.23). The *Skāndapurāṇa* says : 'Whoever says there is any difference between Viṣṇu and Rudra Or between Lakṣmī and Gaurī, the statement of such a deluded fool is condemned by the scriptures' (*Kāśikhaṇḍa*—I Part-27.181). Statements to the effect that Śaṅkara is well-known to possess the characteristics of Brahman, are found in abundance in the smṛtis etc.

*Thus ends the first section of the second chapter of the commentary on the hundred Aphorisms of Śaṅḍilya composed by the most learned teacher Svapneśvara.*

## SECTION II

उक्तौ दृष्टोपकारकौ ज्ञानयोगौ, सम्प्रति प्रतिबन्धकदुरितक्षयमुखेनाप-  
वर्गवत्यो गौणभक्तय उच्यन्ते—

Knowledge and Concentration, the two manifest aids to (devotion) have been discussed. The inferior forms of devotion which lead to liberation through the destruction of sins hindering (such liberation) will now be described.

भक्त्या भजनोपसंहाराद्गौण्या\* परायै तद्धेतुत्वात् ॥ ५६ ॥

56. Because *bhajana* has been summed up by applying the word *bhakti* to it in a secondary sense, (the lower devotion exists) for the sake of the highest, since it is a means to its production.

‘भजन्त्यनन्यमनसो ज्ञात्वा भूतादिमव्ययम्’ (गीता ९.१३) इत्यनेन  
सप्तमाध्यायप्रतिपादितपरभक्तिमनुद्य तत्पश्चाद्गीतम् (गीता ९.१४)—

\*.....गौणी (पा.); .....गौण्याः (पा.)

सततं कीर्तयन्तो मां यतन्तश्च दृढव्रताः ।  
नमस्यन्तश्च मां भक्त्या नित्ययुक्ता उपासते ॥

इत्यादि । तत्पश्चात् (गीता ९.२९)—

‘ये भजन्ति तु मां भक्त्या मयि ते तेषु चाप्यहम्’ इति तदुपसंहारः । ततस्तत्र ‘चित्रया यजेत’ (तै. सं. २.४.६) इतिवत् सामानाधिकरण्येन भक्तिनाम्ना भजनेन फलं भावयेदित्यर्थः । ‘एकभक्तिर्विशिष्यते’ (गीता ७.१७) इत्यादौ भगवद्भक्तौ भक्तिशब्दस्य प्रयुक्तत्वेन संज्ञाप्राप्तेः, भक्तिभजन-योरेकार्थत्वाच्च ॥

After referring to the highest devotion which has been set forth in the seventh chapter (of the *Gītā*), by the line ‘Having known Me as imperishable and the origin of beings they worship (*bhajanti*) Me with a single mind’ (9.13), the *Gītā* proceeds to say : ‘Glorifying Me always and striving with firm resolve, bowing down to me in devotion (*bhakti*) always steadfast, they worship Me’ (9.14). After this again the topic has been summed up in the words ‘They who worship (*bhajanti*) Me with devotion (*bhaktiyā*) are in Me and I in them’ (9.29). Therefore, just as in the case of the (*Mīmāṃsā*) text, ‘Let him sacrifice with *citrā*’ (*Tai. S.* 2.4.6) here also the meaning is ‘let him produce the desired fruit by worship (*bhajana*) which is expressed by the term devotion (*bhakti*)’; because then only there would be a common substratum.<sup>1</sup> An additional reason is that in such statements as ‘he who has devotion to the One (*ekabhaktiḥ*) excels’ (*Gītā* 7.17), the word

*bhakti* has been used in the sense of devotion to God and as such, has acquired that significance ; and also because the words *bhakti* and *bhajana* mean the same thing.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The full text is 'Let him who desires cattle, sacrifice with *citrā*' *citrāyā yajetā paśukāmaḥ*. Here, what is the exact meaning of the wood *citrā* ? Does it mean a particular sacrifice of that name, so called because of the six varieties of things like ghee, honey etc., used in it ? Or does it signify a spotted she-goat which is the victim in *Agniśomiya* sacrifice ? This question is decided by applying the principle of *sāmānadhikaraṇya* ('having the same substratum'). *Citrā* is to be taken as a sacrifice of that name because then only the fruit of the sacrifice (*viz.*, acquisition of cattle) and the prescribed means (*viz.*, the sacrifice itself) will reside in (or belong to) to the common substratum (*ie.*, the sacrificer). If the second meaning is accepted then there will be *vaiyadhikaraṇya* (different substratums) because only the fruit will belong to the offerer whereas the spotted she-goat belongs to the sacrifice *Agniśomiya*. (See *Jaimintya Nyāyamālā Vistarāḥ* 1.4 3).

Before applying this principle here, certain clarifications are necessary. In the first quotation of the *Gītā* (9.13) it is *parābhakti* that is referred to by the word *bhajanti* because it comes *after* knowing Him. In the second quotation (9.14) it is the *aparā* or *gauṇī bhakti* (inferior devotion) that is referred to by the word *bhaktyā*, because *kīrtana* (glorifying Him), *namaskāra* (bowing down to Him) etc., belong to a lower plane. In the third quotation (9.29) where both words (*bhajanti* and *bhaktyā*) are used in summing up, a doubt arises whether the two words bear their respective meanings as accepted above or whether they mean the same thing. If the latter is true, that will need an explanation. This is exactly what the aphorism is for.

We can now apply the principle of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* on the analogy of *Mīmāṃsā* quoted above. Just as the desirer of cattle was advised to offer through the sacrifice called *citrā* to produce the desired result, here also the desirer of God-realization is advised to worship through *bhajana*, called *bhakti*, to produce the desired fruit. Then only would the fruit of God-realisation and the means of *bhakti*, be directly connected to the devotee and the principle of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* is not violated. Since the actual meanings of the words *bhajana* and *bhakti* have differed, here one of them is to be taken in a secondary sense to fall in line with the other.

<sup>2</sup>Because both have been derived from the same root *bhaj*.

नाप्यत्र परभक्तिः फलभावनया विधीयते तस्या अकृतिसाध्यत्वेनाविधेयत्वात् । न चापि तस्या निश्चयसहेतुत्वमज्ञातं ज्ञाप्यते । 'मद्भक्ता यान्ति मामपि' (गीता. ७.२३) इत्यादिना सप्तम एव तज्ज्ञापनस्यापि प्राप्तत्वात् । किन्तु परभक्तेर्विघ्ननाशनसाधनाकाङ्क्षया कीर्तनादिकमेवोपक्रमन्तं भक्तिशब्देन गौण्या वृत्त्या तृतीयान्तेन निर्दिश्य परभजनसाधनत्वं तेषु विधीयत इत्यर्थवादाकाङ्क्षायां 'मयि ते तेषु चाप्यहम्' (गीता ९.२९) इति पश्चादन्वयः । अन्यथा भक्त्या भजनं तेन च मयि स्थितिरिति वाक्यं भिद्येत ।

Nor (should it be said that) the highest devotion has been enjoined as a fruit, because it cannot be produced by an effort of the human will and as such cannot be enjoined (*vide* aph. 7). Nor again (can it be said that) the fact of its being the cause of supreme bliss, which was previously unknown, is being declared (now) ; because even in the seventh chapter itself this reminder is found in the words, 'and My

devotees too attain Me' (*Gītā* 7.23) etc. However (the true view is this) : When the question of destruction of the obstacles to the highest devotion arose, glorifying (*kīrtana*) etc, were brought in as the means. Then the word *bhakti* expressed in the instrumental case, was applied to them in a secondary sense and they were enjoined as themselves the means to the highest devotion. The closing passage 'They are in Me and I in them' (*Gītā* 9.29) was then connected with it to eulogise it. Otherwise the sentence would have to be split up as 'by *bhakti* they attain *bhajana*' and 'through that (*bhajana*) they dwell in Me'.

कीर्तनादिषु भक्तिसाधनत्वेन 'आयुर्वै वृतम्' (तै.सं. २.३.२) इतिवद्भक्तिशब्दो गौणः शक्यसंस्कारेण सुग्रह इति । यद्वा भज्यत एभिरिति व्युत्पत्त्या तासु भक्तिशब्दः, उद्भिद्भूत् (आश्व.श्रौ. ९.८.) । अथवा 'चतुर्विधा भजन्ते माम्' (गीता ७.१६) इति भजनगणपाठात् सृष्टिवत् । 'उदारःस्सर्व एवैते' (गीता ७.१८) इत्यौदार्यगुणयोगाद्वा गौणत्वमिति ॥ ५६ ॥

Since glorifying (the Lord) etc., are means for producing devotion, the word 'devotion' has been applied to them in a secondary sense which is more easily grasped than the literal one, as in the statement 'Ghee is life' (*Tai S.* 2.3.2). Or like the word *udbhīd*,<sup>4</sup> (*Āś. Śr.* 9.8.), the word *bhakti* also is used (with respect to glorifying etc.) in an etymological sense, deriving it as 'He is worshipped by this' (*bhajyate anena*). Or like creation<sup>5</sup>, the application of the word might be due to the grouping according to

the motive of worship as in 'Four kinds of men worship Me' (*Gītā* 7.16). Or this secondary sense (*gaunatva*) may be due to the characterizing (*guṇa*) of the devotees as 'noble-minded', as in the statement 'All these are no doubt noble-minded' (*Gītā* 7.18).

<sup>3</sup> Because taking a strong food like ghee increases life, ghee is termed as life in a secondary sense.

<sup>4</sup> The etymological meaning of this word is *udbhidyate anena*, 'is dug up (or extracted) through this'. A shovel digs up earth; a particular sacrifice 'digs up' the fruit of cattle etc., for the sacrificer. Hence both the shovel and the sacrifice are named *udbhid*.

<sup>5</sup> The created beings are often classified as : (a) *Aṇḍaja*—those born out of an egg; (b) *Jarāyuja*—those born of the womb ; (c) *Svedaja*—those born out of sweat or warm vapour ; (d) *Udbhijja*—those that spring from the soil. Similarly the devotees are also classified into four groups. This four-fold classification seems to be the only common point between them.

This whole para gives several interpretations for taking devotion in a secondary (*gauṇa*) sense.

\*रागार्थप्रकीर्तिसाहचर्याञ्चेतरेषाम् ॥ ५७ ॥

57. Other (inferior forms of devotion) also (produce the same fruit, viz., affection towards the Lord) because they have been associated with 'glorifying (the Lord)' for the sake of gaining affection (towards Him.) :

\*रागार्थ प्रकीर्ति.....(पा.)

एवं हि श्रुतम् (गीता ११.३६)---

स्थाने हृषीकेश तव प्रकीर्त्या  
जगत्प्रहृष्यत्यनुरज्यते च ।

इति तत्र साक्षाद्देवानुरागार्थत्वं कीर्तनस्य श्रुतम् । तत्साहचर्यात् 'सततं कीर्तयन्तो मां यतन्तश्च दृढव्रताः' (गीता ९.१४) इत्यादिनोक्तानामपि तदेव फलमिति ॥ ५७ ॥

So has it been declared (in the *Gītā* 11.36): 'It is but proper, O Lord of the senses, that the world is delighted and filled with love at thy praises.' That glorifying the Lord (*prakīrti*) is for the sake of producing love (*anurāga*) towards Him has been directly affirmed here. Therefore all other inferior forms of devotion as referred to by the statement 'always glorifying Me and striving with firm resolve' etc., (*Gītā* 9.14) also produce the same result (*viz.*, affection towards the Lord) because of their association with 'glorifying (the Lord)' (*kīrtana*).

अन्तराले तु शेषाः स्युरुपास्यादौ च काण्डत्वात् ॥ ५८ ॥

58. But (the inferior forms of devotion mentioned) in between, are subsidiary to (supreme devotion). So also (the devotion towards) the objects of meditation (mentioned in the śruti) because (they form part of) Brahma-kāṇḍa (which treats of devotion).



‘भजन्त्यनन्यमनसो ज्ञात्वा भूतादिमव्ययम्’ (गीता ९.१३), ‘ये भजन्ति तु मां भक्त्या मयि ते तेषु चाप्यहम्’ (गीता ९.२९)— इत्येतयोरन्तराले या गौणभक्तयः श्रुतास्ताः परभक्त्यङ्गानि भवन्ति परभक्ति-सन्दंशादेवेति भावः ॥

The inferior forms of devotion mentioned in between the verse, ‘Having known Me as imperishable and the origin of beings they worship Me with a single mind’ (*Gītā* 9.13) and the verse, ‘They who worship Me with devotion are in Me and I in them’ (*ibid.* 9.29) are subsidiary to supreme devotion because of the very fact that they are included as if in a pair of tongs, in between the two supreme devotions.

ता यथा (गीता अ. ९. श्लो. १४, १५, २२, २५-२८)—

सततं कीर्तयन्तो मां धतन्तश्च दृढव्रताः ।  
नमस्यन्तश्च मां भक्त्या नित्ययुक्ता उपासते ॥  
ज्ञानयज्ञेन चाप्यन्ये भजन्तो मामुपासते ।  
एकत्वेन पृथक्त्वेन बहुधा विश्वतोमुखम् ॥ इति ॥

तथा—

अनन्यादिचिन्तयन्तो मां ये जनाः पर्युपासते ।  
तेषां नित्याभियुक्तानां योगक्षेमं वहाम्महम् ॥ इति ।

तथा—

यान्ति देवव्रता देवान् पितॄन् यान्ति पितृव्रताः ।  
भूतानि यान्ति भूतेज्या यान्ति मद्याजिनोऽपि माम् ॥ इति ।

वत्रं पुष्पं फलं तोयं वो मे भक्त्या प्रवच्छति ।  
तदहं भक्त्युपहतमश्नामि प्रवतात्मनः ॥ इति ।

तथा—

वत्करोषि यदश्नासि वञ्जुहोषि ददासि यन् ।  
यत्तस्वसि कौन्तेय तत्कुरुष्व मदर्पणम् ॥  
शुभाशुभकैरेवं मोक्षसे कर्मबन्धनैः ॥ इति ॥

They are thus (described): ‘Always praising Me, striving with austere vows, and bowing down to Me with devotion, always steadfast, they worship Me’ (*Gītā* 9.14).

‘Worshipping through the knowledge-sacrifice others adore Me, either as identical or as separate, or they adore Me, the manifold, in different forms’ (*ibid.* 9.15).

‘Those persons, who think of nothing else and worship Me through meditation—the accession to and the maintenance of the welfare of such ever devout persons I look after’ (*ibid.* 9.22).

‘The worshippers of the gods go to the gods, the worshippers of the manes go to the manes, the worshippers of the spirits go to the spirits, and My worshippers too come to Me.’

‘He who with devotion offers Me a leaf, a flower, a fruit or water, that devout offering of the pure-minded one, I accept.’

‘Whatever you do, or eat, or sacrifice, or give, whatever austerity you perform, that O son of Kunti, offer unto Me.’

‘Thus you will be rid of the bonds of action resulting in good or evil consequences.’ (*ibid* 9.25-28)

तत्र नाम्नाभिधानं कीर्तनम् । भक्त्यर्थं यत्नश्चात्र लौकिकोऽप्यङ्गता  
प्रस्तावादुक्तः । दृढव्रतत्वं मङ्गलक्यैकादशयुपवासाद्यनुष्ठानम् । नमस्कारः  
स्वाक्कर्षवोषकरशिरस्संयोगादिव्यापारः । ज्ञानयज्ञश्च द्विधा मुख्यामुख्य-  
भेदेनैकत्वपृथक्त्वविषयतया । तन्मात्रचिन्ता तु ध्यानमनुस्मृतिश्च । यागः  
पूजा भगवन्तमुद्दिश्य पत्रादिदानञ्च तथा विहितनिषिद्धसर्वकर्मणां परमेश्वरे  
समर्पणमिति ॥

Here ‘praising’ (*kīrtana*) means the recitation of the names ‘Striving’ (*yatna*) to attain devotion though of a worldly character,<sup>6</sup> has been recounted here since the various subsidiary steps (of devotion) form the subject matter. Observance of fast on *ekādaśī* days etc., with devotion towards Me—this constitutes ‘austere vows’ (*ḍṛḍhavrata*). ‘Bowing down’ (*namaskāra*) means such activity as bringing together the head and the hands in token of self-abasement. Knowledge-sacrifice’ *jñāna-yajña*) is of two kinds : The superior and the inferior, as directed towards unity or plurality. ‘Thinking of nothing else’ (but Him)—means contemplation and continuous remembrance (of Him). ‘Sacrifice’ (*yāga*) means worship directed towards God, giving Him

leaves etc., as also offering all actions enjoined or forbidden—to that Supreme Lord.

<sup>6</sup> Suppose one makes an extra effort to earn more money with the help of which he would like to perform a special worship or go on a pilgrimage. In such cases, even though the 'effort' is apparently worldly, it is to be considered as a subsidiary to devotion since the end aimed at is devotion.

न केवलमेतान्येवाङ्गानि । किन्तु 'मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत' (छा.उ. ३.१८), 'आदित्यानामहं विष्णुः' (गीता १०.२१) इत्याद्युपासनादि शब्दकवलीकृतान्यापि भक्तिसाधनानि । कुतः ? ब्रह्मकाण्डस्य सर्वस्यापि भक्तितत्साधनप्रतिपादकत्वादिति ॥ ५८ ॥

However, these are not the only subsidiary means. Even all those included under the word 'meditation' (*upāsanā*), in such statements as, 'The mind should be meditated upon as Brahman' *Ch. U.* 3.18), 'I am Viṣṇu among the Ādityas' (*Gītā* 10.21) etc., are also aids to devotion. For what reason? Because the whole of the *Brahmakāṇḍa*' (of which the above mentioned statements are parts) treats of devotion and the means thereto.

<sup>7</sup> c. f. what was said in the text and commentary on aphorism 26.

ताभ्यः पावित्र्यमुपक्रमात् ॥ ५९ ॥

59. Purity results from them as seen from the introduction of the subject.

ताभ्यो गौणभक्तिभ्यः पावित्र्यमन्तःकरणमालिन्यहेतुद्वारतक्षयः स एव द्वाग्म् । कुतः ? 'पवित्रमिदमुत्तमम्' (गीता ९.२) इत्युक्त्याभिधानात्, भक्तेरन्तःकरणधर्मत्वात्, पावित्र्यस्यान्तरङ्गत्वादिति । ५९ ।

From these inferior forms of devotion arises purity *i e*, the destruction of sins which cause impurity of the internal organ. This itself is the means. Why? Because (they have been) mentioned after introducing the subject as, 'This is the best purifier' (*Gita* 9.2); and also because devotion is a characteristic of the internal organ and purity is an internal means.

तासु प्रधानयोगात् फलाधिक्यमेके ॥ ६० ॥

60. Some (teachers think) that due to the association of the chief (devotion), the results achieved (by these inferior forms) will be more.

तास्त्रेव कीर्तनादिषु 'यो मे भक्त्या प्रयच्छति' (गीता ९.२६), नमस्यन्तश्च मां भक्त्या' (गीता ९.१४.) इत्यादौ प्रकरणादिसिद्धाङ्गभावेषु 'पुनर्भक्तिसंयोगकथनं प्रवृत्तभक्तीनां तदनुष्ठाने फलाधिक्यार्थमेवेत्येक आचार्या मन्यन्ते ॥ ६० ॥

Some teachers hold that in such statements as 'He who with devotion offers Me' (*Gītā* 9.26), 'Those bowing down to Me with devotion' (*ibid* 9.14) etc., the mention of devotion once again along with 'praising' etc.,—whose subsidiary nature to devotion

has already been determined by the context etc.,— is only to show that those who have already begun the practice of devotion will gain greater results by the practice of these inferior forms (of devotion).

नाम्नेति जैमिनिः सम्भवात् ॥ ६१ ॥

61. Jaimini (thinks that) by (these inferior forms) named (as *bhakti*, supreme devotion is to be attained); because (such an interpretation) is possible.

जैमिनिराचार्यस्तु तासु मौणत्वसिद्धेः 'श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेन' (भा.श्व. श्रौ. ९.७) इत्यादाविव भक्त्या कीर्तनेन, भक्त्या दानेन परभक्ति साधयेदिति सामानाधिकारण्यसम्भवान्नामभावेनान्यार्थं तां मन्यते न फलान्तरार्थं गौरवादिति ॥ ६१ ॥

Their inferiority (to supreme devotion) being already established, the teacher Jaimini thinks that by 'praising' named as 'devotion' by 'giving' named as 'devotion' the supreme devotion is to be secured ; just as in the passage, 'Let him who is using a spell, sacrifice with the *śyena*'<sup>8</sup> (Āś. Śr. 9.7) etc., (the word *śyena* denotes a special sacrifice of that name). It is only thus *sāmānādhikarāṇya*<sup>9</sup> is possible. Hence *bhakti* is to be considered in the sense of a special name, existing for the sake of another (*viz.*, supreme devotion) and not for the sake of producing another result<sup>10</sup> by itself, because this introduces a needless complication.

<sup>8</sup> In the previous aphorism the view of some other teachers was given. This aphorism being in opposition to that view and since Jaimini is being singled out by name, as the champion of this view, we may guess that Śāṅḍilya also concurs with him. So according to this view, *bhaktyā* does not have the ordinary meaning of 'through devotion' but indicates a special name. The statement of Āśvalāyana and its interpretation are brought in, in support of Jaimini. In that statement, one who is desirous of using a spell to destroy his enemy is advised to sacrifice with the *śyena*. This word means both a hawk and a special sacrifice by that name. From the context, by applying the rule of *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, it is concluded there, that *śyena* means the special sacrifice of that name. Similarly here also, the word *bhakti* is to be taken as a special name applied to such inferior forms of devotion as 'praising' (*kirtana*) etc.

<sup>9</sup> See note 1 under aphorim 56.

<sup>10</sup> viz., enhancing the results that would have normally been obtained without it. See the commentary of the previous sūtra.

अत्राङ्गप्रयोगानां\* यथाकालसम्भवो गृहादिवत् ॥ ६२ ॥

62. Here, subsidiary means are to be performed according to time and circumstances, as in the case of (collecting materials for building) a house.

कीर्तननमस्यादीनां सहानुष्ठानम्, एकैकेन वा क्रमेण वाऽनुष्ठानमिति त्रयः पक्षाः । तत्राद्ये कस्यचिदननुष्ठानेऽप्यन्येषां निष्फलत्वप्रसङ्गः । द्वितीये विकल्पप्राप्तावर्थैक्यनियमः स्यात् । तृतीयस्त्वशास्त्रार्थः । एककृतावन्य-

\* अप्रयोगानां (पा.)

स्यानुष्ठानं प्रसज्यते गौरवात् । तस्मादेतेषां मिथो व्यभिचारहेतुत्वमिति पूर्वपक्षः ॥

Now, three alternatives arise : (1) The various subsidiaries like praising the Lord, bowing down to Him etc., are to be performed, all simultaneously ; or, (2) Only one of them need be performed ; or, (3) They are to be performed one after another.

The first view cannot be accepted because the non-performance of even one will render the others useless. Neither can the second view be accepted because there will be (unlimited) choice thereby forcing us to the conclusion that all of them have one and the same purpose. Nor can we subscribe to the third view because that is not what the text means. Moreover, after performing one, the non-performance of the others is likely, because of the unnecessary trouble involved. Hence these different observances simply lead to confusion by each intruding into the province of others ! This is the *prima facie* view.

सिद्धान्तस्तु सर्वाण्येव साधनानि प्रमाणसत्त्वात् । किन्तु सहानुष्ठाननियमो नास्ति प्रमाणाभावात् । येषां तु गन्धपुष्पधूपदीपनैवेद्यादीनामेकप्रयोगश्रवणं तेषामेव सहानुष्ठानम् । तदितरेषां तु यथाकालं यथासम्भवमनुष्ठानं गृहकृत्यादाच्चिन्नं गृहसाधनतृणस्तम्भाद्याहरणं कदाचिदेकदा कदाचित्कमश्च इति । न ह्येतावता तृणादीनामकरणत्वमायाति । तस्मात् यद्यादृशदुरितक्षयसमर्थं तत्तादृशदुरितक्षयं कृत्वा सर्वैः स्वस्वसामर्थ्ये दर्शिते परभक्तिसिद्धिरिति । तथा



च गीयते बहूनां जन्मान्मन्ते ज्ञानबन्मां प्रपद्यते' (गीता ७. १९)  
इति ॥६२ ॥

But our doctrine is that all these observances are means (for the production of supreme devotion), because they are all authoritative. On the other hand, due to the absence of authority, there is no rule that they must all be performed together. Where collective use has been ordained by the śruti, as for instance in the case of sandal paste, flowers, incense, lighted lamp, food-offering, etc., it is only there that collective performance is (necessary). Elsewhere however, they are to be performed according to time and circumstances, as in the case of building a house etc., where the building materials like the thatch, pillars etc, are brought sometimes all together and sometimes one by one. It does not follow from this that the thatch etc., cease to be the means. Therefore whatever sin each observance is specially capable of destroying, let it be performed for that purpose ; and thus all having respectively shown their various efficacies the supreme devotion will eventually arise. So has it been declared : 'At the end of many births he who has knowledge, attains Me' (*Gītā* 7.19).

ईश्वरतुष्टेरेकोऽपि बली ॥ ६३ ॥

63. Even one among them can be sufficient to please God.

तेषु मध्ये यः कश्चिदतिशयानुष्ठानेन बलवान्भवति स एकोऽपि परमेश्वरतुष्टिं जनयित्वा परभक्तये प्रभवति । बहुमशिक्षितपरिचर्याभिगमि यथा नेतरः प्रभुस्तुष्यति, तुष्यति चैकेनापि निर्व्यलीकसततकृतपादसंवाहनेन तद्वन् । कीर्तनाद्यन्यतमेनापि दृढतरसेवितेन भगवत्प्रसादाद्भक्तिः प्राप्यते यथा (गीता १८.५७)—

बुद्धियोगं समाश्रित्य मच्चित्तः सततं भव ।

मच्चित्तः सर्वदुर्गाणि मत्प्रसादात्तरिष्यसि ॥ इत्यादि ।

तथा कालकृतमपि कस्यचिद्बलम् । यथा (ब्र.पु. ९.७.१६६) —

ध्यायन्कृते यजन्यज्ञैस्त्रेतायां द्वापरेऽर्चयन् ।

यदाप्नोति तदाप्नोति कलौ सङ्कीर्त्य केशवम् ॥

इत्यादिकम् । न च व्यभिचारो बलवत्प्रत्येकजन्यभक्तिं प्रति कीर्तनत्वादिना हेतुत्वादिति ॥ ६३ ॥

Among these inferior forms, whatever becomes powerful due to plenty of practice, even that one pleases the Lord and becomes capable of producing supreme devotion. The case is similar to that of an earthly lord who is not pleased even by several items of service loosely and carelessly performed, but is pleased even by a single service of shampooing the feet, done continually with hearty zeal. Supreme devotion is obtained through the grace of God who will be pleased by the resolute practice of any one from among the various inferior forms like 'praising' etc., as declared by the *Gītā*: 'Devoting thyself to the yoga of the intellect, fix thy mind always on Me.

Fixing your mind on Me you will overcome all difficulties through My grace' (18.57).

Similarly some of the practices may obtain their efficacy from a certain time, as declared in such statements as : 'What one attains by meditation in the Kṛta, by sacrifices in the Tretā and by external worship in the Dvāpara, the same is obtained in the age of Kali by merely reciting Keśava's names' (*Br. P.* 97.166).

Nor will these different means interfere with one another because each one of them like reciting etc., when it becomes powerful by practice, will produce its own result, *viz.*, devotion.

ननु कीर्तनाद्यन्तरालिकानां सर्वेषामेव पावित्र्यं द्वारमुत्त केषाञ्चिदन्य-  
दपीत्यत आह—

Is purity the doorway (to devotion)<sup>11</sup> in the case of all the (inferior forms) included in the list beginning with praising etc., or is it something else in the case of a few ? This question is now answered :

<sup>11</sup> See sutra 59. These inferior forms remove the sins of the mind and purify it thereby enabling the rise of supreme devotion. The question is whether all these forms pass through the same process or whether some of them produce supreme devotion in some other way also.

अबन्धोऽर्पणस्य मुखम् ॥ ६४ ॥

64. The absence of bondage (arising out of) surrendering (the works to God), is the means.

भगवत्यर्पितशुभकर्मणां स्वफलजननलक्षणबन्धाभाव एव द्वारम् ।  
यथोक्तम् 'शुभाशुभफलैरेवं मोक्ष्यसे कर्मबन्धनैः' (गीता ९.२८) इति ।  
अर्पणमन्त्रोऽपि पुगणान्तरे—

कामतोऽकामतो वाऽपि यत्करोमि शुभ-शुभम् ।

तत्सर्वं त्वयि संन्यस्तं त्वत्प्रयुक्तः करोम्यहम् ॥ इति ॥

The absence of bondage characterised by the inability to produce their results, of all actions, good or bad, due to their being offered to God—this alone is the means (to supreme devotion). So has it been said : 'Thou shalt thus be delivered from the good and evil consequences caused by works' (*Gītā* 9.28). The formula for this surrender of works is thus described in another Purāṇa : 'Whatever good or bad I do, either willingly or unwillingly, all that is offered to you. I do as impelled by Thee.'

न चैवं स्वातन्त्र्यप्रसङ्गः, तत्करणबलेन पापाचरणाभावस्यापि तदङ्गत्वात् ।  
यथा स्मृतिः 'न वेदबलमाश्रित्य पापकर्मरतिर्भवेत्' इति । तस्मात् पावित्र्यं  
तदितरविषयमेवेति । अत्र शुभं कर्म स्वाश्रमविहितनित्यनैमित्तिकात्मकं बोध्यम् ।  
सम्यगाश्रमपरिपालनाद् ब्रह्मलोकादिफलं तत्प्राप्तौ मुक्तये विलम्बः स्यादित्यादि-  
बन्धः । ब्रह्मण्यर्पिते तु तत्प्रसिद्धिः । एवं कामाज्ञानकृतकाम्यकर्मपापयोरपि  
पश्चादर्पणे फलभाव एव इति ॥ ६४ ॥

It does not follow from this that one would be free to do as he pleases ; because the absence of committing sins, arising out of the strength of such surrender, is also a part of such surrender. For

instance the *smṛti* says : 'One could not be addicted to sin while depending upon the strength of the Veda'. Therefore this purification refers to something other than (the purification) of committing sins. Here, it is the daily and occasional duty prescribed to one's station in life (*āśrama*), that is meant by the term 'good deed' (*śubhakarma*). The proper performance of one's duties prescribed to one's station in life brings the reward of the world of Brahmā etc. Since on the attainment of such worlds, liberation is delayed, (even) they are considered as bondage. On the other hand when they are surrendered to Brahma, liberation is surely attained. Similarly works done through the desires for fruits, as also sins committed due to ignorance, if offered even afterwards, will not produce their consequences.

अथ गौणीष्वेव विशेषश्चिन्त्यते, तत्र श्रुतिस्मृतिमध्ये यत्स्वरूपमुच्यते यथा 'य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्यमयः पुरुषो दृश्यते हिरण्यश्मश्रुहिरण्यकेशः' (छा. उ. १.६.६) इत्यादि । तथा (ना. प. ११.७१) —

ध्येयस्सदा सवितृमण्डलमध्यवर्ती  
नारायणस्सरसिजासनसन्निविष्टः ।  
केयूग्वान्मकरकुण्डलवान् किरीटी  
हारी हिरण्यवपुर्धृतशङ्खचक्रः ॥

इत्येवमादि । तत्र किमेवंविधेष्वेव ध्याननियमः पूर्णप्रादुर्भावाद्वा वा यथा-  
श्रुतेष्विति । तत्र ध्येयस्वरूपश्रवणान्नियमप्राप्तावुच्यते—

Now, a special question is to be thought of even with regard to these inferior forms of devotion. The śrutis and smṛtis describe certain forms (for meditation). For instance the *Chāndogya* says : 'That golden being who is seen within the orb of the sun, with a golden beard and golden hair' (1.6.6). The *Nārada-Pañcarātra* says : 'He is ever to be meditated upon, who resides in the orb of the sun, Nārāyaṇa seated on a lotus seat ; crest-bearing, wearing bracelets and *makara* ear-rings, be decked with a string of pearls, with golden body and carrying conch and discus' (11.71). Here the doubt is : whether there is any rule that one should meditate on such forms alone or can one meditate on complete manifestations as given in other śrutis ? The *prima facie* view is that there is such a rule since the śruti has described a definite form for meditation. This view is now refuted :

ध्याननियमस्तु दृष्टसौकर्यात् ॥ ६५ ॥

65. However, the rule regarding meditation is there, because it is easier (to contemplate) a visible object.

ध्याने ध्येयनियमकथनं दृष्टार्थं नानाविषयत्वे चित्तविक्षेपसम्भवात् ।  
तस्मात्सौकर्यार्थमेव तत्कथनं ज्ञेयम् । अदृष्टार्थत्वे विकल्पादिप्रसङ्गात् ।  
तस्माद्यथाश्रुतेषु व्यवस्था । अत एव गोपीनां शिशुपालादेश्च तन्नियम-  
मन्त्रेणैव ध्यानस्य दुर्लभं फलनुपलब्धमिति ॥ ६५ ॥

The rule restricting meditation to a particular object is there (to present the mind with )a visible object, because, otherwise there is the possibility of the mind being distracted by several objects. Therefore its mention is to be considered only for the convenience it affords. If the object of meditation were invisible there is (the risk of infinite number) of choices.<sup>12</sup> Therefore the rule is different with regard to the different passages of the śruti. That is why the milkmaids, Śiśupāla etc., even without recourse to this rule, could obtain such results for their meditation which would normally be very hard to obtain.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Hence diversion also would be more.

<sup>13</sup> The idea is that they obtained these fruits by meditating not upon the form as described in the scriptures quoted above but upon the forms they liked (or disliked) most. If the rule were universal, this would not have been possible. Patañjali also says that one can obtain samādhi by meditating upon any form one likes : याथभिमतध्यानाद्वा (Y.S. 1.39)

तद्यजिः पूजायामितरेषां\* नैवम् ॥ ६६ ॥

66. There, the root *yaj* is used in the sense of worship; not so in the case of other (sacrifices).

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\*..... पूजायामितरेषां तु नैवम् (पा.)

‘यान्ति मद्याजिनोऽपि माम्’ (गीता ९.२५) इत्यत्र यजिः किं प्रसिद्ध-  
ज्योतिष्टोमादिविषयः, किं वा पूजावचन इति । तत्रायं यजिः पूजायामेव  
प्रयुक्तः । कुतो ज्ञायते ? विष्णुं पूजयेदित्यादिना नित्यकाम्यपूजा तादर्थ्ये  
विहिता, तस्याः परभक्त्यङ्गत्वमात्रमत्र विधीयते, न तादर्थ्यम् । इतरयागानां  
तु न तादर्थ्यं श्रुतं तेषामीश्वरोद्देश्यकत्वं भक्तिसंयोगश्चोभयं विधातव्यमिति  
वाक्यभेदः स्यात्॥

In the statement of the Gītā (9.25), ‘Those who sacrifice to Me (*madyajinah*) go to Me’, does the root *yaj* (‘to sacrifice’) refer to the well-known sacrifices like the *Jyotiṣṭoma* etc., or does it denote worship? There, this root *yaj* is used only in the sense of worship. How is this known? By such statements as ‘Let him worship Viṣṇu’ etc., daily worship with desire is already enjoined with reference to Viṣṇu. That this worship is subsidiary to supreme devotion is all that is enjoined here (in the Gītā), but not with reference to Viṣṇu. However in the case of other sacrifices, there is no express statement that they be directed to Viṣṇu. Otherwise we would be forced to split the sentence into two, one enjoining that they be directed towards the Lord and the other enjoining that it be related to devotion.

अथ ‘विष्णवे उरुक्रमाय सूते चरुम्’ इत्यादिविहितस्य भक्तिसंयोगोऽ-  
स्त्विति चेत् ; सत्यम् । काम्यानां तत्फलेनैव निराकाङ्क्षत्वात् ।  
जीवनमात्रनिमित्तकनित्यपूजायास्तु भक्तिसंयोगविधौ बाधकाभावात् नित्यत्वे



सततोपस्थितिः शक्यः चेति । अत एव मोक्षधर्मे हिंसायुक्ताधर्मनिन्दायाम्  
(म. भा. शा. २६५. ५, १०) —

सर्वकर्मस्वहिंसां हि धर्मात्मा मनुब्रवीत् ।

कामरागा हि हिंसन्ति बहिर्वेषां पशून्मराः ॥

विष्णुं ये चाभिजानन्ति धर्मादेव यजन्ति ते ।

पायसैस्सुमनोभिश्च तथाऽपि यजनं स्मृतम् ॥ ३३ ॥ इति ।

**Objection :** Well then, since there are such injunctive statements as 'He offers an oblation of milk and butter to the wide-stepping Viṣṇu,' let it be accepted that there is connection with devotion (also) !

**Reply :** True. However, oblations motivated by desires become purposeless once those results are obtained ; (and hence the devotion associated with them will also have no further end to be achieved, like supreme devotion). But there is nothing to hinder the injunction of connexion with devotion in the case of the daily worship which has been made obligatory by the very fact of one's living; and since they are to be performed daily, they are always at hand.<sup>14</sup> That is why, while censuring the acts of worship accompanied by injury to living beings, it has been declared thus in the *Mokṣadharmā* : 'The righteous Manu prescribed non-injury in all ceremonial works. Men injure animals, outside the sacrificial altar, because they are tainted by desires. They alone, who know Viṣṇu, worship Him rightly with

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offerings of pudding and flowers. Thus is His worship prescribed in the smṛti<sup>15</sup> (*Mbh. Ś.* 264. 5, 10).

<sup>14</sup> The arguments of the whole commentary boil down to this : Though the root verb *yaj* normally means 'to sacrifice', in the particular statement of the *Gitā* it means worship. (See also *ibid* 9.34). Development of supreme devotion is the object of this worship whereas it is not so in the case of other sacrifices like *ḥyotiṣṭoma* etc., in which oblations are offered to certain minor gods with a view to attaining some lower desires. The particular quotation with which the objector confronts us, though it contains the name of Viṣṇu and hence seems to support the view that devotion can be associated with sacrificial acts also, does not really serve his purpose ; because this devotion to Viṣṇu ends with the fulfilment of the particular desire. So also the act of oblation. But in the case of daily worship of the Supreme Lord, the devotion has to culminate only in supreme devotion because there is no particular desire to be attained by this act and also because this act is to be carried on as long as one lives.

<sup>15</sup> These are the words of king Vicaknu who was moved by pity at the sacrifice of animals.

अथ पूजाप्रस्तावादधिकरणत्रयम्—

Now three sections on worship (*pūjā*) will follow, since this topic has been raised :

पादोदकं तु पाद्यमव्याप्तः ॥६७॥

67. The term *pādodaka* ('water of His feet') means the *pādyā* ('water meant for washing His feet'), as otherwise it would not apply to all cases.

एवं स्मर्यते (नृ. पु. ५९. ४३)—

गङ्गाप्रयागगयपुष्करनैमिषाणि

पुष्यानि यानि कुरुजाङ्गलयामुनानि ।

कालेन तीर्थसलिलानि पुनन्ति पापान्

पादोदकं भगवतः प्रपुनाति सद्यः ॥

इत्यत्र तर्किक पादसंयुक्तं जलं पादोदकम्, उत पादे दत्तकोत्सृष्टं जलम् ? तत्र पाद्यमेव पादोदकम् । कुतो ज्ञायते ? अन्यथाऽव्याप्तिप्रसङ्गात् । तथा हि भगवतस्साक्षात्पादसम्बन्धो न सम्भवति । नाप्यवतारद्वारा । तस्याप्यनुष्ठातृ-रुन्निधानासम्भवात् । किन्तु पूजाधिष्ठानप्रतिमापदसम्बन्धादुपचारस्तत्रापि प्रतिष्ठितायाः, अप्रतिष्ठितायास्तु पूजार्थमावाहने सति, तथा च शालिग्राम-शिलाद्यधिष्ठाने पादाभावे तन्न स्यात् । तत्रैव व्याप्त्यनुरोधात् पाद्यमेवास्तु प्रतिमद्यत्यन्तव्यवहितसम्बन्धकल्पनाप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ३७ ॥

The smṛti says thus : 'Those sacred waters of Gaṅgā, Prayāga, Gayā, Puṣkara and Naimiṣa as also those of Kurujāṅgala and Yamunā, cleanse sinners only after a lapse of time ; but the water of Lord's feet cleanses immediately (Nr. P. 59.46). Here does *pādodaka* mean the water actually connected with the (Lord's) feet, or does it mean the water offered at His feet (*pādya*)? Between these two, it is the water offered at His feet alone that is meant by the (word) *pādodaka*. How is this known ? Because, otherwise it would not apply to some other cases (which ought to be included). To explain : Direct connection with the Lord's feet is not possible. Nor

is it so through an incarnation, since His proximity to the worshipper is not (always) possible. Suppose we say in a secondary sense, it is connected with the feet of the consecrated image in worship, even then it would not hold good in the case of a non-consecrated image brought for worship or in the case of the *śaligrāma śilā* etc., which have no feet at all. Therefore in order to make that passage apply to all cases let it be taken to mean as *pādya* itself. Otherwise one has to imagine all sorts of distant connexions through the images etc.

स्वयमर्पितं\* ग्राह्यमविशेषात् ॥ ६८ ॥

68. What is offered to God (in worship) may (also) be taken by oneself, because there is no difference (between the devotee and the *śatvata*).

पूजायां भगवते दत्तं नैवेद्यनिर्मल्यादिकं 'वैष्णवं सास्वतेभ्य' इत्यादिना प्रतिपाद्यत्वेन विहितम् तदिह सास्वतत्वाविशेषादेव भगवद्भक्तेन स्वयमपि ग्राह्यं भोजनधारणादिना स्वोपकार्यमित्यर्थः। स्वयमपि ग्रहणे प्रतिपत्तिः सिद्ध्यति। धर्मशाठ्यं तु वर्जनीयमेव। यथा अभ्याद्युद्देशेन त्यक्तपुरोडाशस्यापि 'उत्तरार्धात् स्विष्टकृतमवद्यति', 'यजमानपञ्चमाः पुरोडाशं भक्षयन्ति' (आप. श्रौ. ३. १-२) इति प्रतिपत्तिस्तथेदमपि वचनादेव। अन्यथा सास्वतेभ्योऽपि न प्रतिपादयेत् परद्रव्यत्वात्।

\* स्वयमर्पितं (पा.)

It is ordained by such words as, 'What belongs to Viṣṇu must be given away to the *sātvatas*<sup>16</sup>', that the food, flowers etc., offered to God in worship are to be disposed of. Since the characteristic of being a *sātvata* is common to the devotee of the Lord also, he himself also can partake of them, can make use of them by eating, wearing etc. This is the meaning. The final ceremony (of *pratipatti*)<sup>17</sup> is fulfilled even by one's own taking. However all trickery in the name of *dharma* must be avoided. Therefore just as the *puroḍāśa* cake<sup>18</sup> which was given over to Agni etc., is afterwards disposed of in accordance with the words of injunction, 'He cuts the offering to Agni (*sviṣṭakṛt*) from the upper half,' 'the four priests, with the *yajamāna* as the fifth, eat the *puroḍāśa* cake', similarly here also the same thing is done in accordance with the words of injunction. Otherwise it cannot be given even to the *sātvatas* because it is a property belonging to somebody else!<sup>19</sup>

<sup>14</sup> The full text is like this :

विप्रेभ्यस्त्वथ तद्देयं ब्रह्मणे यन्निवेदितम् ।

वैष्णवं सात्वतेभ्यश्च भस्माङ्गेभ्यश्च शाम्भवम् ।

'What was offered to Brahmā, be given to the Brāhmaṇas. What belongs to Viṣṇu, must be given to the *sātvatas*. What belongs to Śāmbhu (Śiva) must be given to those who smear their bodies with the holy ash.'

*Sātvata* means a worshipper or devotee of Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa.

<sup>17</sup> In the treatises on rituals, the final disposal of what is left at the end of a rite, is technically called *pratipatti*. *c.f.* *Jaimintya Nyāyamāla Vistara* 3. 4. 21.

<sup>18</sup> Cake made of ground rice usually offered in Vedic sacrifices.

<sup>19</sup> Whatever has once been offered to others, belongs to them. Then none else will have the right to appropriate it to oneself ! Hence, what has once been offered to Viṣṇu belongs to Him and even the Sātvatas cannot partake of it !

वचनादिति चेन्न, न हि वचने स्ववर्जनमुक्तम् । अथ ‘ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दद्यात्’ इत्यादिना ब्राह्मणत्वादात्मनेऽपि दानप्रसङ्गादिति चेत् ; न, दानस्य स्वस्वत्वध्वंसनेन परस्वत्वापादनरूपत्वात् । न चैवं प्रतिपत्तौ युक्तं पुरोडाशस्यापि यजमाने प्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात् । क्रयादिवत् प्रतिपत्तिरपि स्वत्वापादिकैव । तदेवं यत्रान्यसात्वताऽसम्पत्तिस्तत्र स्वयं ग्रहणेनाप्यवैगुण्यं परिहार्यमेव । तथा स्वयं दत्तपाद्यादिधारणेऽपि ज्ञेयमिति । किञ्च ‘तैर्दत्तानप्रदायैभ्यो यो भुङ्क्ते स्तेन एव सः’ (गीता ३.१२) इत्यत्र समानकर्तृकत्वात् स्वत्वध्वंसे समानकर्तृत्वप्रतीतेः । क्त्वासमभिव्याहृतनजः सामानाधिकरण्येनान्वयात् तैर्दत्तानित्यत्र तज्जातीयपरत्वे मानाभावात् । तस्माद्वाधकं विना देवेभ्यो दत्तमपि भोक्तव्यमिति ध्येयम् ॥ ६८ ॥

**Objection :** Because of the the injunction it can be given to the sātvas, (but not to others).

**Reply :** No. There is nothing in the injunction to show that oneself must be excluded.

**Objection :** But then, since there is the injunction ‘must be given to the Brāhmaṇas’ and being a Brāhmaṇa, one may as well give it to oneself !

**Reply :** Not so ; because ‘gift’ means divesting oneself of the ownership on that object and

constituting another's ownership over it. It is not proper to apply this to the final ceremony of disposal because it is seen that the institutor of the sacrifice (*yajamāna*) also has a share in the puroḍāśa cake. Like purchasing etc., the final ceremony also establishes his ownership over it. This being the case, when there are no other sāvatas, this deficiency is to be made up by oneself taking them. Same principle is to be understood in the case of taking the water for washing the feet' (*Pādyā*) etc., already given (to God) by oneself. And also, the statement, 'He is verily a thief who eats things given by the gods, not having first given them to them' (*Gītā* 3. 12) (supports our view); because (1) the agent being the same and his supposed ownership over them being destroyed the object also must be understood to be the same; (2) the negation with the indeclinable participle *ktivā* (अप्रदाय=न दत्त्वा) should necessarily be connected with the same object as the verb ('eats') by the principle of *sāmānādhikarāṇya*; (3) in the statement 'what is given by them' there is no proof to show that these are things of a *similar* kind (and not the very *same* things).<sup>20</sup> Therefore we should hold that unless there is some other rule to hinder it, what is given to the gods also may be used by the offerer.

<sup>20</sup> The point of controversy in the statement of the *Gītā* is whether what is given to the gods and what is eaten by the offerer are one and the same; or are they different but similar things? The former is the view of the commentator which he has

proved by these three arguments. This will support the main contention of the sūtra also.

**निमित्तगुणाव्यपेक्षणादपराधेषु व्यवस्था ॥ ६९ ॥**

69. With regard to the offences in worship, (their nature) is to be settled in accordance with the occasion and character.

'देवपूजाऽपराधास्ते द्वात्रिंशत्परिकीर्तिताः' (व.पु. १२४.४.) इत्युपक्रम्य द्वात्रिंशापराधाः, तत्र प्रायश्चित्तानि च विहितानि । तत्र किं सर्वापराधवर्जनं पूजाङ्गम्, उत केषाञ्चिर्द्रव्यजनमङ्गं केषाञ्चित्पुरुषार्थ इति । अत्रोच्यते (व.पु. १२४.६५)—

अकर्मण्येन पुष्पेण यो मामर्चयते नरः ।

पतनं तस्य वक्ष्यामि तच्छृणुष्व वसुन्धरे ॥ इत्यादि ।

तत्राकर्मण्यानां पुष्पाणां पर्युदस्तत्वान्न पूजाङ्गत्वम् । किन्तु पूजाक्रम-प्रयोगमध्ये भ्रमादिनाऽर्पणे कृते तन्निमित्तमपेक्ष्य प्रायश्चित्तम् । यत्र तु 'अदत्त्वा गन्धमाल्यानि धूपं यो मे प्रयच्छति' (व.पु. २५.३६) इत्यनेन पूजाक्रम-भङ्गापराधे तत्तत्क्रमस्य पूजाङ्गत्वादङ्गवैगुण्यपरिहारात् तत्प्रायश्चित्तस्याङ्गत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । यत्र पूजामन्तरेण 'दन्तकाष्ठमखादित्वा यस्तु मामुपसर्पति' (व.पु. १२५. १) इत्यादि श्रुतं तत्र व्यक्तमेव पुरुषार्थत्वमिति व्यवस्थैवेति ॥ ६९ ॥

Beginning with the line, 'Thirty two offences in divine worship have been enumerated' (*Var. P.* 125.4), thirty two offences as also their expiations have been laid down. Now the question is whether



the avoidance of all these offences is part and parcel of the worship or the avoidance of a few is part of the worship whereas the avoidance of others is an end in itself. With reference to these points we have another statement: 'whoever worships Me with a flower unfit for the rite, hear O earth, I will declare that man's fall (into hell)' (*ibid* 124.65). Here, since flowers unfit for the rite have been forbidden, their avoidance cannot form part of the worship. However, in the midst of the worship if such a flower is offered by mistake, there is an expiation with reference to that offence, due to that reason. But where, as indicated in the statement 'when anyone offers me incense, without having first given me sandal paste and garlands' (*ibid*. 25.36) there is an offence committed against the proper order of worship, since that particular order is part of the worship, the expiation performed to remove this defect, is to be considered as part of that worship. But when it is said as in 'But whoever approaches Me, not having chewed a twing (to clean his teeth)' (*ibid*. 125.1), where there is no mention of any worship, there it is clear that the avoidance of this offence is an end in itself (as leading to happiness). This is how we have to determine the relative position of the different offences in worship.

एवं पूजाया भक्तिसंयोगसिद्धौ 'पत्रं पुष्पं फलं तोयम्' (गीता ९.२६)  
इत्यनेन भगवदुद्देश्यकदानमात्रस्य भक्त्यङ्गत्वविधिरित्याह—

Having thus established the connection of worship with devotion, he now proceeds to state the rule on the strength of the statement '(He who gives Me with devotion) a leaf, a flower, a fruit or even water' (*Gītā* 9.26), that only those gifts directed towards God, are subsidiary to devotion :

पत्रादेर्दानमन्यथा हि वैशिष्ट्यम् ॥ ७० ॥

70. The offering of leaf etc., (is a part of devotion), as otherwise it would become specialized (and limited).

‘यद्यदिष्टतमं लोको यच्चान्यद्दयितं गृहे ।  
तच्चद्धि देयं प्रीत्यर्थं देवदेवाय चक्रिणे ॥’

इत्यादिना प्राप्तस्य भगवदुद्देश्यकसर्वदानस्य भक्त्यङ्गत्वविधिः । अन्यथा पत्रादिचतुष्टयविशिष्टदानमेव स्यात् । प्रत्येकविधौ वाक्यभेदः । तस्मात् पत्रादिशब्देन प्राप्तं दानमनूद्य उपव्ययते’ (तै. सं. २.५.११) इत्यनेन नित्योपवीतस्य दर्शाङ्गत्ववदङ्गत्वविधिरेव युक्त इति ॥ ७० ॥

(The statement of the *Gītā* regarding the gift of leaf etc.) actually enjoins that all gifts directed towards God are part of devotion, by adopting the principle already enunciated in such statements as, ‘whatever is desired most in the world, whatever else is dear to one at home—all that must be given over to the discus-holding God of gods, to please Him’ etc. Otherwise (that gift stated in the *Gītā*)

will become specialized (and hence limited to) the gift of the four things like leaf etc. only. If it were a (special and) separate injunction then it would result in the defect of *Vākyabheda*.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, just as (in the Vedic passage) 'he wears his sacred-thread in the *upavīta* way (*i.e.*, over the left shoulder)' (*Tai. S.* 2.5.11) where the usual mode of wearing the sacred thread (is once again specially enjoined as) part of the *darśa* sacrifice, here also it is enjoined that the general gifts (to God) which follow from the statement regarding the gift of leaf etc., are parts of devotion.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> According to the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* if it is desired to state several different characteristic circumstances about a thing already enjoined, it should be done in several sentences and not in one sentence. The latter is a technical defect called *Vākyabheda*. Therefore if the objector maintains that all the four things (*viz.*, leaf, flower, fruit and water) are enjoined, then there should have been four separate sentences and not one as here.

<sup>22</sup> The *upavīta* way of wearing the sacred thread is the normal practice enjoined by the *smṛtis* and *smārta sūtras*. That it is specially mentioned once again in connexion with the *darśa* sacrifice (performed during the new-moon) is to be taken as a positive injunction as a part of that sacrifice, even though it is not expressed in the potential mood (*vdhiliṅ*). Similarly here also, the general gifts to God already mentioned (*c.f.* the well-known statement quoted at the beginning of the commentary) are enjoined once again as parts of devotion through the words 'leaf' etc., and not merely those four things only.

सुकृतजत्वात् परहेतुभावाच्च क्रियासु श्रेयस्यः ॥ ७१ ॥

71. (These various forms of devotion) are the best among good works ; because they are born out of those good works and are the causes of supreme devotion.

ता भक्तयः सर्वकर्मसु श्रेयस्य एव । कुतः ? परभक्तिहेतुत्वात्  
इतरधर्मजन्यत्वाच्च । यथा (गीता ४.१०-११)—

बहवो ज्ञानतपसा पूना मद्भावमागताः ॥

ये यथा मां प्रयच्छन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम् । इति ।

भावशब्दश्च भक्तौ प्रयुक्तः—

गङ्गाजले किं न वसन्ति मत्स्याः

देवालये पक्षिगणा वसन्ति ।

भावोज्झितास्ते न फलं लभन्ते

तीर्थाच्च देवायतनाच्च मुख्यात् ॥ इत्यादौ ।

तथा 'चतुर्विधा भजन्ते मां जनाः सुकृतिनोऽजुन' (गीता ७.१६) इति ।  
अत्र पूर्वसुकृतजत्वाद्भक्तीनां तास्तेभ्यो मुख्याः ।

एतेन भक्तिमीमांसायां विचरो युज्यते, न कर्ममीमांसायामित्युक्तम्  
॥ ७१ ॥

Among all the works, these devotions are verily the best. Why? Because they are the causes of supreme devotion and are themselves born out of other good works. So is it said : 'Many, being

purified by knowledge and asceticism, have attained devotion to Me. In whatever way they worship Me, in accordance with that do I show favour to them' (*Gītā* 4 10, 11).

And here the word *bhāva* is used in the sense of devotion, as for instance in the verse: 'Do not fishes dwell in the waters of the Gaṅgā? Do not flocks of birds dwell in the temples (*i. e.* in the temple-towers)? Because they are devoid of devotion (*bhāva*), they receive no benefit from the important sacred river or the temple.'

And again: 'Four classes of men, all having done good works, worship Me with devotion, O Arjuna' (*Gītā* 7. 16). Here, since their devotions are born out of their previous good deeds, they are superior to those good deeds.

By this it is to be concluded that this whole discussion fits in with the inquiry of devotion and not with the inquiry of works.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Though all the questions raised and discussed so far (*sūtras* 66–71) appear to belong to the realm of works, they are really part of devotion only.

ननु भक्तानां न गौणमुख्यभावः, तथा सति (गीता ७. १६)—

चतुर्विधा भजन्ते मां जनास्प्रकृतिनोऽर्जुन ।

आर्तो जिज्ञासुरर्थार्थी ज्ञानी च भरतर्षभ ॥

इति चतुर्णां तुल्यवदभिधानं किं कृतम् ? इत्यत आह—

There are no higher and lower classes among the devotees. Otherwise, how could they be spoken of, as if all the four were equal, as in the statement, 'Four classes of men, all having done good deeds, worship Me with devotion, O Arjuna : The distressed person, the aspirant after knowledge, the speaker of wealth and the man of knowledge, O best among the Bharatas' (*Gītā* 7.16).? This contention is now refuted :

गौणं त्रैविध्यमितरेण तुत्यर्थत्वात् साहचर्यम् ॥ ७२ ॥

72. The three classes of devotees are subordinate. Their Association with the other is for the sake of eulogy.

गौणं त्रैविध्यमेव तासां मुख्येन साहचर्यश्रवणं तु स्तुत्यर्थम् । यथा राजसमभिव्याहारेणामात्यानाम् । एवञ्च पापक्षयविपदुद्धारादिनिमित्तं स्मरण-कीर्तनादि आर्तभक्तिः, ज्ञानार्थं यज्ञाद्याचरणं जिज्ञासोर्भक्तिः । यथा च 'तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपासाऽनाशकेन' (बृ.उ. ४.४ २२) इत्यादि । तथा 'स्वकर्मणा तमभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः' (गीता १८.४६),

'न चळति निजवर्णधर्मतो यः  
सममतिरात्मसुहृद्विपक्षपक्षे ।

न हरति न च हन्ति किञ्चिदुच्चैः

स्थितमनसं तमवेहि विष्णुभक्तम् ॥' (बि. पु. ३.७.१६)

इत्यनेन स्वस्ववर्णाश्रमविहितवेदानुवचनादीनां ज्ञानार्थमनुष्ठानं जिज्ञासा भक्तिः ॥

The three classes of devotees are really subordinate. The śruti has associated them with the chief devotee (*i.e.* the man of knowledge) only to eulogise them. It is like praising the ministers by mentioning them along with the king. So then, 'the devotion of the distressed' means remembrance, glorifying etc., for the sake of destroying one's sins or to be delivered from difficulties etc. 'The devotion of him who desires knowledge' means the performance of sacrifices etc., in order to attain knowledge. (Or, this devotion called 'the desire of knowledge' may also mean the performance of the duties prescribed to one's *varṇa* and *āśrama* like the repetition of the Veda, in order to attain knowledge as enunciated in) such passages as : (1) 'Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to comprehend by studying the Veda, by sacrifice, charity, austerity, fasting etc.' (*Bṛ. U.* 4.4.22); (2) 'Having worshipped Him with his own prescribed duties, a man attains perfection' (*Gītā* 18.46) ; (3) Him, who never deviates from the duties of his *varṇa*, who looks with an equal mind on himself, or his friend, or his own group or that of his adversaries, who takes nothing from another and smites none down—him, of a fixed mind, know to be Viṣṇu's devotee' (*V. P.* 3.7.16)

अर्थार्थिता भक्तिरपि द्विधा—तत्रैका परभक्त्यर्थं क्रियमाणा पूर्वोक्ता,  
राज्यस्वर्गाद्यर्थं क्रियमाणा च कीर्तनादिरूपाऽपरा । यथा (वि.पु. ३.७.३)—

भौमान्मनोरथान्कामान् स्वर्गिवन्द्यं परं पदम् ।

प्राप्नोत्याराधिते विष्णौ निर्वाणमपि चोत्तमम् ॥ इति ॥

तत्र निर्वाणप्राप्तिः परभक्तिद्वारेति परभक्तिप्रयोजनार्थिता, 'ये भजन्ति  
च मां भक्त्या मयि ते तेषु चाप्यहम्' (गीता ९.२९) इत्यनेन सहैक-  
वाक्यत्वात् । यच्च भागवते (७.५. २२.२३)—

श्रवणं कीर्तनं विष्णोः स्मरणं पादसेवनम् ।

अर्चनं वन्दनं दास्यं सख्यमात्मनिवेदनम् ॥

इति पुंसाऽर्पिता विष्णौ भक्तिश्चेन्नवलक्षणा ।

इति तदेतेष्वेव यथायथमन्तर्भावनीयम् । तदेवमुपाधीनामेषामुपधेयसाङ्ख्येऽपि  
न दोष इति ॥ ७२ ॥

The devotion due to the desire for wealth or happiness is of two kinds : The one described before and carried out for the sake of supreme devotion ; and the other of the form of 'praising the Lord' etc., performed with the desire to attain kingdom, heaven etc. So is it said : 'When Viṣṇu is worshipped, a man obtains all terrestrial enjoyments that one can imagine, the supreme abode adored even by the dwellers in heaven, as also the final liberation which is the best of all' (V.P. 3.7.3).

Here, liberation is obtained through the supreme devotion ; and as such, the desire to take advantage



of supreme devotion, is entertained. This also fits in with this sentence in the *Gītā*, 'Whosoever worship Me with devotion, they are in Me and I in them' (9.29). And as for what is said in the *Bhāgavatam* (7.5.22-23), 'To hear and repeat the names of Viṣṇu, to remember Him, to serve His feet, to worship Him, to bow down to Him, to do service as His slave, to love Him as a friend and to surrender oneself to Him—if this ninefold devotion is offered to Viṣṇu by a man, (I consider that as the best lesson)', they can all be included in these four themselves, according to the circumstances. There is nothing wrong therefore, in these artificial characteristics, even though the subject-matter may sometimes get mixed-up.

ननु कीर्तनादीनामङ्गत्वे कथमात्म्यादिषु प्राधान्यं घटते ? इत्यपेक्षया-  
मुच्यते—

If 'praising the Lord' etc. were subordinate parts of supreme devotion how can they now be considered as principal, among 'the devotion of the distressed' etc.? With reference to this, it is now said :

बहिरन्तस्थमुभयमवेष्टिसववत् ॥ ७३ ॥

73. Like *aveṣṭi* and *sava*, (they are) both inside and outside (of supreme devotion).

\*

स्मरणकीर्तनादीनां परमक्त्यङ्गतया तदन्तर्गतत्वम् , अनारभ्य फलान्तर-  
श्रवणात् तद्वह्निर्भावेनोत्कर्षोऽपि । यथा राजसूयान्तर्गताऽप्यवेष्टिः प्रधानाऽपि,  
अनारभ्य फलान्तरसम्बन्धात्तत् उत्कृष्यते । यथा वा बृहस्पतिसवः क्वचित्प्रधान-  
मपि वाजपेयाङ्गं तद्वत् प्रमाणसत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां विशेषात् । एवं—

‘प्रमादात् कुर्वतां कर्म प्रच्यवेताध्वरेषु यत् ।

स्मरणादेव तद्विष्णोः सम्पूर्णं स्यादिति श्रुतिः ।’

इत्यनेन सर्वकर्मणां नैमित्तिकाङ्गत्वेनापि प्रवृत्तेः । स्वभावाङ्गत्वं स्वर्गादिफलाय  
प्राधान्यञ्च न विरुद्धमिति ॥ ७३ ॥

Remembrance of God, praising Him etc., are included in supreme devotion in as much as they are its subordinate parts. When they are without reference to any particular object, they can also be considered as being outside it and separate, because the śruti has mentioned independant fruits (in the latter case). For instance : The *aveṣṭi*<sup>24</sup> right even though a part of the *Rājasūya*, can also be a principal one, when performed without reference to it, in as much as it is connected with an independent fruit of its own, and hence can be separated from that sacrifice. Or it may be like the *Brhaspati-stava*<sup>25</sup> which is sometimes performed as a principal rite even though it is a part of the *Vājapeya* sacrifice. This distinction depends upon the existence or the non-existence of authority for it (in the śruti). And also on the strength of the statement, ‘Whatever rite connected with a sacrifice—if it becomes deficient due to careless performance—that becomes corrected and

completed by the very remembrance of Viṣṇu. So saith the śruti', all rites can also be performed occasionally as subordinate (to devotion to God.) There is nothing contradictory in accepting that they are naturally parts of supreme devotion and yet principal in relation to the fruit of heaven etc.

<sup>24</sup> This is described in *Tai. S.* 1.8.19. The discussion can be found in *J.N.V.* 11.4.3.

<sup>25</sup> This ceremony is performed by one who wishes to become a family priest, as Bṛhaspati was to the gods. It is described in *Tai. Br.* 2.7.1.

इदानीमार्तभक्तौ विशेषश्चिन्त्यते—

A special aspect of 'the devotion of the distressed' is now discussed :

स्मृतिकीर्त्योः कथादेश्चार्तो प्रायश्चित्तभावात् ॥ ७४ ॥

74. Remembering (God), praising (His glories), reciting His story etc. are (to be included) in 'the devotion of the distressed' (*ārtabhakti*); because they have the nature of expiation.

स्मरणकीर्तनकथानमस्कारादीनामार्तभक्तौ निवेशस्तत्तत्पापकृतनरकार्तिमता  
तत्तत्पापक्षयहेतुत्वेन कथनात् । यथा (वि.पु. २.६ ३२-३३) —

पापे गुरुणि गुरुणि लघूनि च लघुन्यपि ।

प्रायश्चित्तानि मैत्रेय जगुः स्वायम्भुवादयः ॥

प्रायश्चित्तान्यशेषाणि तपःकर्मात्मकानि वै ।  
यानि तेषामशेषाणां कृष्णानुस्मरणं परम् ॥

तथा (वि. पु. ६.७. ९) —

यन्नामकीर्तनं भक्त्या विलायनमनुत्तमम् ।  
मैत्रेयाशेषपापानां घातूनामिव पावकः ॥

एवम् (म. भा. शा. मोक्षधर्म ३४३.२, ३)

सर्वाश्रमाभिगमनं सर्वतीर्थावगाहनम् ।  
न तथा फलदं सौते नारायणकथा यथा ॥  
पाविताङ्गाः स्म संबृत्ताः श्रुत्वेमामादितः कथाम् ।  
नारायणाश्रयां पुण्यां सर्वपापप्रणाशिनीम् ॥ इत्यादि ।

तस्माद्युक्तमार्तो निवेशनमिति ॥ ७४ ॥

The inclusion of remembrance, glorifying, reciting His stories, bowing down to Him etc., in the 'devotion of the distressed' is but proper ; because they have been described as responsible for the destruction of such and such sins to those suffering the pain of hell caused by those sins. Thus we read : 'Arduous expiations for great sins and trifling ones for minor offences, have been propounded, O Maitreya, by Svāyambhuva and others. But Whatever be the expiatory acts, whether penances, deeds of charity or the like,—to remember Kṛṣṇa is superior to all' (V.P. 2.6.32-33). Again : 'That repetition of His name with devotion, O Maitreya, (that) is the best consumer of all sins, as fire is of metals' (V.P.6.7.9). So

also : To visit all hermitages, to bathe in all sacred waters , confers not such fruits, O Sauti, as the story of Nārāyaṇa. Men become purified in personality, when they have heard His holy story from the beginning,—whose subject is Nārāyaṇa and which destroys all sins'. (*Mbh. Ś. Mokṣadharmā* 343. 2-3)

Therefore it is quite proper that these should be included in 'the devotion of the distressed'.

भूयसामननुष्ठितिरिति चेदाप्र\*याणमुपसंहारान्महत्स्वपि ॥ ७५ ॥

75. If it be objected that the non-practice of the more difficult expiations would result, we reply that (remembrance etc.) must be ranked among the great expiations since they include a period ending only in death.

स्यादेतत्—न्यायविरोधादेतद्वचनानां स्वल्पपापविषयत्वमेव युक्तम् ।  
अन्यथा भूयः क्लेशसाध्यानामननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यमिति चेन्न तेषामामरण-  
मुपसंहारस्मरणात् क्लेशाधिक्यात् । यथा (वि. पु. २ . ६ . २९) —

तस्मादहनिशं विष्णुं संस्मरन् पुरुषो मुने ।

न याति नरकं शुद्धः सङ्घीणाविलकल्मषः ॥

इत्यनेन सातत्योपसंहारात् । उपक्रमोपसंहारयोरेकार्थत्वादिति भावः । नचोपक्रमै-  
कालः श्रूयते येन तद्विरोधादुपसंहारस्य भिन्नार्थताऽपि भवेत् । तथा च

\* आप्रायणम् (पा.)

क्लेशसाभ्यादितरेषां नाननुष्ठानमप्रामाण्यम् । 'प्रातर्निशि तथा सन्ध्या-  
मध्याह्नादिषु संस्मरन्' (वि. पु. २.६.६५) इत्येतदवयुत्यानुवाद एव ॥

**Objection :** This may be true. (Still) it is but proper to consider these words as having reference only to the minor sins, since they are opposed to reason. Otherwise expiations involving considerable trouble and pain would lose their authoritativeness due to their not being practised.<sup>26</sup>

**Reply :** Not so ; since the (minor expiations like remembrance etc.) have been described as including a period ending only in death, they also involve considerable pain and trouble. So we read : 'Therefore O sage, the man who remembers Viṣṇu day and night, being purified and having all his sins destroyed, never goes to hell' (V.P. 2.6.29). By this it is concluded that (remembrance etc ) have to be carried on incessantly without any break. The idea is that the beginning and end agree.<sup>27</sup> No definite time is specified for the beginning, on the strength of which the end could have been proved to be different since it was opposed to that beginning<sup>28</sup> Therefore, since these are equal to the other (difficult) expiations in respect of trouble and pain, there is no fear of the others losing their authority due to their not being practised. As for the statement, 'At morning and night, sunset and noon, remembering Viṣṇu' (V.P. 2.6.35) etc., it is really a repetition (*anuvāda*) only.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> In the commentary on the previous sūtra, ślokas were quoted from the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* to the effect that a simple remembrance of Kṛṣṇa would destroy all sins whether heinous or minor even though in the normal course the former would require difficult expiations involving a lot of expenditure of time, energy, money and pain. If it is so easy to get rid of the effects of even heinous sins by such a simple process, nobody would care to perform the very severe penances described in the scriptures and thus they would lose all their authority !—This is the contention of the objector.

<sup>27</sup> It is a well-known principle of Mīmāṃsā, that *Upakrama* (the beginning) and *Upasanihārā* (the end) must agree in sense. In this statment, no definite time has been specified either for the beginning or for the ending of the 'remembrance' Hence they agree.

<sup>28</sup> The idea is that even if only one of them, say, the beginning, had been definitely specified, we could have given an implied meaning to the end (different from what it appears to be) and thus limited the time to a specified period. Since this is not so, the only alternative is to understand that it be practised throughout the life, until death.

<sup>29</sup> The fact that times are specified in this verse does not contradict our view ; because it is only an *anuvāda*, a simple repetition of what was already (*V.P.* 2.6.29) stated.

नाप्यनुत्प्राधिकारिकमिदम् ।

(वि.पु. २.६. ३४) —

कृते पापेऽनुतापो वै यस्य पुंसः प्रजायते ।

प्रायश्चित्तं तु तस्यैकं हरिसंस्मरणं परम् ॥

इत्यस्यापि सर्वप्रायश्चित्ताङ्गानुतापस्थानुवादत्वादेकमित्यस्यापि प्रायश्चित्तान्तर-  
नैरपेक्ष्यस्य न्यायप्राप्तस्यानुवादः । अन्यथा वाक्यानि भिद्येरन् विशिष्टविषयाश्च  
भवेयुः । अतो यच्छब्दान्तर्गतत्वाद्यथायथमनुवादत्वान्नार्थवादत्वं पूर्ववाक्या-  
नाम् । अत एवान्यत्रापि (वि.पु. ३.७.३४-३५)—

किङ्करा दण्डपाशौ वा न यमौ न च यातनाः ।  
समर्थास्तस्य यस्यात्मा केशवालम्बनः सदा ॥  
चक्रायुधस्य नामानि सदा सर्वत्र कीर्तयेत् ।  
नाशौचं विद्यते तस्य स पवित्रकरो यतः ॥

इत्यादिभिः सातत्यमुक्तमिति ॥ ७५ ॥

Nor is this expiation meant for the repentant sinner only. As for the statement, 'Whosoever, having committed sin, feels repentance, his best expiation, the only one, is remembrance of Hari' (V.P. 2.6.34); since this is a reiteration (*anuvāda*) of the fact that repentance is a part of every expiation, the word 'one' (*ekam*) must also be a reiteration of that comparative disregard of all other expiations which had followed from the previous discussions. Otherwise the sentence would have to be split up into two, with separate and special objects.<sup>30</sup> Therefore the previous passages (V.P. 2.6.33 etc.) also are only repetitions and not eulogies (*arthavāda*) by the fact of their being severally involved in the same construction of the relative and its corresponding demonstrative (*yat* and *tat*). That is why in other places also this continuous remembrance has been described



as in : 'Yama's attendants, their staves and binds, Yama himself as well as his tortures, are powerless against him whose mind is ever dependent on Keśava. Let him at all times and in all places repeat the names of the wielder of the discus. No impurity can be found in him, for He is the purifier' (V.P. 3.7.34-35).

<sup>30</sup> The first part of the sentence (V. P. 2.6.34) clearly declares what had been already enjoined. (i.e. that repentance is necessary in every expiation), and is therefore an *anuvāda*. Whether the second part also is an *anuvāda*, or does it convey a different sense, say, eulogy (*arthavāda*) ? If the second standpoint is accepted, then the sentence would have to be split up, one conveying *anuvāda* and the other, *arthavāda*. However, the correlative pronoun *yasya* and *tasya* cannot allow this. Therefore it is but proper that the whole sentence is an *anuvāda* only.

लध्वपि भक्ताधिकारे\* महत्क्षेपकमपरसर्वहानात् ॥ ७६ ॥

76. In the case of the devotee, even a little (effort like the remembrance etc.) destroys great (sins), because all other means (like expiations) have been given up.

लध्वपि सकृत्स्मरणकीर्तनादि महतामपि पापानां क्षेपकं नाशकं भवति ।  
यतो भक्ताधिकारे प्रायश्चित्तान्तराणां सर्वेषां त्यागलक्षणहानिप्रतीतेरित्यर्थः ।  
यथा गीतम् (गीता १८. ६६)—

\* भक्त्याधिकारे (पा.)

सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं ब्रज ।

अहं त्वां सर्वपापेभ्यो मोक्षयिष्यामि मा शुचः ॥ इति ।

अत्र हि न काम्यकर्मत्यागपूर्वकत्वमर्थः काम्यत्यागे पापाभावात् किं भगवता मोक्षणीयम् । अथ पापान्तरं नाशयं काम्यत्यागस्यादृष्टार्थत्वापत्तेः । नित्यनैमित्तिकयोरपि त्यागपूर्वकता न तम्यार्थः, तयोस्त्यागे यदि विधिरस्ति न ततः पापं किं मोक्षणीयम् । अथ नास्तीति वाच्यम् । मैवम्, एवं वाक्येनैव तद्विधानात् पापाजनकत्वात् ॥

Even a little effort like remembering and praising the Lord only once, can become the destroyer of even great sins; because in the case of the devotee, the abandonment characterised by the giving up of all other expiations, is clearly discernible. This is the meaning. So is it sung (by the Lord Himself) : 'Abandoning all religious duties, take refuge in Me alone. I will deliver thee from all sins. Do not grieve' (*Gītā* 18.66).

Here, the sin accruing from the previous abandonment of desire-motivated (*kāmya*) actions is not what is meant; because no sin will result from giving up such actions rooted in desires. Where is then the sin from which the Lord is to deliver? If it be said that (by such giving up) some other kinds of sin are to be destroyed, (this is also not correct); because, in that case one has to accept that there is an invisible merit produced by such giving up.<sup>31</sup> Neither does it mean the previous abandonment of the 'obligatory' (*nitya*) and 'occasional' (*naimittika*) duties. If there is

an injunction to give them up (under certain special circumstances), there is then no sin from which one is to be delivered.

**Objection :** There is no such rule !

**Reply :** Not so, because by the very sentence (quoted from the *Gītā*) it has been enjoined and hence no sin is produced.

<sup>31</sup> This is contrary to convention. It is the production of an invisible merit by the performance of *kāmyakarma*, which will ultimately fulfil desires for which it was done, that is accepted and not the contrary.

अथ 'सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य' इत्यनेन संन्यासिनमनूद्य तदधिकारिकम् तेषामवकीर्णादिप्रायश्चित्तादिस्मरणात् तैस्सह विकल्पप्रसङ्गात् पूर्वबन्महतामननुष्ठानं च स्यात् । न च सातत्येन तद्दोषपरिहारः ।

महापातकयुक्तोऽपि ध्यायन्निमिषमच्युतम् ।

पुनस्तपस्वी भवति पङ्क्तिपावनपावनः ॥

इत्यादिना लघुनोऽपि महत्क्षेपकत्वात् । किञ्च संन्यासाश्रमस्यासन्निधानेन बुद्धयनारोहात् । तस्माद्यथा लोके 'सर्वान् विहाय मां भज, क्लेशास्ते नाशयिष्यामि' इत्यत्र क्लेशनाशकान्तरहानिः प्रतीयते तथान्तरपापनाशकान्तरत्यागोऽवगम्यते वाक्यादेव । एतेन कथञ्चित्संन्यसविधायकेन सहैकाध्यायपाठेऽपि न तद्विषयकत्वं प्रकरणसन्निधानयोः सबलत्वात् । किञ्चास्त्रिध्याये 'काम्यानां कर्मणां न्यासं संन्यासं कवयो विदुः' (गीता १७. २) इत्यादिना काम्यकर्मत्याग एवोक्तो न संन्यासाश्रमः । एवञ्च प्रायश्चित्तान्तरत्यागसङ्कल्पेन केवलभगवन्नामादिभिरार्तिं यस्तर्तुमिच्छति तदधिकारिकमेव सकृत्स्मरणादि ॥

**Objection :** But then we say that the words, ‘abandoning all religious duties’ (*Gītā* 18.66) describe by *anuvāda* the saṁnyāsin and hence refer to him.

**Reply :** (No), because the smṛti has laid down expiations for the saṁnyāsins, as that in the case of unchastity etc. ; and (your interpretation) would give them an option between those expiations and devotion, thereby resulting as before, in the non-performance of those difficult (expiations). Neither can this defect be obviated by the continuous (remembrances of the Lord etc.), because by such statements as, ‘even though filled with great sin, if he meditates on Acyuta even for the twinkling of an eye, the ascetic becomes again the purifier even of those who purify others sitting in the same line’, it is declared that even a little act can destroy great sins<sup>39</sup>. Moreover, it does not occur to our minds that the institution of saṁnyāsa is meant here because this topic is to be found nowhere in the proximity. Therefore, just as in the world, when some one says to another ‘Give up everything and depend upon me, I will put an end to all your troubles’, the abandonment of all other means of getting over one’s troubles is meant, here also, on the strength of that very sentence (of the Lord) the abandonment of all other means of destruction of one’s inner sins, is implied. Even though the whole chapter is viewed in connection with this one verse which somehow enjoins saṁnyāsa, it is clear that saṁnyāsa is not its topic

since context and proximity (both of which deny this assumption) are more powerful. Moreover in this chapter, by the words, 'By *samnyāsa*, the seers understand the abandoning of all desire-motivated actions' (*Gītā* 18.2), it is the abandonment of desire-motivated actions alone that is stated and not the institution of *samnyāsa*. This being the case, 'remembering Him once' etc., refers only to him who makes up his mind to give up all other expiations, but desires to overcome his distress only on the strength of the Lord's name etc.

<sup>32</sup> This is to prevent the objector from taking advantage of the arguments put forward by the *siddhāntin* under similar circumstances ! The objector cannot say that by the continuous practice of remembrance etc., till death, which would also involve great trouble, the choice is balanced : because these practices are so powerful that they destroy even great sins at one stroke.

तथा च भिन्नाधिकाराद्दूषणानां न समुच्चितिः । नापि क्लेश-  
भयाद्भूयसामननुष्ठानम् ।

दुःखमित्येव यत्कर्म कायक्लेशभयात्त्यजेत् ।

स कृत्वा राजसं त्यागं नैव त्यागफलं लभेत् ॥ (गीता १८.८)

इत्यनेन सादृशसंन्यासस्य हेयत्वात् ।

कलिकल्मषमत्युग्रं नरकार्तिप्रदं नृणाम् ।

प्रयाति विलयं सद्यः सकृच्चत्रानुसंस्मृते ॥ (वि.पु. ६.७.१०)

इत्यादि तदधिकारपरम् । एवम् (गीता ९.३०.३१)—

अपि चेतुदुराचारो भजते मामनन्यभाक् ।  
 साधुरेव स मन्तव्यः सम्यग्बसितो हि सः ॥  
 क्षिप्रं भवति घर्मात्मा शश्वच्छान्तिं निगच्छति ।  
 कौन्तेय प्रतिजानीहि न मे भक्तः प्रणश्यति ॥

इत्यनेन, तथा (नृ.पु. ८.२८-२९)—

नारकाः कृष्ण कृष्णेति नारसिंहेति चुकुशुः ।  
 इति सङ्कीर्तितो विष्णुर्नारकैर्भक्तिपूर्वकम् ॥  
 नारक्यो यातनास्सर्वास्तेषां नष्टा महात्मनाम् ।

इत्यादिना च भक्त्यधिकारः सुव्यक्त इति । अत्र कीर्तनस्योच्चारणमात्रमिह  
 प्रतीतम् । न तु प्रथमान्तपदेनेत्यादिनियम इति ॥ ७६ ॥

And also, these various objections (against our position) cannot be brought simultaneously, because they refer to different types of aspirants. Nor will it result in the non-performance of the more difficult expiations due to the fear of the trouble they would involve, because by the statement, 'Whatever religious act he leaves unperformed through fear of bodily trouble, saying "it is painful", that abandonment only springs from the principle of *rajas* and he will not gain the fruit of abandonment' (*Gītā* 8.8), such an abandonment has been condemned.

Such passages as, 'The very terrible sin of men in the Kali-age which gives them the pain of hell, is at once abolished by His name being once repeated' (*V. P.* 6.7.10), refer to the devotee. Similarly, the following passages from the *Gītā* and the *Nṛsiṃhapurāṇa*

clearly refer to the topic of devotion : ‘Even if a very wicked person worships Me to the exclusion of anybody else, he should be regarded as righteous, for he has rightly resolved. He soon becomes righteous-minded and attains eternal peace. O son of Kuntī, be assured that My devotee never perishes’ ((*Gītā* 9.30,31); ‘The inhabitants of hell, (in their agony), cried out, “Kṛṣṇa, O Kṛṣṇa !”, “O Nārasimha !” Thus was Viṣṇu mentioned by those in hell, and all the internal pains of those great-souled ones were destroyed’ (*Nṛ. P.* 8.28,29). Here, ‘recitation’ (*kīrtana*) merely means the bare mention of the name, and there is no rule that it must be in the vocative case.

तत्स्थानत्वादनन्यधर्मः खलेवालीवत् ॥ ७७ ॥

77. It does not partake of the characteristics of the others (*i.e.* the expiations), since, like the post of the threshing floor, it has come as a substitute.

‘प्रायश्चित्तं तु तस्यैकं हरिसंस्मरणं परम्’ (वि.पु.२.६.३४) इत्यादौ नामातिदेशेन प्रायश्चित्तान्तरधर्मस्तु न मन्तव्यः । प्रायश्चित्तस्थानत्वात् तत्स्थाने तद्विधानात् इत्यर्थः । यथा ‘खलेवाली यूणे भवति’ (आश्व.श्रौ.९.७) इत्यत्र पशुनियोजने यूपकार्ये खलेवालीविधिरिति । न यूपधर्मस्याष्टास्रिकरणादेः प्रसङ्गस्तद्वदत्र नखलोमादिवपनानां प्रायश्चित्तधर्माणामप्राप्तिरिति । न कीर्तनादेः रपि पापक्षयहेतुत्वात् प्रायश्चित्तमेवेति वाच्यम् !

प्रायो नाम तपः प्रोक्तं चित्तं निश्चय उच्यते ।

तपोनिश्चयसंयुक्तं प्रायश्चित्तमिति स्मृतम् ॥

इत्यनेन तपोरूपे प्रायश्चित्तशब्दो मुख्यः, अन्यत्र गौणः इति ध्येयम् ॥ ७७ ॥

From the statement, 'his best expiation, the only one, is remembrance of Hari' (V.P. 2.6.34) etc., it should not be understood that the characteristics of other expiations are implied due to the mention of the name (*prāyaścitta*); because they (*i.e.*, remembrance etc.) have come in the place of these expiations, they have been enjoined in the place of these (expiations). This is the meaning. Just as in the statement, 'The post of the threshing floor becomes the sacrificial post' (*Āś. Śr. 9.7*), the rule enjoins that the post of the threshing floor be used as the sacrificial post for tying up the animal victim, but it does not follow from this that this substituted post should have eight corners etc. (like the original), so here also, the characteristics of the expiations like the shaving off of the bodily hair, cutting of the nails etc., do not necessarily follow. It should not be said that recitation of the Lord's names etc., must be considered as expiations only, due to their causing the destruction of sins; because by the statement, 'Penance (*tapas*) is called *prāyas* and *citta* means certainty; the tradition says that is *prāyaścitta* which is combined with penance and certainty'<sup>33</sup> it is clear that the word *prāyaścitta* primarily applies to some form of penance and is used elsewhere only secondarily.



<sup>33</sup> The reading in the printed commentaries is तयोर्निश्चयसंयुक्तं which seems to be a mistake. The reading given here is found in the *Śabdakalpadruma*.

अथाङ्गानां प्रधानाधिकरणनैयत्यात् तदधिकारश्चिन्त्यते—

Since the restrictions regarding the subsidiary means depend upon the restrictions on the principal which they subserve, the question as to who is eligible to practise devotion (which is the principal) is now discussed :

आनिन्द्ययोन्यधिक्रियते पारम्पर्यात् सामान्यवत् ॥ ७८ ॥

78. All, down even to the despised births, are entitled (to practise devotion); because (they can learn of it, as they learn of) the common truths, indirectly.

निन्दितचाण्डालादियोनिपर्यन्तं भक्तावधिक्रियते संसारदुःखजिहासाया अविशेषात् । अथ वेदाध्ययनानधिकारात् कश्चमत्रैवर्णिकानां स इति चेत् तत्राह पारम्पर्यादिति ।

‘ चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः ’ (पू. मी. १.१ २.),

‘ शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ’ (ब्र. सू. १.१.३)

इति न्यायादालौकिकोऽर्थः श्रत्यैकसमधिगम्य इत्यत्र न विप्रतिपद्यामहे किन्तु स्त्रीशूद्रादीनामितिहासपुराणादिद्वारा चाण्डालादीनां च स्मृत्याचारवदुपदेश-पारम्पर्येण ज्ञानमपि श्रुतिमूलमेव भवति । यथा तेषां सामान्याहिंसाधर्मादि-ज्ञानम् । अन्यथा तदसिद्धिप्रसङ्गादिति ॥ ७८ ॥

★

Right up to the despised births like the *cāṇḍāla* etc., all are entitled to practise devotion, because the desire to escape from the miseries of mundane existence is common to all. It may now be objected : 'How can anyone, who does not belong to the first three Varṇas, practise devotion, since he has no right to the study of the Vedas ?' To this it is replied : 'indirectly'. We certainly do not dispute that transcendental things can be directly known only from the Śrutis, because of such statements as 'Duty (*dharma*) is a thing recognized by the urging character (of the passage of the śruti which mentions it)' (*Pū. M.* 1.1.2) and 'Because the *śāstra* alone is the means of right knowledge' (*Br. S.* 1.1.3). But knowledge based upon the Śruti can still be produced in women, the Śūdras etc., through the *itihāsa* (*Mahābhārata*) and the *purāṇas*, and in the *cāṇḍālas* etc., through such mediate teaching which is in accordance with the *smṛtis* and good customs. Just as they learn of the common truths (virtues) like non-injury etc. (from these sources, here also). Otherwise it would follow that they will not have a knowledge of these latter also.

अतो ह्यविपक्वभावानामपि तल्लोके ॥ ७९ ॥

79. Hence, even those with immature devotion (will perfect it) in His world.

यतः सर्वाधिकारोऽतः खलु येषामत्र परभक्तिर्विपक्वभावं न गता तेषां श्वेतद्वीपे भगवल्लोके परभक्तिसाधनानुष्ठानं स्मर्यते । यथा (म.भा.शा. मोक्षधर्मे नारायणीये ३३६. २७, २८) —

क्षीरोदधेरुत्तरतः श्वेतद्वीपो महाप्रभः ।  
तत्र नारायणपरा मानवाश्चन्द्रवर्चसः ॥  
एकान्तभावोपगतास्ते भक्ताः पुरुषोत्तमे ।

इत्युपक्रम्य तेषां परभक्तिसाधनानुष्ठानं श्रतम् ।

(म. भा. शा. मोक्षधर्मे ३३६. ३९, ४०) —

सहिताश्चाभ्यधावन्तस्ततस्ते मानवा द्रुताः ।  
कृताञ्जलिपुटा हृष्टा नम इत्येव बादिनः ॥  
ततो विवदतां तेषामश्रौषं विपुलध्वनिम् ।  
बलिः किलोपक्रियते तस्य देवस्य तैर्नरैः ॥ इत्यादि ।

तस्मान्सर्वत्र तदधिकार इति । अत एव 'तदुपर्यपि बादरायणेन,\* सम्भवात्'  
(ब्र. सू. १.३.२६) इति सूत्रिनम् ॥ ७९ ॥

Since all are entitled (to the practice of devotion), for that very reason, the practice of the various means to supreme devotion by those whose devotion has not yet become mature, in *Śvetadvīpa*, the world of the Lord, has been declared by the *smṛti* thus : 'To the north of the ocean of milk lies the splendid *Śvetadvīpa*; there live men bright as the moon, intent on

\* तदुपर्यपि बादरायणः.....' is the version found in the usual texts of *Brahma Sūtras*.

Nārāyaṇa, filled with the idea of absolute unity, —these are devoted to the Puruṣottama' (*Mbh. Ś. Mokṣadharmā—Nārāyaṇīya* 336.27,28) Beginning with these verses, their practice of the means of supreme devotion has been described ending it thus : 'Then those men quickly ran up together, folding their hands, full of joy and uttering shouts of praise ; then I heard a great shout as they spoke,—lo ! an offering is presented by them to that deity' (*Mbh Ś. Mokṣadharmā* 336.39,40). Therefore all have a right to practise it. That is why it has been said in the *Brahma Sūtras*, (1.3.26) 'Bādarāyaṇa (allows a right to the study of the Vedas) even to beings above men, since it is possible (for them also to attain knowledge)'.

अथ विपन्नभावानामपि कथं न तल्लोक इत्युपोद्घातेनोच्यते—

Now, introducing the question, 'How is it that His world is not, even for those with perfected devotion ?' it is answered thus :

क्रमैकगत्युपपत्तेस्तु ॥ ८० ॥

80. But (it is only by this interpretation that the doctrines of) gradual attainment and immediate attainment can be accounted for.

तुश्चागतशङ्काव्यवच्छेदार्थः । नारायणीय एव श्रूयते 'येऽतिनिष्कलुषा लोके पुण्यपापविवर्जिताः' (म.भा.शा. ३४४.१३) इत्युपक्रम्य, आदित्य-मण्डलद्वाराऽनिरुद्धप्रद्युम्नसङ्कर्षणव्यूहक्रमेण गतिमभिधायाभिहितम् ।

(म.भा.शा. ३४४.१९) —

समाहितमनस्कास्तु नियतः संयतेन्द्रियाः ।

एकान्तभावोपगता वासुदेवं विशन्ति ते ॥ इति

क्रमगत्यभिधानम् । तथा पश्चादुक्तम् (म.भ.शा. मोक्षधर्मे ३४८ २.४) —

ये तु दग्धेन्धना लोके पुण्यपापविवर्जिताः ।

तेषां त्वयाभिनिर्दिष्टा पारम्पर्यक्रमाद्गतिः ॥

चतुर्थ्यां चैव ते गत्यां गच्छन्ति परमं पदम् ।

नूनमेकान्तधर्मोऽयं श्रेष्ठो नारायणप्रियः ॥

अगत्वा गतयस्तिस्त्रो यद्गच्छन्त्यव्ययं हरिम् ।

इत्येकगत्यभिधानं च पक्वभक्तिविषयत्वेनोपपद्यते । अन्यथा विरोधात्, तस्माद-  
पक्वविषयस्तत्तल्लोकलाभ इति ॥ ८० ॥

The word 'but' (*tu*) is used to dispel the doubt. In the *Nārāyaṇīya* section itself after beginning with the words, 'Those who are exceedingly sinless in the world and are devoid of merit and demerit' (*Mbh.Ś.* 344.13), and after describing their successive movement through the orb of the sun, into the forms of Aniruddha, Pradyumna and Saṅkarṣana, it is declared: 'But those who have their minds intently fixed in contemplation, who are self-restrained, and sense-subdued, filled with the idea of absolute unity, enter Vāsudeva' (*Mbh. Ś.* 344.19). Thus has the gradual attainment (of God) been described. It is said afterwards: 'But they, who are like the fire which has consumed its fuel, who are devoid

of all merit and demerit—their destination has been thus declared by thee, through successive stages ; and in this fourth stage they attain the highest sphere. But verily this person who is absolutely devoted is dear to Nārāyaṇa because he attains to the immortal Hari without passing through the three intermediate stages' (*Mbh. Ś. Mokṣadharmā* 348.2-4). This mention of the final stage of immediate attainment can be accounted for only if it refers to the perfected devotion. Otherwise there will be contradiction between these two statements. Therefore the attainment of 'His world' refers only to the immature devotees.

उत्क्रान्तिस्मृतिवाक्यशेषाच्च\* ॥ ८१ ॥

81. (The same is proved) from the remainder of the sentence also in the smṛti, relating to the departure of the soul.

उत्क्रान्तौ 'भक्त्या युक्तो योगबलेन चैव' (गीता ८.१०) इत्युपक्रम्य,

ओमित्येकाक्षरं ब्रह्म व्याहरन् मामनुस्मरन् ।

यः प्रयाति त्यजन्देहं स याति परमां गतिम् ॥ (८.१३)

इत्युक्तम् । तत्र च वाक्यशेषः (८.२४)—

अग्निर्ज्योतिरहः शुक्लः षण्मासा उत्तरायणम् ।

तत्र प्रयाता गच्छन्ति ब्रह्म ब्रह्मविदो जनाः ॥

\* उत्क्रान्तिवाक्यशेषाच्च (पा.)

इति क्रमाद्भितिः श्रुता । तथा (गीता ८.१६)—

आब्रह्मभुवनालोकाः पुनरावर्तिनोऽर्जुन ।

मामुपेत्य तु कौन्तेय पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥

इति वाक्यशेषे लोकोपक्रमादुरशब्दमहिम्ना च तत्समीपलोकप्राप्तिरविपक्व-  
भावानामेव युक्ता, विपक्वभावस्य न तल्लोकगमनमपि फलं युज्यते तत्फलस्या-  
क्षयित्वात् तल्लोके साधनाननुष्ठानश्रवणान्च । किञ्च, अविपक्वभक्तेस्तत एव  
कममुक्तिसिद्धौ तत्कालीनस्मरणविधिवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । न च तेन परभक्ति-  
समुच्चयो घटते 'पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यया' (गीता ८.२२)  
इत्यन्यनिरपेक्षमोक्षसाधनत्वावगतेः । तस्मात्तल्लोकेऽप्यधिकारः । भारतभूमेस्तु  
(वि.पु. २.३.५)—

‘न खल्वन्यत्र मर्त्यानां भूमौ कर्म विधीयते’

इत्यनेन कर्मोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वैव । भक्तिस्तु न कर्मात्मिकेत्युक्तं प्राक् । तदज्ञानामप्राप्तिः  
स्यादिति चेत् ; न, प्रधानप्राप्तावेवाङ्गप्राप्तेर्निषादस्थपतियागाङ्गवदिति ।  
शूद्रादीनां तु वैदिकमन्त्रजकर्मनिवृत्तिर्न तु स्मरणकीर्तनादेर्भक्तिसाधनस्येति  
तावतैवाधिकारसिद्धौ न विद्याप्रयुक्तिकल्पना युक्ता ॥ ८१ ॥

The passage in the *Gītā* relating to the departure of the soul begins thus : ‘endowed with devotion and the power of yoga’ (8.10); and continues : ‘Repeating monosyllable *Om* which is Brahman, and thinking of Me, he who departs from the body, attains the highest goal’ (8.13). And there, the remainder of the sentence is : ‘Fire, the flame, the day, the bright half of the month and the six moths of the sun’s northern course—departing by this path, the knowers of

Brahman attain Brahman' (8.24). Here the gradual attainment has been described. So also in another remainder (of the immediate context) it says: 'All the worlds, O Arjuna, including the world of Brahmā, are subject to recurrence ; but after attaining Me there is no rebirth, O son of Kuntī' (8.16) Here, by the beginning of the statement with the word *loka* (the several worlds) and also by the strength of the word *upa* (in *mām upetya*) ('reaching Me'), it is but proper to conclude that the attainment of the worlds near to Him, refers only to those of immature devotion. As for him whose devotion is perfect, even the fruit of attainment of His world is not proper because His reward is imperishable, and also since there is no mention in the śruti of the practice of any means (to increase his devotion which is already perfect).<sup>34</sup> And again, if gradual liberation is possible for one with immature devotion, from that itself, the injunction that he should remember the Lord at the time of death, would become useless.<sup>35</sup> Nor can we say that by dwelling in His world, supreme devotion would be added on ; because, by the statement, 'This Supreme Puruṣa, O pārtha, is to be attained only by one-pointed devotion' (*Gītā* 8.22), it is clear that supreme devotion is an independent means of liberation. Therefore all that we can concede is that even in that world, one is entitled to get supreme devotion. As for the birth in the sacred land of Bhāratavarṣa, it is only useful for performing ceremonial rites (and hence not a pre-



condition for practising devotion), as shown by the statement : 'Nowhere else is ceremonial rite enjoined to the mortals' (*V. P.* 2.3.5). It has already been declared (*sū.*7) that devotion is not of the nature of ceremonial rite.

**Objection :** (By being born elsewhere) it is still possible that one would fail to obtain the subsidiaries for devotion !

**Reply :** No ; because, just like the adjunct (fire) of the sacrifice of the Niṣāda king,<sup>36</sup> here also the subsidiaries are automatically included, once the principal is attained. As for the śūdras etc., what is prohibited is the ceremonial rite arising out of the Vedic hymns and not remembrance, praising etc., as a means of devotion. Hence, when their right to practise devotion is thus being established, the conception that it must be associated with knowledge is improper.

<sup>34</sup> From the aphorism 79 onwards, the point under discussion has been this : If all have a right to the practice of devotion, what will be the fate of those mediocre devotees with immature devotion, after death ? This is answered by the assurance that they will attain 'His' world wherein they will continue their practice and ultimately perfect their devotion when they will be merged in Him. This standpoint has been proved by first mentioning the example of the devotees of the Lord at Śvetadvīpa, next by showing the logic behind the principle of gradual liberation for the immature devotees and direct immediate liberation for those of perfected devotion and finally summing it up with the 'remainder of the sentence' or Vākyaśeṣa.

The contention of the objector here is : ‘Why should not the perfect devotees too go to those worlds ?’ This has been answered with two important points : (1) All worlds right up to *Brahmaloka* are perishable. Since the fruit that a perfect devotee deserves is nothing short of immortality, it is not proper to send him to such worlds! (2) The very purpose of these worlds is either to reap the results of the merit he has acquired, or, as in the case of the highest world, to practise further to perfect his devotion. Neither of these alternatives holds good in the case of the perfect devotee because of the very perfection of his devotion itself.

<sup>35</sup>It is not immaturity of devotion that takes him to those worlds but the final remembrance of the Lord at the time of death which is a sure sign of his continuous endeavour.

<sup>36</sup>Niṣādas are śūdras. There is a particular sacrifice which a king of the Niṣādas can perform. Whether the *caru* oblation of that sacrifice is to be made in the common fire or in the duly consecrated fire is the point of discussion in the Mimāṃsā works. The discussion is necessitated by the fact of the śūdra not having the right to light up a duly consecrated fire. The conclusion drawn is that he should offer it only in the common fire because fire being the adjunct of the sacrifice is no doubt enjoined, but the *ādhāna* ceremony (ceremonial piling up of the fuel and lighting the fire) which is an adjunct of the fire is not specifically enjoined as in *Darśapūrṇamāsa* etc.

Once it is agreed that the Niṣāda king also can offer the sacrifice, the necessary adjunct, fire, also follows. Similarly once the right to practise devotion is granted to anyone, all the subsidiaries of devotion like remembrance etc., also follow automatically.

अस्तु तर्हि महापातकिनामपि परभक्तावेवाधिकारस्तथा तदङ्गाङ्गवेदानु-  
वचनादावगीत्यत आह—

In that case, let it be granted that even those who have committed great sins are entitled to attain supreme devotion. Then it follows that they have a right to the repetition of the Vedas etc. also which itself is subsidiary to devotion. This is now countered thus :

महापातकिनां त्वार्तो ॥ ८२ ॥

82. But the great sinners (are entitled only) to the devotion of distress (*ārtabhakti*).

पतनहेतुपापरतानाञ्च पुनरार्तिभक्तावेवाधिकारः, प्रायश्चित्तवन्नान्यत्र ;  
तत्पापक्षयस्य सर्वापेक्षयाऽभ्यर्हितत्वात् भुञ्जानो वर्धयेत् पापमित्यादिना ।  
तदपगमे तु सुतरामधिकारसिद्धिः ॥ ८२ ॥

And again, those who have been addicted to sins which are responsible for their fall into lower states<sup>37</sup>, are entitled, like their right to expiations, only to the devotion of distress, and not to anything else ; because the destruction of those sins is more urgently needed by them than anything else. (This is seen from) such statements as ‘enjoying, he increases his sin’ etc. However, on the abolition of that sin, he would certainly gain the right (to practise devotion).

<sup>37</sup> Like hell or animal births.

अथैकान्तिकप्रस्तावात् सर्वधर्मः किं परभक्तितो भिन्न इति शङ्का-  
पिशाचीमपाकरोति—

Since the topic is that of one-pointed (or supreme) devotion, he now proceeds to dispel the ghostlike doubt whether all religious duties are different from supreme devotion :

सैकान्तभावो\* गीतार्थप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ॥८३॥

83. That (supreme devotion alone is) the one-pointed devotion (and nothing else); because such has been recognised as the meaning of the *Gītā*.

सा परा भक्तिरेवैकान्तभावः, नान्यः । कुतः ? गीतार्थेन प्रत्यभिज्ञा-  
श्रवणात् । यथा नारायणीय एव (म. भा. शा. मोक्षधर्म ६४८.५, ६) —

सहोपनिषदो वेदान् ये विप्राः सम्यगास्थिताः ।  
पठन्ति विधिमास्थाय ये चापि यतिधर्मिणः ॥  
ततो विशिष्टां जानामि गतिमेकान्तिनां नृणाम् ।  
केनैष धर्मः कथितो देवेन ऋषिणाऽथवा ॥

इति प्रश्ने प्रत्युत्तरम् (३४८.८) —

समुपोढेष्वनीकेषु कुरुपाण्डवसेनयोः ।  
अर्जुने विमनस्के वै गीता भगवता स्वयम् ॥ इति ॥

तस्मादेकान्तिता परभक्तिरिति ॥ ८३ ॥

\* सैकान्तभावे (पा.)

That supreme devotion alone is one-pointed devotion and nothing else. Why? Because this has been recognized as the meaning of the *Gītā* by the śruti (*Mahābhārata*). Thus in the Nārāyaṇīya section itself the question is asked ‘Those brāhmaṇas who, duly intent and observing all the rules, read the Vedas along with the Upaniṣads, and those who follow the duties of the sannyāsins,—I know of a way better than theirs, the way of those with one-pointed devotion. By Whom—which god or ṛṣi—was this way taught?’ (*Mbh. Ś. 348 5,6*). And the answer : ‘When the troops of the Kuru and Pāṇḍava armies met in battle array, when Arjuna was full of despondency, this was sung by the Lord Himself, (*ibid 348.8*). Therefore one-pointedness is supreme devotion.

अथ गौण्योऽपि साक्षान्मुक्तिं जनयन्तु, को दोषः ? तत्राह—

What harm is there if it is conceded that the inferior forms of devotion also produce liberation directly? This is now tackled :

परं कृत्वैव सर्वेषां तथा ह्याह ॥ ८४ ॥

84. All (are useful in liberation) only through the production of the supreme (devotion). So does (the Lord) verily say.

परं भक्तिं कृत्वैव सर्वेषां मुक्तावुपयोगः । तथा हि सद्देतुकं भगवानाह  
(गीता १८.६८)—

य इदं परमं गुह्यं मद्भक्तेष्वभिधास्यति ।

भक्तिं मयि परां कृत्वा मामेवैष्यत्यसंशयम् ॥

इति । तत्रैतद्धर्मस्योपदेशफलमपि ब्रह्मभावापत्तिरित्येवार्थसिद्धौ 'भक्तिं मयि परां कृत्वा' इति किमर्थमाह ? तस्या मोक्षसाधनत्वेन श्रुतत्वात् । अत एवोपरिचरवसोः 'आत्मराज्यं धनञ्च' (म.भा.शा. ३३५. २३) इत्यादिना परमेश्वरानुरक्तिरूपाया भक्तेर्लिङ्गं प्रदर्शितमिति स्वतः प्रयोजनत्वाभावात् । सर्वेषां मुक्तिहेतुत्वेन श्रुतानां परभक्तिजननेन मुक्तावुपयोग इत्यभिप्राय उन्नीयत इति । न चोभयजनकत्वं तस्य कर्मत्वेन मोक्षाजनकत्वात् । एवञ्च दृष्टार्थता भवति वाक्यस्येति ॥ ८४ ॥

इत्याचार्यस्वप्नेश्वरविद्वद्भिरविरचिते शाण्डिल्यशतसूत्रीये माप्ये  
द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ॥ २ ॥

समाप्तश्चाध्यायः ॥ २ ॥

Only by producing the supreme devotion do (all other means) become useful in liberation. So does the Lord say, giving reasons : 'whosoever shall impart this profound secret to My devotees, he, having produced supreme devotion towards Me, shall undoubtedly attain Me' (*Gītā* 18.68). Here, since it is already established that even the fruit of this teaching is the becoming one with Brahman, why is it said, 'having produced supreme devotion towards Me'? Because *that* is the means to liberation, according to the śruti. That is why in the legend of the king Uparicara Vasu, when he says, 'My kingdom, wealth...' (*Mbh.* Ś. 335.23) it is understood that

the characteristic of devotion, of the nature of love for the Supreme Lord, has been exhibited since ~~the~~ act by itself is useless. Therefore, when the Śruti says that all (forms of religious duties) cause liberation, the idea to be inferred is that they are all useful in liberation through the production of supreme devotion. It (i.e. the religious duty) cannot produce both (supreme devotion and liberation) because, it being an action, cannot produce (an indestructible result like) liberation. Hence the sentence should be taken to refer to a visible effect (like the production of supreme devotion).

*Thus ends the second section of the second chapter of the commentary on the hundred aphorisms of Śāṅḍilya, composed by the most learned teacher Svapneśvara.*

**THE SECOND CHAPTER ENDS HERE**

## THIRD CHAPTER

### SECTION I

भजनीयोत्तमत्वेनः भक्तेरुत्तमता यत।  
भक्ततद्भावतश्चात्र भजनायो निरूप्यते ॥

Since the excellence of devotion arises from the excellence of the object of devotion (*viz.* God) and also due to the identity of the devotee with Him, He, the object of devotion, is now described.

Suddenly Svapneśvara seems to have entered into the mood of a poet! His commentary on this chapter is mostly in verses.

भजनीयेनाद्वितीयमिदं\* कृत्स्नस्य तत्स्वरूपत्वात् ॥ ८५ ॥

85. This (visible world) is not different from the object of devotion (*i.e.* God), since everything is His manifestation.

ज्ञानाधीना ज्ञेयसिद्धिरिति तन्त्रेषु निर्णयः ।  
ज्ञानं सत्त्वा न सा जातिर्जात्यादौ तदसत्त्वतः ॥

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\* भजनीयमद्वितीयमिदं (पा.)



The Śāstras have come to the conclusion that the proof of an object of knowledge depends upon knowledge. (And) existence is (itself) knowledge. It is not a genus (*jāti*) since it does not exist in genus etc.

According to the Advaita Vedānta doctrine, all that exists is Brahman whose nature is pure consciousness and bliss, So Brahman *is* existence, *is* consciousness, *is* bliss. The Nyāya doctrine however maintains that 'existence' is a *summun* genus. That view is refuted here. The idea is that this Nyāya view would lead to infinite regress since one can imagine another genus in that genus, another one in that and so on

सत्त्वे वा नेष्टसम्बन्धकरूपनागौरवादपि ।  
तस्माज्ज्ञानं परं ब्रह्म सर्वत्रानुगतं स्वतः ॥

Even if it did exist, the desired connexion would not (be established), because of the cumbersome imagination (one has to invent, to prove it). Therefore the all-pervading Supreme Brahman Himself is knowledge.

The connexion by which a genus is supposed to exist in its species—for e.g., the existence of 'Cowness' in each of the individual cows is—called *samavāya sambandha*, or inherence. If it is somehow accepted that a genus can exist in another genus, then the connexion by which it exists will have to be newly invented; and this is bound to be more complicated and cumbersome than even this *samavāya*.

★

तदभेदो दृश्यमात्रे दृश्यभेदस्तु सत्परे ।\*

घटो ज्ञानमितीदृक् स्यात् प्रत्ययस्सन्निवेति चेत् ॥

In all visible things there is identity with that (Brahman). Even the (apparent) diversity is found only in what exists really.

**Objection :** In that case, just as we perceive the jar as ‘the jar is’, we should have perceived it as ‘the jar is knowledge’ !

The contention of the objector is that if everything is Brahman and He is knowledge, we should have perceived even the ordinary things like the jar, as knowledge only. Since we are not, the siddhāntin is wrong.

अस्ति स्वरूपधीनैव सत्यत्वेनानुपस्थितेः ।

तदुपादानविषये<sup>†</sup> ज्ञानेच्छाकृतिहेतुना ॥

तासां सन्निवृत्त्येन हेतुत्वे लाघवं महत् ।

यत्तत्सन्निवृत्त्यं ब्रह्म गुणवन्नैव गौरवात् ॥

**Reply :** But we never perceive the jar as only ‘it is’, since it does not present itself (to our senses) as real existence.<sup>1</sup> If it is supposed (as the Naiyāyikas do) that God is the cause of creation due to His knowledge of the material cause, the desire to act upon it (for the sake of creation) and the consequent effort, then (our conception of Brahman as the

\*दृश्यते वस्तुसत्परे (पा.)

†तदुपादानविषय- (पा.)

only cause) is far more simple than the supposition of these three along with their object. He along with His object (*viz.*, *māyā*, His power or Cosmic Ignorance) is not a substratum of the qualities<sup>2</sup> (of knowledge, desire and effort), because this is a cumbersome hypothesis.

<sup>1</sup> We do not perceive the jar as 'existence appearing as the jar', but only as 'the jar exists'. Hence the recognition of the principle of existence in the jar is vague and indirect. But from the transcendental stand-point it really exists only in Brahman, or better, as Brahman, who is knowledge itself.

<sup>2</sup> But is Himself knowledge.

कालवेद्योपाधिकृता\* तज्ज्ञातृत्वादिकल्पना ॥ ८५ ॥

85. The conception that He is the knower etc, arises from the limiting adjunct (*māyā*), as is seen from the parallel instance of time.

Just as our limited understanding divides the indivisible time into definite portions as minutes, days, months etc., so also it is our ignorance that attributes the qualities of knowing wishing and acting to God.

तच्छक्तिर्माया जडसामान्यात् ॥ ८६ ॥

86. His power *māyā* (is the material cause of this world), as it is the common factor in all insentient objects.

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\* कालस्येवोपाधिकृता (पा.)

तस्य ब्रह्मण ऐश्वर्यशक्तर्मायेति गीयते ।

‘दैवीह्येता गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया ।

मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते ।’ (गीता ७ १४)

The almighty power of that Brahman has been declared in the *Gītā* (7.14) as *māyā*, thus: ‘Verily this My *māyā*-power, consisting of the three *guṇas*, is hard to be overcome. Only those who take refuge in Me will cross over this *māyā*.’

‘मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिस्सूयते सचराचरम् ।

हेतुनानेन कौन्तेय जगद्विपरिवर्तते ॥’ (गीता ९. १०)

‘Through Me as its superintendent, nature (*prakṛti*) brings forth this world of movable and immovable objects. Due to this reason,<sup>1</sup> O son of Kuntī, the world revolves’ (*Gītā* 9.10).

<sup>1</sup> *i e.* due to my superintendence.

तन्मायात्वं तु कार्याणां वैचित्र्यान्नानृतत्वतः ।

कार्यसत्त्वोपपत्त्यर्थं ब्रह्मसत्तःश्रुतेरिति ॥

It is *māyā*, not because it is unreal, but because of the diversification of its effects. This is known from the *śruti* (*Ch. U.* 6.2.2; 3. 14.2) which declares Brahman as real, in order to prove the reality of His effects.

*Māyā* is not unreal as the Advaitins hold but a reality, a power, of Brahman. Svapneśvara takes the meaning of this

word in its old sense, as the power to create varieties. See also the commentator's introduction at the very beginning of this work.

मिथ्यात्वस्यानुषक्तेश्च तन्मिथ्यात्वं न साम्प्रतम् ।  
 तत्त्वज्ञानेन बाध्यत्वं मिथ्यात्वमिति चेन्नहि ॥  
 मिथ्यात्वस्याप्यतथ्यत्वात् सत्यत्वं सुतरां स्थितम् ।  
 मिथ्यात्वस्य च सत्यत्वे दृश्यसत्यत्वमागतम् ॥

To surmise the falseness (of this world) would result in the falseness of its cause (also), which is not proper (as seen from the statements of the śruti).

**Objection:** By falseness we mean that it is dispelled by the knowledge of reality.

**Reply:** No, because (you hold) that this falseness (*māyā* or *avidyā* or ignorance) is itself false, thereby confirming the reality of this world even more firmly! On the other hand, if you say that its (inferred) falseness is true, its reality is (even more) true since it is being established by direct perception!

अलीकानामभानाच्च भास्यत्वे तु सदेव तत् ।  
 रज्जौ सर्गद्विमानं यदन्यथाख्यातिरेव सा ॥

Since what is (absolutely) unreal cannot present itself (to our senses), whatever presents itself must be real only. As regards the appearance of a snake in the rope (which may be quoted as an exception to this), it is only a case of mistake (known technically) as *anyathākhyati*.

<sup>1</sup> According to the Naiyāyikas all error is *anyathākhāyati*, knowing (*khyāti*) one thing for another (*anyathā*). The idea of a snake already seen elsewhere, is transferred to the rope due to darkness. Hence this mistake. But the Vedāntins hold that the snake is there, actually produced by ignorance, though it belongs to the class of 'apparent' (*prātibhāsika*) things and *not* to the class of 'practical' (*vyāvahārika*) things. Obviously our commentator does not subscribe to the Vedāntic view.

\*अन्यत्र सदसत्त्वाभ्यां बाधाबाधव्यवस्थितेः ।

सा माया जडसामान्यं ज्ञेयं तु नित्यमेव तत् ॥

अन्यथा त्वव्यवस्था स्यात् तस्माच्चिज्जाडयनित्यता ॥ ८६ ॥

It is an acknowledged rule in all other things (except undeveloped nature or *prakṛti*), that their reality or unreality depends on their being capable or of not being contradicted (or falsified) by a more authoritative judgment. This *māyā* is the totality of the insentient creation, and as it is being capable of being known, it must be real. Otherwise a universal rule would be contradicted. Therefore both the pure consciousness (Brahman) and the insentient creation (*prakṛti*) are real.

\*This is the reading that Cowell has accepted. He says he has taken it from the two manuscripts of the Calcutta Sanskrit College. Other readings, which are more obscure, are as follows :

अन्यस्य सदसत्त्वाभ्यां बाधाबाधव्यवस्थितेः ।

सा माया जडसामान्यं ज्ञेयत्वं नित्यमेव तत् ॥

अन्यथा तु व्यवस्था स्यात् तस्माच्चिज्जाडयनित्यता ॥

व्यापकत्वाद्वाच्याप्यानाम् ॥ ८७ ॥

87. (And also) because the effects are pervaded by (their respective material) causes.

एवं व्यापकतत्त्वेभ्यो व्याप्यतत्त्वसमुद्भवः ।

व्यापकानां हि तादात्म्याद्वाच्याप्योपादानता मता ॥

The pervaded-principles (effects) arise out of the pervading-principles (causes). Since the pervading-principles are identical with the (respective) pervaded-principles, the latter are therefore held to be the material causes of the former.

This is a well-known doctrine of the Sāṅkhya adopted by the Vedāntins also. It is called *sat-kārya-vāda* which means that the effect pre-existed in the cause in a potential form. Hence the cause pervades the effect, and is identical with it (*tādātmya*). Applying this principle to the subject under discussion, the world-effect is pervaded by and hence identical with, *prakṛti* or *māyā*, the insentient general substance, which again is identical with Brahman as his power, who pervades it.

न तावत्समवायेन भेदसम्बन्धगौरवात् ॥

शब्दानां समयोऽप्येवं शृङ्ग्राहिकया लघुः ॥

The (cause and effect) are not (connected) by inherence (*samavāya*, as the Naiyāyikas hold) because (the imagination of such a) connexion (based on the) difference (between the cause and effect instead of identity as we hold) is cumbersome.<sup>1</sup> The conclu-

sion of the śrutis<sup>2</sup> also is this only. And this assumption—like the siezing of the oxen by their horns<sup>3</sup>—is simple.

<sup>1</sup> According to the Naiyāyikas *samavāya* is the connexion that is supposed to exist between a quality and the substance it qualifies, between motion and the object of motion etc. The essential pre-requisite of this view is that the two things thus connected are *different*. If the same connexion exists between the cause and its effect also, the process by which this is to be proved becomes very cumbersome due to the cause and its effect being materially the same and *not* different, as the *samavāya* normally requires.

<sup>2</sup> See *Ch. U.* 6 1.4-6

<sup>3</sup> *Śiṅga-grāhikā-nyāya* (the maxim of siezing by the horns) is explained thus : If a cowherd boy is asked which cow gives maximum milk, he just catches the horns of that particular cow and shows it. This is the simplest and direct method. Similarly the explanation of the connection between the cause and the effect as *tādātmya* is direct and simple, whereas the assumption of *samavāya* is cumbersome.

सत्त्वेन सर्वकार्येषु कारणत्वं परेशितुः ।

निमित्तत्वं हि तद्वुद्धेर्बोद्धयेष्वनुगत्वतः ॥

The causality of the Supreme Lord is due to His presence in all the effects. He is (also) the efficient cause<sup>1</sup> because of His knowledge or intelligence pervading through all the objects of knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a pot, clay is the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) and the potter as also his stick and wheel, are the efficient causes



(*niimitta-kāraṇa*). Similarly the Supreme is the material cause of this world through His *māyā* or *prakṛti* which is identical with Him, and also the efficient cause due to His knowledge.

<sup>2</sup> Because He makes them after conceiving them in His mind.

बुद्धेस्तु साक्षिभाम्याया अबोध्यत्वं यतो धियः ।  
बोद्धव्याया बुद्धितत्त्वव्यभिचारोऽपि सम्भवेत् ॥

However, intelligence (*buddhi*), being enlightened by the witness (i.e. the soul), cannot know itself; because if intelligence can be taken as known by itself<sup>1</sup>, its very principle will be contradicted.<sup>2</sup>

This is in answer to a possible objection like this : If *buddhi* is thus connected with all objects, then, why not consider that itself as the material cause of the world?

<sup>1</sup> Just as the eye cannot see itself, intelligence also cannot know itself.

<sup>2</sup> Because *buddhi* also is insentient by itself, and 'knows' other objects only through the consciousness of the soul reflected in it.

सुप्तोत्थितस्य प्रलयाद् बुद्धेः प्रथममुद्भवः ।  
कार्यकारणभावादि बुद्वा निर्माति स प्रभुः ॥

When *Īsvara* gets up from His sleep after mundane destruction His intellect is the first thing that arises. After having known the cause-effect relations (of various objects) He, the Lord, proceeds with the creation (of the world).

स्वतो निर्विषयाप्येषा चैतन्योपाधिभावतः ।  
तैलादिवत् प्रदीपस्था सप्रकारप्रकाशिनी ॥

This intellect, though having no object by itself, being associated with consciousness as its adjunct, will reveal the various species of creation like the oil in a lamp.

Oil by itself cannot illumine objects since it is not a light. But, associated with a burning lamp, it can. Similarly intellect being insentient, cannot by itself reveal objects. When associated with consciousness, it can.

करिष्यामीतिसङ्कल्पादहङ्कारोद्भवस्ततः ।  
स ऐक्षत बहु स्यामित्येवमादिश्रुतिस्मृतेः ॥

Next arises the principle of egoism from His volition, 'I shall make (the world)'. This is known from the śrutis and smṛtis such as, 'He thought, "Let Me become many"' (Ch. U. 6.2.3).

बुद्धेर्विकारेद्विच्छादावनुगत्वादह कृतेः ।  
साऽप्येकतत्त्वं तद्वे तु बुद्धिर्व्यापकभावात् ॥

Egoism also is a first principle since it has entered into the modifications of the intellect like wish etc. But still, intellect resides in it since (being more general) it pervades it.

ईशोऽहं कृतिजन्यत्वात् तन्नैयत्यादहङ्कृतेः ।  
मात्राभूतेन्द्रियादीनामहङ्कारोऽपि कारणम् ॥

'I am the lord'—(this is the utterance of egoism). Since all things are thus created by volition and are determined by egoism, egoism also is a cause of the subtle elements, gross elements, the sense-organs etc.

तत्र शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धत्वसंज्ञया ।

सामान्यान्येव शब्दादिस्थूलानां चापि हेतवः ॥

And among these, the general elements *viz.* (the principles of) sound, touch, form, taste and smell known by those respective notations, are also the causes of the gross elements of sound etc.

सर्वत्र ग्रह एव स्यात् तत्त्वानामिति चेदतः ।

विकारग्रहणे जातिग्रहवत् तद्ग्रहस्थितेः ॥

**Objection :** In that case, it should be possible to detect these first principles everywhere !

**Reply :** (Yes). Just as the genus or general (*jāti*) is perceived in the individual modifications, their perception also does exist (once their developments are properly recognized).

एवं व्यापकतत्त्वानां व्याप्येष्वनुगमः क्रमात् ।

ब्रह्मादिसर्वतत्त्वानां घटोपादानता स्फुटम् ॥

Thus the first principles or causes have respectively pervaded their effects. It is clear that the

material cause of (all things like) a pot consists of these first principles starting right from Brahman.

न कर्मणान्यथासिद्धिरिह तत्त्वस्य युज्यते ।  
तादात्म्यादन्यथाऽसिद्धेरतादात्म्यः योजकम् ॥

The objection that the first principle (we have posited) is proved to be wrong because it is sufficient to assume *karma* (the pre-existing deserts) as the cause, is not valid; for, a material cause cannot be established to be so, unless it is identical with its effects. (The *karma* that the objector puts forward) cannot produce such an identity (since it is only an instrumental cause and not the material cause).

एवं कारणतत्त्वानां मोक्षोपायतया पुनः ।  
निर्मितिः प्राणिबुद्ध्यादेरतादात्म्यात् पृथक्पृथक् ॥

Moreover, these first principles which are causes (of the world) are also (indirectly) means to liberation.<sup>1</sup> Since (beings are) not identical (with one another)<sup>2</sup> their intellects etc., have been created separately.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Intellect etc. contribute to the production of knowledge which produces devotion, thus leading to liberation.

<sup>2</sup> This is from the phenomenal standpoint.

<sup>3</sup> Depending upon the karma of each individual.

आसर्गप्रलयादीनां बुद्धिर्नास्ति न यत् क्वचिन् ।  
सुषुप्तौ जीवबुद्धीनां लयोऽनन्तस्य मोक्षणे ॥ ८७ ॥

Intellect never wholly ceases to exist, from the first creation (of one cycle) to the final destruction (of that cycle). However the intellects of individuals get dissolved (temporarily) in deep sleep. This dissolution will be final in liberation.

अथानीश्वरसाङ्ख्यानं बुद्धेः सर्गो न युज्यते ।  
क्रमाद्विनिगमाभावादित्येतत्सूत्रमुच्यते ॥

The next aphorism declares that the evolution of creation in succession from the intellect, as held by the atheistic Sāṅkhyas, is untenable because it cannot be proved :

न प्राणिबुद्धिभ्योऽसम्भवात् ॥ ८८ ॥

88. (Creation) cannot take place from the individual intellects, because it is impossible.

क्रमाद्देवार्षिसर्गादिः श्रूयते कस्य बुद्धितः ।

\*न सम्भवति सर्गोऽयं तस्मादीशोऽस्ति बुद्धिमान् ॥ ८८ ॥

From whose intellect is the successive creation of the gods, the sages etc., declared in the śrutis, to have been produced ? This creation cannot be done by (an individual intellect). Therefore (it must only be) the Supreme Lord (who can) have such an intellect.

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\* सम्भवाद्भूतसर्गोऽयं (पा.)

निर्मायोच्चावचं श्रुतीश्च निर्मिमीते पितृवत् ॥ ८९ ॥

89. Having created the high and the low, He also produces the Vedas, like a father.

उच्चावचानि भूतानि धर्माधर्मानुसारतः ।  
निर्माय निर्मिमीतेऽसौ वेदांस्तद्धितकाम्यया ॥

Having created all beings, the high and the low, according to their merits and demerits, this (Lord) desirous of their welfare produces the Vedas.

यथा पितोत्पाद्य पुत्रान् अज्ञातौ ज्ञापयत्यपि ।  
हिताहितपरिहारौ वाक्यैस्तदयं प्रभुः ॥ ८९ ॥

Just as a father, having begotten sons, teaches them also by words, about the unknown means of obtaining the good and warding off the evil, so does this Supreme Lord too.

मिश्रोपदेशान्नेति चेन्न स्वल्पत्वात् ॥ ९० ॥

90. If it is objected that (He is) not a (well-wisher like a father) because of the teaching (of sacrifices which are) mixed up (with injurious acts), we deny it; because (the result of such injurious acts is comparatively) small.

अथायमीश्वरो नैव हितः पितृसमो यतः ।  
पापसाधनहिंसाभिर्मिश्रयागोपदेशनात् ॥

इति चेन्न प्रधानांशफलसौख्यात्पेक्षया ।

अङ्गहिंसाफलाल्पत्वान्नाहितस्तद्विधानकृत् ॥

**Objection :** But, this Lord is not a well wisher like a father; because, He has taught sacrifices which are mixed up with injurious acts productive of sin !

**Reply :** No, the enjoiner of these sacrificial acts is not an ill-wisher ; because, compared to the happiness produced by the principal parts (of a sacrifice) the evil fruit of the accessories involving injury (to animals) is rather small.

ननु क्वत्तङ्गहिंसायाः प्रधानैकफलत्वतः ।

न सामान्यनिषेधस्य विषयत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥

कुर्यान्न कुर्यादित्येवं विकल्पस्त्वन्यथा भवेत् ।

तस्माद्विशेषादन्यत्र स्याद्यदाहवनीयवत् ॥

**Objection by the Mīmāṃsist :** But can we not answer that objection this way ? — The general prohibition (regarding killing)<sup>1</sup> does not hold good here, since the injurious act which is a subsidiary of the sacrifice has no independent fruit of its own but that of the principal<sup>2</sup>. Otherwise there would result a choice between two (equally forceful) commands, 'must be done' and 'must not be done'.<sup>3</sup> Therefore the general prohibition—just as in the case of the *āhavaniya* fire<sup>4</sup>—will hold good only in those cases where there is no special injunction to the contrary.

<sup>1</sup> There should be no violence to any living being' *mā hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*.

<sup>2</sup> Since this ancillary exists for the whole it cannot produce any result of its own apart from that of the principal. Hence the above prohibition should be deemed to apply only to independent acts of killing.

<sup>3</sup> This will result in confusion.

<sup>4</sup> Offerings of butter, etc., called *āhutis* are generally offered in the duly consecrated *āhavanīya* fire. But in the *upanayana* ceremony the boy, has to offer three *āhutis*. He has no right to do so in the *āhavanīya* fire since he is not yet initiated formally. Hence the *āhutis* are given in this particular case, in the ordinary fire. Thus the general rule is suspended by the special rule as far as that particular case is concerned. See *J N. V.* 6. 8. 2

आत्रोच्यतेऽङ्गहिंसायाः म्यादपूर्वस्य हेतुता ।

पापहेतुश्च सामान्यहिंसेत्येवाविरोदता ।

**Reply :** With regard to this, we say that the injury (to animals) which is a subsidiary (to the main rite) can become the cause of an (evil) desert and also of sin since, after all, it is also injury. In this there should be no difference between us.

अथ प्रबलदुःखस्यानुबन्धाष्टहेतुता ।

विध्यर्थोऽयं नञायुक्तस्तदभावस्य बोधकः ॥

*Mīmāṃsist :* But then (we say that the subsidiary rites involving injury) produce the desired fruit unconnected with great pain. As for his negative



injunction (*mā hiṁsyāt*) it applies to cases where such (injurious) rites are not involved.

तथा च सर्वान् मा हिंस्यादस्य दुःखाद्यहेतुता ।

Therefore this injunction, 'There should be no violence to any being' (is helpful by) not producing pain etc.

सत्यं यागाङ्गहिंसातो यद्दुःखं प्रबलं न तत् ॥

**Reply :** But the pain produced by the injurious act which is an accessory of a sacrifice is real. However, it is not very powerful.

प्रधानफलसौख्यादेर्नैयत्यान्नान्तरीयकम् ।

अन्यथाऽतिप्रसङ्गस्स्यात् प्रबलत्वानिरुक्तितः ॥

Since it is restrained by the happiness etc. which are the fruits of the principal rite, this pain will not prove to be an abstacle.<sup>1</sup> Otherwise, since the, 'powerful-ness' is not defined exactly, there is the danger of the extending the (detering influence of pain) too far.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A hungry man will not mind trouble of securing foodstuffs and cooking them since, compared to the happiness he obtains by eating, all this is insignificant. Similarly here also.

<sup>2</sup> Since all actions involve some trouble or other, there is the danger of giving up all actions and becoming lethargic !

★

तस्माज्जातिविशेषोऽयं दुःखेषु प्रबलत्वता ।  
 प्रायश्चित्तादिमरणे प्रयागमरणेऽपि वा ॥  
 आत्महत्याकृतं दुःखं तत्फलापेक्षया लघु ।

Therefore this idea of greatness or predominance as applied to pain is a class into itself. As for instance: when one dies voluntarily as an expiation (for heinous sin) or drowns himself at (the sacred confluence of) Prayāga (to get religious merit), the pain of suicide is trifling compared to the (great) results obtained by such (a suicide).

अतः प्रत्यवमर्शं हि प्राह पञ्चशिखोऽपि तत् ॥

That is why Pañcaśikha also says that this (pain) is to be borne with patience.

This alludes to a sūtra of Pañcaśikha, an ancient teacher of Sāṅkhya. He was the disciple of Āsuri who was a direct disciple of Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya system.

The sūtra has been quoted in The *Bhāṣya* of Vyāsa, on the *Yoga Sūtras* 2.13 स्यात् स्वल्पः सङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः कुशलास्य न पकर्षावालम् । कस्मात् ? कुशलं हि मे बह्वन्यदस्ति यत्रायभावपं गतः स्वर्गेऽप्यपकर्षमल्पं करिष्यति ॥ 'The mixture with a very small pain is easy to be obviated (by expiations), and to be borne with patience, and it is not enough to destroy one's merits. Why so? Because I have much other merit stored up, in which this little annoyance being thrown, will make little diminution in heaven.'

स्वल्पत्वात् बलीयस्त्वाद्यत्र दुःखस्य गौरवम् ।

पर्यग्निकरणेत्सर्मास्तत्र श्रत्यैव दर्शिताः ॥

(Such pain is to be borne) because it is small. But not so when it is powerful enough to cause great suffering. There are general rules declared by the Veda, enjoining the performance of the *Paryagni rite*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (2.5) describes it thus : ‘The priest takes a firebrand from the *āhavanīya* fire and carries it on the right side thrice round the animal which is to be sacrificed’. This rite is to avert evil. Such rites are provided in the Veda itself as expiatory rites for the necessary killing of animals in sacrifices.

पञ्चसूना गृहस्थानामिति स्मृतिषु चोदितम् ।

न सामान्यविशेषोक्तिर्न शून्ये सुतरां यथा ॥

रङ्गोपजीवी पशुहा नरकं शरणं व्रजेत् । इति ॥ ९० ॥

‘There are five slaughter-places (*pañca-sūnāḥ*) in the homes of house-holders’- so do the *smṛtis* declare, (and give expiations).<sup>1</sup> Such special statements<sup>2</sup> are not for all, (but strictly limited to the duly initiated Vedic house-holder and priest). Much less can they apply to persons without the due qualifications.<sup>3</sup> That is why it is said : ‘The actor, the butcher go to hell.’<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This refers to *Manusmṛti* 3.68. The five slaughter-places are : the fireplace, the grindstone, the broom, the mortar and the water pot. The five daily sacrifices (*pañcayajña*) are the expiations.

<sup>2</sup> regarding the expiations for the injury involved in those necessary rites.

<sup>3</sup> So, the general rule *mā hiṁsyāt* etc., will apply to them without exception.

<sup>4</sup> See *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 2.6.21.

श्रुतिप्रसङ्गाच्छ्रौतानामपूर्वमथ चिन्त्यते ।  
कर्तृभोक्तृगतं तत्किमथवा परमेश्वरे ।'

Since a topic pertaining to the śruti (has thus been raised), the doctrine of *apūrva* is now discussed. Does it reside in the performer (of the Vedic rites) or in the enjoyer (of its fruits) or in the Supreme Lord ?

*Apūrva* literally means 'that which did not exist before.' When a person desirous of heaven or such other-worldly fruits performs the prescribed sacrifices, these sacrifices are said to produce an *apūrva*, potential unseen fruit, which will mature after the person's death and give him the desired object.

The question raised is : Where does this *apūrva* reside, when the performer is still living ? Does it reside in him ? Or does it reside in him who is going to enjoy the fruits of that rite ? (This is possible since a rite can be performed by one for the sake of another.) Or does it reside in the Supreme Lord ? The sūtra now answers this question.

\*फलमस्माद्बादरायणो दृष्टत्वात् ॥ ९१ ॥

91. Bādarāyaṇa (says) that the fruit comes from Him, because it is seen so (in the world also).

\* फलमस्मादिति बादरायणो (पा.)

राजादिरोषतोषाभ्यां दृष्टत्वात् कर्मणां फलम् ।  
अस्माद्ब्रह्मण एवाह भगवान् बादरायणः ॥

As it is seen (in the world) that the fruits of ordinary actions (of the men of the world) come from the pleasure or displeasure of the king (or a similar authority), (similarly here also the fruits of men's actions come) from this Brahman. So does the venerable Bādarāyaṇa say.

The reference is the *Brahma Śūtras* 3.2.38 :

'From Him (the Lord) come the fruits of actions ; for that is reasonable.'

तन्न कर्तृगतं पुत्रे जातेष्टिफलदर्शनात् ।  
अथ भोक्तृगतो भोगः कस्मिन्नित्येव चिन्त्यते ॥

The potential fruit does not reside in the performer, because the fruit of the ritual *jāteṣṭi* accrues to the son (though it is the father who performs it). If it is said that its enjoyment resides in the enjoyer, it is still worthwhile thinking in whom it does reside.

The *jāteṣṭi* rite is performed by the father on the birth of his son. It is supposed to bestow on the son ceremonial purity, health etc.

अभ्योन्याश्रय एव स्यादुभयो सव्यपेक्षणात् ।  
तस्माद् दृष्टतया रोषतोषाभ्यां परमेशितुः ॥  
हिताहितफलप्राप्तिः फलोद्देश्यगता भवेत् ।

In that case, the defect of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya doṣa*) will result because each conception depends upon the other.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, as seen (in the world) here also, good or an evil fruit will result from the Supreme Lord's pleasure or displeasure, accruing to the person who deserves it.

<sup>1</sup> In whom does this fruit of enjoyment reside? In the enjoyer. Who is the enjoyer? He in whom enjoyment resides. This will be the line of argument in which the defect of mutual dependence is obvious.

नाप्युद्देश्यगतत्वेन व्यापारान्तरकल्पनम् ॥  
 अन्यथा राजसेवादावप्यपूर्वं प्रसज्यते ।  
 अत एवेश्वरप्रीतिप्रदत्वं कर्मणां श्रुतम् ॥

Nor even the conception of a different mode of distribution of the fruits (like the *apūrva*), to its subject necessary. Otherwise this idea of the *apūrva* will have to be assumed even in the case of the service to the king etc. (and the consequent reward or punishment). That is why it is stated in the śruti that human actions give pleasure to the Supreme Lord :

ये तु धर्म्यामृतमदं यथोक्तं पर्युषामते ।

श्रद्धावान्ना मत्परमा भक्तास्तेऽतीव मे प्रियाः ॥' (गीता १२.२०)

'But those who follow this ambrosial doctrine as I have declared it, full of faith and devoted to Me,

they, my devotees, are exceedingly dear to Me' (*Gītā* 16.20)

रोषतोषादिसत्त्वेऽपि न संसारित्वमीशितुः ।

तद्वृत्तत्वाददुःखत्वान्नित्यमुक्ततयाऽपि च ॥ ९१ ॥

Although displeasure and pleasure are attributed to Him, the Lord is not thereby brought within the scope of mundane existence ; because, He is all that exists, He is without pain and sorrow, and He is ever free.

व्युत्क्रमादप्ययस्तथा\* दृष्टम् ॥ ९२ ॥

92. Dissolution takes place in the reverse order; so is it seen (in the world also).

प्रलयो व्याप्यतस्त्वानां व्यापकेषूत्क्रमान्मतः।

व्यापिकायां मृदि व्याप्यघटादिलयदर्शनात् ॥ इति ॥ ९६ ॥

इत्याचार्यश्रीस्वप्नेश्वरविद्वद्गविरचिते शाण्डिल्यशतसूत्रीये भाष्ये  
तृतीयाध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥ १ ॥

It is held that dissolution (at the end of a periodical mundane existence) takes place in the reverse order, with the pervaded-principles (or effects) dissolving in their respective pervading principles (or material causes), since we observe in the world

\*.....तथा हि दृष्टम् (पा.)

that the effects like the jar etc., are resolved back (on destruction) into their material cause like clay.

*Thus ends the first section of the third chapter of the commentary on the hundred aphorisms of Śāṇḍilya composed by the most learned teacher Svapneśvara.*



## SECTION II

जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावो हि मुक्तिरित्यभिधीयते ।  
तद्विवेकतयाऽत्रापि भजनीयविवेचनम् ॥  
अन्यस्य कथमन्यत्वं षटेतेति वितर्कयन् ।  
भगवद्भावे योग्यतामाह सूत्रकृत् ॥

The attainment of oneness with Brahman by the individual soul is called (his) liberation. By discussing about that liberation, here also, the discussion on that object of devotion (viz., the Supreme Lord or Brahman) (is continued). While investigating the question, 'How is it possible for one thing to become another?' the author of the aphorisms declares the capacity of the individual souls to become one with the Lord :

तदैक्यं नानात्वैकत्वमुपाधियोगहानादादित्यवत् ॥ ९३ ॥

93. Unity is its (nature). The diversity or unity is caused by the conjunction or the disjunction of the limiting adjunct, as is the case with the sun.

‘सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म’ (छा. उ. ३. १४. १); ‘नेह नानाऽस्ति  
किञ्चन’ (क. उ. ४. ११),

‘यथा प्रकाशयत्येकः कृत्स्नं लोकमिदं रविः ।

क्षेत्र क्षेत्री तथा कृत्स्नं प्रकाशयति भारत ॥’ (गीता १३. ३३)

‘क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत ।’ (गीता १३. २)

इत्यादिभि तस्यैकत्वमेव स्वभावः । \*अत एव यो नानात्वप्रत्ययः स

जीवोपाधिबुद्धेरात्मनि कृतः । तथा च श्रुतिः—‘एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते  
जलजन्द्रवत’,

सितनीलादिभेदेन यथैकं दृश्यते नभः ।

भ्रान्तदृष्टिभिरात्माऽपि तथैकः सन् पृथक् पृथक् ॥’

वि. पु. २. १६. १२)

इति । ततः परमक्त्या जीवोपाधिबुद्धिहाने सति पुनरेकत्वमप्यबिरुद्धम् ।  
यथाऽऽदित्यस्य प्रकाशात्मनः प्रतिबिम्बोपाधिदर्पणाद्यपगमे तद्वत् ॥ ९३ ॥

That his oneness (with Brahman) is natural to him is known from the (following) statements (of the śrutis) :

‘All this is verily Brahman’ (Ch. U. 3.14.1).

‘There is no diversity whatever, here’ (K U. 4.11).

‘As the one sun illumines all this world, O Bhārata, the soul illumines all the bodies’ (Gītā 13.33).

\* This reading is adopted from Cowell (p 99). The usual printed texts run as follows : उभयथा चात्मप्रत्ययः स जीवोपाधिबुद्धेरात्मानु-  
कृतः । This is very obscure.

And know Me also, O Bhārata, to be the embodied soul in all the bodies' (*ibid* 13.2).

That is why, the idea of diversity is produced in the soul, by the internal organ which is a limiting adjunct of the individual soul. So does the śruti also say : 'It is seen in one way and also in many ways like the moon in water'. And again : 'As the one sky is apparently seen diversified as white, blue etc. so the ātman which is in truth but one, is seen by those of deluded vision as distinct (in different individuals)' (*V. P.* 2.16.12).

Therefore when the limiting adjunct of the soul, viz., the internal organ, is dispelled by supreme devotion, then, that the essential oneness (manifests once again) is above contradiction. Just as the sun who is of the nature of light (continues to remain as one), after the removal of mirrors etc. which are the reflecting adjuncts, so here also.

पृथगिति चेन्न परेणासम्बन्धात् प्रकाशानाम् ॥ ९४ ॥

94. If it is said that (the souls are) separate (from the supreme), (we) deny it ; because the self-manifesting (souls) cannot have any connection with the Supreme.

पृथगेव परस्पामत्यन्तभिन्नाः प्रकाशात्मन एव जीवाः, अन्यथा कश्चिन्मुक्तः कश्चिद्बद्ध इति व्यवस्था न स्यादिति चेत् ; न, कथञ्चिदनीश्वर-साङ्ख्यानानां तथा सम्भवेऽपि सेश्वरसाङ्ख्यानानां तदसम्भवात् । कथम् ? प्रकाशात्मना

परेण परमेश्वरेण सह द्रष्टृत्वदृश्यत्वलक्षणसम्बन्धाभावात् तेषां स्वप्रकाशतयाऽऽ-  
दित्येनेव प्रदीपानामप्रकाशनात् । तथा चानीश्वरत्वमसर्वज्ञत्व ज्ञयत्व च  
ब्रह्मणः स्यात् । अथ प्रकाश्याः, तेषां जाड्यप्रसङ्गात् । नापि मिथो  
बुद्धिवृत्त्या प्रकाश्यत्वम् । तद्धि तमोऽभिभूत्यैव नैवान्तःकरणसत्त्ववृत्त्या ।  
न च तदयोग्यत्वे तत् सम्भवति । न खल्वावरणनिवृत्तावपि दीपो दीपान्तर-  
प्रकाश्य इति, बाह्याभ्यन्तरप्रकाशयोः कश्चिदौपाधिकोऽप्येकधर्मो येन 'स्वय-  
ज्योतिरेवायं पुरुषः'\* (बृ. उ. ४.३.९) इत्यादौ गौणो ज्योतिश्शब्दः ।  
तस्माच्चिदात्मा जगत्प्रकाशकत्वेनैव सिद्ध्यतीति न तत्र परापेक्षा । किञ्च,  
मनोवर्मभ्रमतस्त्वधियोरधिष्ठानतया चात्मसिद्धिरप्रत्यूहैव बुद्धिवृत्तीनां तु गौण  
एव ज्ञानत्वसुखत्वव्यवहारः ।

किं मानमात्मनां भेदे बुद्धितस्त्वभिदा स्थिता ।

बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्थाने नित्यमुक्तात्मनां कृतः ॥ इनि ॥ ९४ ॥

**Objection :** (The individual souls) are separate (from the Lord), (and) absolutely different from one another. And, these souls are of the nature of light. Otherwise there could be no basis for the fact that someone is free while someone else is bound.

**Reply :** Not so, Even if this can somehow be proved to be possible in the school of the atheistic Sāṅkhyas, it is impossible in the case of the theistic Sāṅkhyas. How so? Because, they being of the nature of light (or knowledge), cannot have a

\* The actual quotation in the *Kāṇva* recension is : अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं ज्योतिर्भवति. The commentator may just be giving the idea here, instead of the actual quotation.

seer-seen-type of relationship with the Supreme Lord, just as lamps being self-luminous, cannot be illumined by the sun. If such a position is accepted, there is every prospect of Brahman losing His omnipotence and omniscience, and becoming knowable.

**Objection :** Let them, then, be illumined (by Him).

**Reply :** Then you have to take up the position that they are insentient !<sup>1</sup> Nor can we accept that these souls are illumined (or manifested) by the mutual modifications of the internal organs ; because this manifestation takes place by the removal of the darkness (of ignorance) and not by the evolution of the internal organ under *sattva*.<sup>2</sup> This internal organ being thus incapable of manifesting the soul, it cannot take place. Even when the veil between two lamps is removed, one of them cannot indeed be illumined by the other. Between the two lights (the soul and the lamp)—one internal and the other external—there is a common characteristic though it may be a non-essential one, (*viz.* their capacity to manifest themselves as also others, thus not needing a second illuminator to illumine themselves). For instance, there is the statement, ‘This soul is verily a light himself’ (*Br. U.* 4.3.9), where the word ‘light’ has been used in a secondary sense. Therefore the conscious soul is established by the very fact of its illumining the world, for which it needs the help of no second entity. And also, the existence of the

soul is incontestably established by the fact of its being the substratum both for the attributes of the internal organ erroneously reflected in it<sup>3</sup> and for real knowledge. As for the attributing of knowledge, happiness etc., to the modifications of the internal organ in common parlance, it is only in a secondary sense.

‘What is the proof of the separate existence of individual souls? It is clear that the principle of *buddhi* is separate (for separate individual souls). Since the souls are eternally free, how otherwise<sup>4</sup> can there be the determination of bondage and liberation?’

<sup>1</sup> There is a general rule that whatever is illumined or manifested by another, is insentient ; यद्वि परस्य प्रकाश्यं तज्जडम् ।

<sup>2</sup> According to the commentator Svapneśvara, perception takes place like this : When a sense organ like the eye comes into contact with a jar, the darkness or ignorance concealing that jar is first removed. The internal organ next assumes the shape of the jar and presents it to the soul. The soul’s light or consciousness is reflected in this modified internal organ, when the soul is said to ‘perceive or know’ the jar. This is slightly different from the usual Vedantic standpoint wherein the internal organ itself, removes the veil of ignorance through its modifications.

<sup>3</sup> It is the internal organ that undergoes modifications and not the soul. When the soul identifies itself with these modifications reflected in itself, it thinks ‘I am happy’, ‘I am suffering’ and so on. Even for such an erroneous reflection there must be a substratum and that is the soul.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. except by this conception of different internal organs which act as limiting adjuncts, just like several reflecting media, reflecting the same sun and making it appear to have become many.

अथ विकारिण एव सत्तात्मानो ज्ञानेच्छादयस्तद्गुणाः जानामीच्छामि सुखीत्यादिप्रत्ययादिति मतं निरस्यन्नाह—

Let then the souls, of the nature of existence, be considered as capable of undergoing modifications and that the knowledge, desire etc., be their qualities because of such perceptions as 'I know', 'I desire', 'I am happy' etc. This doctrine is now refuted :

न विकारिणस्तु\* करणविकारात् ॥ ९५ ॥

95. But, the (individual souls are) not capable of being modified ; because, it is the instrument which gets modified (and this is sufficient to meet the objection).

न ज्ञानादिविकारवन्त आत्मानो भवितुमर्हन्ति । कुतः ? सुखोपलम्भादेः करणगतत्वेन ज्ञानादीनामुपत्तेरात्मनामविकारित्वात् । तथाहि—सुखोपलब्धिः सकरणिका इत्यनुमाने तादृशकरणासम्बन्धस्य तादात्म्येन सत्त्वात् सुखादयो नात्मविकाराः, आत्मनि प्रतीतत्वात्, गौरत्वदिवत्—इत्यनुमानाच्च । एवमहन्त्वस्यापि कारणतादात्म्येनैव मनसा ग्रहणम् । सुषुप्तौ मनो लये तद्ग्रहणम् । कालोपाधीनां कालत्ववदिति दिक् ॥ ९५ ॥

\* न विकारणस्तु जीवा (पा.)

The (individual) souls are not capable of such modifications as knowledge etc. Why? Because it is possible to explain the occurrence of knowledge etc. by noting that the perception of pleasure etc. belong to the instrument (*i.e.* the internal organ). Consequently the souls do not get modified. For instance, in the inference, 'perception of pleasure has to be through an instrument', the soul being really unconnected with such an instrument, identifies himself with it through the reflection. And there is the other inference that pleasure etc., are not modifications of the soul, because they are perceived reflected in the soul, just like whiteness etc., (of the body, being reflected in the soul, is identified with it). Similar is the perception by the mind of egoism through identification with its cause (*viz.* egoism). When the mind is dissolved in deep sleep, there is no (such) perception of egoism. Just as the limiting adjuncts of time<sup>5</sup> themselves constitute the time (here also, the limiting adjuncts of the mind like joy, knowledge etc., themselves constitute the mind).<sup>6</sup> This is the general line of argument.

<sup>5</sup> Like moments, minutes, hours, days, etc., past, present, future etc.

<sup>6</sup> It will be appropriate here to quote the following passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (1.5.3) : कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा वृत्तिरधृतिर्हीर्षाभीरिस्येतत्सर्वं मन एव, 'Desire, deliberation doubt, faith, want or faith, steadiness, impatience, shame, intelligence and fear—all these are nothing but forms of mind.'



अथ कथं जीवस्य ब्रह्मभाव इत्यपेक्षायामाह —

Well then, how does the individual soul become Brahman ? This question is now discussed :

अनन्यभक्त्या तद्बुद्धिर्बुद्धिलयादत्यन्तम्\* ॥ ९६ ॥

96. Identification with Him (is achieved) through undivided devotion. (Liberation is attained) when the (individual's) internal organ is dissolved absolutely.

(गीता ८. २२) —

पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यया ।  
यस्यान्तस्स्थानि भूतानि येन सर्वमिदं ततम् ॥

इति श्रुतम् । तथा (नृ. पु.) —

भक्त्यैकलभ्ये पुरुषे पुराणे  
मुक्तौ किमर्थं क्रियते न यत्नः । इति ।

तस्मात् परभक्तिमात्रेण बुद्धेरत्यन्तलये सति ब्रह्मानन्दावासिलक्षणा मुक्तिरित्यर्थः ।  
तथा च तदीयबुद्धिविलयप्रागभावासहवृत्तिब्रह्मानन्दावाप्तिर्मुक्तिरिति तल्लक्षणं  
सूचितम् । अत्र बुद्धिर्जीवोपाधिर्मता भगवत एव बुद्धितत्त्वाभ्युपगमात्† ॥

It has been declared in the *Gītā* (8.22) : ‘That Supreme Being, O Pārtha, in whom are all beings

\*तद्बुद्धिलयादत्यन्तम् (पा.)

† This sentence is adopted in this place, following Cowell's reading. In the usual printed texts, it comes after the next sentence which does not obviously fit in.

\*

and by whom all this is pervaded, is attainable by undivided devotion'. So also in the *Nṛsiṃhapurāṇa* : 'When that Ancient Person who can be attained through devotion only, is there, why not an effort be made for liberation?' Therefore, when the internal organ is dissolved through supreme devotion only, liberation characterised by the attainment of the bliss of Brahman, results. This is the meaning. Its characteristic is thus indicated to be the attainment of the bliss of Brahman, unaccompanied by the antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) of the dissolution of the internal organ<sup>7</sup>; this is liberation. Here, the internal organ is held to be the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, since it is accepted that the principle of *buddhi* has sprung up from the Lord Himself.

<sup>7</sup> This long and complicated sentence simply means that the attainment of the bliss of Brahman is accompanied by the dissolution of the internal organ. Another reading of the original is *prāgabhāva-sahavṛtti* instead of *prāgabhāva-asahavṛtti* which is even more complicated to translate sensibly.

अथ ब्रह्मानन्दावाप्तेः सिद्धत्वेनापुरुषार्थत्वमिति चेत् ; न, प्रामादि-  
बद्धिशिष्टतया पुमर्थत्वात् । अन्यथा 'इदं सुखम्', 'अत्र सुखत्वम्' इति  
ज्ञानात् जातेर्नित्यतया तद्विशिष्टस्य पुमर्थाभावप्रसङ्गात्, ईहाकृत्योर्विकल्पकत्वा-  
भावात् । तस्मादसिद्धोपरागेण सिद्धे अपीच्छाकृती इति ॥

**Objection :** Since the attainment of the bliss of Brahman is ever present, it is not an end to be pursued by man.

**Reply :** Not so ; because like a village<sup>8</sup> etc., it can still be of utility to man, in a special way. Otherwise, even in the case of happiness there is the possibility of its not being an object of pursuit by man ; because in such cognitions as ‘This is the thing happiness determined by the general idea (*jāti*) of happiness (*sukhatva*) inhering in it’, since the general idea is eternal, anything possessing it also becomes eternal, and hence does not become an object of pursuit by man. And, (unlike the power of cognition), desire and volition cannot separate the individual from the species. Therefore (we maintain that) desire and volition being coloured by that part of the object which is unfixed, pursue also that which is fixed (both being to them inseparably mixed).<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Though the village is always there and hence is not to be produced by our will, still, we can produce a special relationship with it; as for instance, that of the owner of that village. Similarly though the bliss of Brahman is ever present, the individual soul can create a special relationship with it through supreme devotion.

<sup>9</sup> Perception is of two kinds : *savikalpaka* or determinate and *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate. The latter is a general comprehension whereas the former is particular comprehension. When we see a jar, we first comprehend the general species (*i. e.* jar-ness or *ghatatva*) and also the jar in which this inheres. The two ideas are distinct. This perception is *nirvikalpaka*. Next however, the two ideas are combined and there arises the perception ‘This is a jar’, (and then the knowledge about its size, colour etc.) which is called *savikalpaka*.

Usually we are not conscious of the first step. The commentator says that though the power of cognition has these two distinct steps, desire and volition do not have that. Consequently they are unable to separate the two (*i.e.* the species and the individual, the quality and the qualified etc.). Hence it is quite possible to argue for argument's sake, on the above lines leading to the conclusion that even happiness cannot be sought after by man since it is always there !

कृत्यसाध्यत्वज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धकमिति चेत् । श्येनादौ बलवदनिष्टानु-  
बन्धित्वतिरोधानादिवोत्कटरागेण कृत्यसाध्यत्वमपि तिरोधाय प्रवर्तितमिति  
किमनुपपन्नम् ? आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच्च मोक्षे प्रतिष्ठितमित्यागमादपि  
तथात्वमध्यवसेयमिति ॥ ९६ ॥

**Objection :** The knowledge that the object cannot be obtained by our volition (or effort) will act as a restraint !

**Reply :** What is there that is incongruous in this? Just as in the case of the *śyena* sacrifice<sup>10</sup>, where the intense desire (to destroy the enemy) will overshadow the knowledge that it is accompanied by a very undesirable result (and goad him to perform that sacrifice), here also, a strong desire may overshadow the knowledge that the object cannot be got by his volition, and thus goad him to action. Moreover, the *Āgama* also says that bliss is the essential character of Brahman and that is established in liberation. from this also (it is known) that such a state is to be striven for.

<sup>13</sup> The *Śaṅkara Brāhmaṇa*(3. 8) recommends this sacrifice to him who wants to kill his enemies by incantations.

अथ परभक्तिसिद्धौ जीवनादृष्टभोगवद् इतरेषामपूर्वाणामपि भोगेनैव लय इत्यनिर्मुक्त एव स्यादित्यत उच्यते —

But then, even if supreme devotion is attained, there will be no liberation ; because, just as the unseen desert, which is responsible for this life, has to be dissolved only through working it out, so the other types of unseen deserts also (accumulated over the past several births) get dissolved only by working them out. This objection is now met :

आयुश्चिरमितरेषां तु हानिर्नास्पदत्वात् ॥ ९७ ॥

97. (Liberation is) delayed only so long as life lasts. However, the other (unseen deserts) get destroyed since they have no place to abide in.

आत्मस्तौ सत्याम् 'तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये, अथ सम्पत्स्ये'  
(छा. उ. ६.१४.२) इति । तथा (वि.पु. १.२.२०)—

धर्मार्थकामैः किं तस्य मुक्तिस्तस्य करे स्थिता ।

समस्तजगतां मूले यस्य भक्तिः स्थिरा त्वयि ॥

तथा च, आयुर्जीवनादृष्टं तन्मात्रमेव चिरं परभक्तौ सत्यामपि मुक्तिप्रतिबन्धकं तावदेव जीवन्मुक्तिः । इतरेषां धर्माधर्माणां जीवनादृष्टलये सति बुद्धेरत्यन्तलये भोगास्पदस्याभावाद्धानिर्भोगाभाव एवेति नानिर्मुक्त इति बुद्धेरपि विकार्यत्वेन कारणत्वात् । नापि तददृष्टाद्देतुत्वं कारणान्तराभावे फलानिष्पत्तावपि

हेतुत्वाक्षतेः । तस्य भगवत्तोषरोषरूपस्यापि लयः कालात् प्रलयसामग्रीतो वा यथाङ्गापूर्वाणामङ्गवैगुण्यादजनितपरमापूर्वाणां लय इति । ब्रह्मार्पणं तु प्रतिबन्धकीभूतकर्मणामबन्धायेति सर्वमनवद्यम् । परम्परयैव ज्ञानाग्निना कर्मक्षय इति ॥ ९७ ॥

When devotion to the Supreme soul arises, 'He will be delayed only so long as he is not liberated (from the body) ; then he will obtain (Him)' (*Ch. U.* 6.14.2), Similarly (we read elsewhere) : 'Whoever has steady devotion to Thee, the root-cause of all the worlds, what has he to do with meritorious acts, wealth or desire ? Liberation is (already) placed in his grasp' (*V.P.* 1.2.20). This being the case the word *āyuh* ('life') (in the aphorism) means that unseen desert which has produced the present life. Even though supreme devotion has arisen, there is 'delay' *i.e.*, obstruction to liberation, to that extent only and so long he will only have *jivānmukti*.<sup>11</sup> When this unseen desert gets dissolved (with the death of the body) and (with it), the internal organ also being absolutely abolished and there being no place for the 'others', *i.e.* the unfructified merits and demerits to abide in, they also get destroyed, *i.e.* will not produce any experience. Consequently there is no question of final liberation not coming off, (especially) since the internal organ also, being itself changeable (and so, destroyable), helps to cause it. It should not be supposed that these other unseen deserts cannot produce their fruits ; because, their capacity of being

a cause (to produce those fruits) is indestructible though they do not actually produce them due to the absence of other helpful causes.<sup>12</sup> The (unseen desert) which may manifest itself through the pleasure or the displeasure of the Lord, will also get destroyed in course of time or by the occurrence of a mundane dissolution (*pralaya*), just as the potential fruit (*apūrva*) of a principal will not be produced at all by the subsidiary potential fruits due to some defect in the performance of those subsidiaries.<sup>13</sup> And there is no defect in all our arguments, because (according to us) the fruits of actions are offered to the Supreme Brahman so that they do not cause any bondage. As for the destruction of the fruit-bearing tendencies of our actions by knowledge, it is only indirect.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> According to some schools of Indian philosophy, the final liberation will come only after the death of the body, even though supreme knowledge or devotion has been attained while living. This liberation is technically termed *videhamukti*; However, such a person has, while living, attained the highest possible state which is called *jīvanmukti*, as opposed to *videhamukti*.

<sup>12</sup> A seed kept in a closed tin does not sprout even though it has the inherent capacity to do so, due to the absence of other causes like soil, water etc. Similarly here also.

<sup>13</sup> It was previously declared that merit and demerit of the individuals reside in the intellect of the Supreme Lord and that He gives their fruits by being pleased or displeased. So, it may now be argued that since the Lord's intellect will never be dissolved, merit and demerit will continue to exist eternally and hence there will be no hope of any liberation !

Svapneśvara has tried to counter this objection on the analogy of a Vedic sacrifice consisting of several subsidiary rites.

For example, the *darśa-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice consists of six parts. Each of these parts produces its own *apurva*. But the general *apurva* of the sacrifice as a whole is produced only by the united effects of all. Even if any one of the subsidiaries is not performed, or becomes defective due to any reason, the general *apūrva* will not be produced.

And there, the analogy ends ! It is not very clear how this can be connected with the question under discussion. Man's life is not like a systematic sacrifice consisting of several essential parts. Normally, with regard to any work, he has the freedom to do, or not to do or even to do it in a different manner. Hence the unseen desert produced by each and every action of his should produce its own result independent of others, sooner or later, and can never be destroyed either by time or by mundane dissolution.

There seems to be some force and substance in the objector's contention. If time or mundane dissolution can destroy them, as our commentator argues, then there is no reason why it should not destroy the merits and demerits of all irrespective of their spiritual realisation !

Perhaps, a better way of arguing it out would be to say that the Lord—on whose pleasure or displeasure depends the retribution for *karma*—will be so pleased with His devotee who has developed supreme devotion, that He will wipe off the balance of his *karma*, just as a king will remit the balance of his own sentence upon his subject, whose subsequent behaviour has pleased him immensely. This being a treatise on devotion, there should be no difficulty in accepting this explanation.



14 It is indirect because it produces supreme devotion, which alone has the power to destroy the bondage of karma. This standpoint is obviously opposed to Saṅkara's.

संसृतिरेषामभक्तिः स्यान्नाज्ञानात् कारणासिद्धेः\*॥ ९८ ॥

98. Their transmigratory existence arises (due to) want of devotion and not due to want of knowledge since (it has) not been proved to be the cause.

अथ जीवस्य संसारः किमज्ञानकृतो मतः ।

उत्तमभक्तिकृतस्तत्र सूत्रमेतत् प्रवर्तते ॥

Is the transmigratory existence of the individual soul considered to be due to want of knowledge (*i.e.* ignorance) or is it the result of want of devotion? This aphorism proceeds to (answer this question).

स्वर्गोऽथ जीवन्मुक्तत्वं मुक्तिरेषां त्रयी गतिः ।

जीवन्मुक्तः परा भक्तिस्तदसिद्धिस्तु संसृतिः ॥

These individual souls have three alternative courses : heaven, jīvanmukti, and final liberation. Out of these, jīvanmukti or liberation while still living, means the attainment of supreme devotion. Its non-attainment is however, transmigratory existence.

\* संसृतिरेषामभक्तेः स्यान्नाज्ञानात् कारणासिद्धेः (पा.)



साऽपि भक्तेः कामनानामभावादेव तिष्ठति ।

भक्तौ सत्यां निवर्तेत तथा चोक्तं महर्षिभिः ॥

This transmigratory existence also, is there, only due to the want of the desire for devotion. It will disappear when devotion is produced. So has it been declared by the great ṛṣis.

तावदार्तिस्तु सा वाञ्छा तावन्मोहस्तथा सुखम् ।

यावन्नायाति शरणं त्वामशेषाघमोचनम् ॥ (वि.पु. १.९ ७२)

‘As long as one has not taken refuge in Thee, the deliverer from all sin, so long will one have distress, desire, infatuation as also worldly pleasures’ (V.P. 1.9.72).

तत्त्वाज्ञानाकृता सृष्टिर्ज्ञानात्तद्भानिरिष्यते ।

रज्जुसर्पादिहेतूनामभावात् तदसम्भवात् ॥

(Some people) desire to state that this creation has been produced due to the ignorance of the truth and that it gets abolished on the attainment of the knowledge of the truth. Since there are no material causes which produce the snake in the rope etc., and since their (disappearance due to knowledge also) is impossible (the above-mentioned theory cannot be proved).

So far the first part of aphorism had been explained. This verse now deals with the latter part. The Advaitic standpoint that ignorance is the cause of all bondage and that

knowledge is the cause of deliverance is criticised here. The reasons given in support of this in the sūtra 86 may be remembered here. The gist of the whole argument is that the material universe being real, it cannot be produced by mere ignorance of the truth, just as a real snake cannot be produced by the mere ignorance of the nature of the rope. In this stock example of Advaitins, there never was any real snake and the whole thing was a case of mistake in reception. If ignorance was really the cause of this universe, then knowledge could certainly have abolished it. Since the former is not true, the latter also cannot be possible.

जन्मानि घोरयमकिङ्करताडनानि

दैन्यानि तानि तपनात्मजदर्शनानि ।

जन्तोरहम्मतरङ्गकुरङ्गतृष्णा-

कृष्णाङ्घ्रिपङ्कजपराङ्मुखतानुभावः ॥ इति ॥ ९८ ॥

“The succession of births made miserable by the sight of the son of Sun (i.e. Yama), and also by the scourgings of the servants of Yama—these are the mirage of the wave of the creature’s sense of ‘I’ and ‘mine’, the effect of turning away from the lotus feet of Kṛṣṇa.”

This looks like a quotation but the source has not been traced.

त्रीण्येषां नेत्राणि शब्दलिङ्गाक्षभेदाद्रुद्रवत् ॥ ९९ ॥

99, Like Rudra, these (individual souls) have three eyes (as it were), due to the division (of the means of knowledge) into verbal testimony, inference and sense-perception.

एषां जीवानां त्रीणि नयनानि, साधनानि, अर्थप्रमितौ प्रमाणभूतानीति यावत् । प्रमित्वाविशेषेऽपि करणत्रैविध्यात् त्रैविध्यम् । तानि यथा ज्ञायमानयोग्यपदपदार्थरूपशब्दः शाब्दप्रमाकरणम् । तस्य प्रथममभिधानमलौकिकभक्तेस्तत्साधनतादौ प्राधान्यकथनार्थम् । तथा ज्ञायमानव्याप्यपक्षधर्मलिङ्गज्ञानमनुमितिकरणमस्माकं स्कार्थत्वाज्ज्ञायमानत्वमप्यविरुद्धम् । प्रत्यक्षप्रमितिकरणान्यक्षाणि विषयसम्बद्धानि तानि च मनश्चोत्रत्वक्चक्षुःसन्घ्राणानि षट् स्वसम्बन्धेनान्तःकरणस्य तमोऽभिभूय चिदात्मप्रकाशमानार्थाकारां सत्त्ववृत्तिं जनयन्ति । अत एवोक्तम् 'सर्वद्वारेषु देहेऽस्मिन् प्रकाश उपजायते' (गीता. १४. ११) इति ॥

These individual souls have three 'eyes', instruments for determining the nature of things ; in other words, three means of knowledge. Though there is no difference with regard to the knowledge obtained, the three-fold division is due to the instruments (of knowledge) being three-fold. They are as follows : Verbal testimony is of the form of a word and its meaning which are fit for knowing ; (it is the same as) producing knowledge through the word. It has been listed first because (being revealed word), it is the chief means of knowing about the supernatural devotion and its means. Again, inferential knowledge is produced by the knowledge of the 'sign' (*liṅga*) which abides in the minor term (*Pakṣa*) and is invariably accompanied by a known major term (*sādhyā*).<sup>15</sup> Since we hold that an effect always pre-exists in its cause, there is no incongruity in saying 'the sign when recognised as abiding' etc.<sup>16</sup> The

senses produce direct perceptive knowledge when they get connected with their objects ; and they are six : mind and the organs of hearing, touching, seeing, tasting and smelling. These, by their connection with their objects dispel the darkness of the internal organ and produce a modification in it of *sattva* (the quality of light, knowledge and goodness) taking the form of the object and illumined by the conscious soul. That is why it has been declared thus: 'Light arises in this body through all its avenues (*Gītā* 14.11).

<sup>15</sup> All this jugglery of words can be cleared by an example : 'The hill is on fire, because, it has smoke. It is known that wherever there is smoke, there is fire'. Here, the knowledge of the fire on the hill, though the fire itself is not seen directly, is gained by inference. There are certain technical terms normally used with regard to such inferences. The thing to be proved (*e.g.* the fire) is called *sādhya* or *dharma* or *anumeya* or the major term. The thing in which this major term exists, is known as *pakṣa* or the minor term (*e.g.* the hill). The sign (*liṅga*) or the reason (*hetu*) which leads to such a conclusion is the middle term (*e.g.*, smoke). This knowledge from inference will not be valid unless there is a universal connection (*vyāpti*) between the middle term and the major term (*e.g.*, smoke and fire).

<sup>16</sup> The term *jñāyamāna* is in present continuous tense. It may be objected that at the time of inference the 'sign' might not be there, having already passed off. It may come in future also. Consequently no inference would be possible. This statement is in reply to such a possible objection. Since, according to the *satkāryavāda* to which the commentator subscribes, an

effect is always pre-existing in its cause, the 'sign' will always be present—latent or manifest—and hence inference also is always possible.

जीवबुद्धिरूपमनसो दुःखादिविकारस्तु नाज्ञाताः सन्तीत्यात्मप्रकाशेनैव प्रकाश्यन्त इति न तत्र सत्त्ववृत्त्यवकल्पनं गौरवात् । एतदेव साक्षिभास्यत्वम् । एवं शब्दानुमानप्रत्यक्षभेदात् त्रीण्येवः यथा रुद्रस्य त्रीणि चक्षुरधिष्ठानानि नाधिकानि न न्यूनानि तद्वच्चन्द्रसूर्याग्निरूपत्वचिह्नानि । उपमानं तु शक्तिग्रह-मात्रार्थम्, तच्च सामान्यतोदृष्टानुमानसहकारेण प्रसिद्धपदसामानाधिकरण्यात् कविकाव्यपरिच्छेदवन्मनसाऽपि सम्भवतीति त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भूतमिति न पृथक् । प्रमाणविचारोऽस्माभिर्न्यायतत्त्वनिकषे वेदान्ततरवनिकषे च निरूपित इति नेह प्रतन्यते ॥

As for sorrow etc., which are modifications of the internal organ of the individual soul, (which organ is of the the nature of understanding or intellect), they do not remain unknown; but become manifest due to the light of the soul itself. Hence there is no necessity to assume the modification of *sattva* to account for their being known as this is cumbersome. It is this only that is meant by saying that (they are) illumined by the witness (i. e. the soul). Therefore there are only three (means of knowledge) divided as verbal testimony, inference and sense perception. Just as Rudra has three organs of sight, neither more nor less, so here also; and like them, they indicate the moon, the sun and the fire.<sup>17</sup> However, 'comparison' (*upamāna*) being only useful for comprehending the direct meaning of a word, is included

in these three only and is not an independent (means of knowledge); because, it is effected by the mind itself with the assistance of the inference known as *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, starting from the recognised fact that a well-known word is applied to the same object to which unknown word is applied, just as the determination by analogy of the metaphorical meanings of words in poetry.<sup>18</sup> Since we have already discussed about the means of knowledge in our two works, *Nyāyatattvanikaṣa* and *Vedāntatattvanikāṣu*, it will not be extended here.

<sup>17</sup> Cowell gives an interesting explanation : ‘Siva’s right eye is the sun, his left is the moon and his third eye in the centre of his forehead is fire. I suppose that the sun properly stands for revelation as being the brightest, the moon for inference (from its connexion with *pakṣa* as the ‘lunar fortnight’ and ‘the minor term’) and the five fires for the five senses. In the text, however, the moon is put first in the compound (according to the rule *abhyarhitāṅga*) as being the monarch of the stars, planets, and brāhmaṇas. See V. P. 1.22’ (Cowell’s translation, p. 109).

<sup>18</sup> Logicians divide *anumāna* or inference into three kinds : 1) *pūrvavat*, 2) *śeṣavat* and 3) *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. When we see the clouds and expect rain, it is a case of *pūrvavat* inference where we perceive the antecedent and infer the consequent. This is because of our previous experience. When we see a river in flood and say that there was rain, it is a case of *śeṣavat* inference where we perceive the consequent and infer the antecedent. When we see a horned animal and infer that it has a tail, it is a case of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference. It is based on uniformity of experience.

*Upamāna* or comparison is another means of knowledge accepted by many schools including Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta. It is the means by which we gain the knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing previously known. Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (23) puts it nicely thus:

प्रसिद्धवस्तुसाधभ्यादप्रसिद्धस्य साधनम् ।  
उपमानं समाख्यातं यथा गौर्गवयस्तथा ॥

'To prove an unknown thing by its similarity to a well-known thing, is called *upamāna*. For instance ; the *gavaya* (wildox) is like the cow.'

Unlike the logicians and the Advaitins, *Śaṅḍilya* accepts only three valid means of knowledge. Svapneśvara has tried to prove here that *upamāna* considered by others as a separate and independent means of knowledge can be included under inference itself. His arguments run as follows: Comparison or *upamāna* is useful only in so far as it helps us to comprehend the direct meaning of a word and does not produce any new knowledge. For example, when we hear a new word *gavaya* and are told that it is an animal resembling a cow, and when we actually see a *gavaya*, we connect the word with the object inferring that this must be the animal called *gavaya*. This knowledge is actually got by the mind with the help of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference itself. How? By applying a well-known word (like 'cow') to the same object (an animal like cow) as the unknown word (*gavaya*) also : 'This animal must be a *gavaya* because it is just like a cow.' This is just like determining the metaphorical meanings of words and phrases used in poetry. When the poet says 'The tiger has come' with respect to a human being we infer that the man is known for his ferocity like that of a tiger, has come.



जीवबुद्धिर्मनो नाम तत्सङ्कोचाविकासवत् ।  
यौगपद्यायौगपद्ये धिया तेनोपपद्यते ॥

The 'intellect' of the individual soul is called *manas* or mind. It has the power of contraction and expansion. It is by this that the simultaneousness or non-simultaneousness of several perceptive knowledges can be accounted for.

Here, the nature of mind is being described. Though Sāṅkhya holds that intellect (*buddhi*), mind (*manas*) and egoism (*ahaṅkāra*) are all distinct, Svapneśvara, following the usual Vedāntic standpoint, considers them as same. The same internal organ (*antahkaraṇa*) gets different names when it is modified into different forms : Resolution and doubt go by the name of *manas*. Determinative faculty is *buddhi*. Thought waves are *citta*. Egosense is *ahaṅkāra*. Hence the *buddhi* or the intellect associated with the individual soul is the same as *manas* or mind. According to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools mind is atomic and as such can comprehend only one thing at a time. Our commentator holds that it is not so, but is capable of contraction and expansion. When it expands, it can perceive several things simultaneously like the colour, smell and softness of a flower. When it is contracted it can perceive only one.

ईश्वराहङ्कृतेर्जीवबुद्धीनात्तद्भवो यतः ।  
बुद्धौ दुःखादिवत्साक्षादहन्त्वमपि गृह्यते ॥

Like the sensations of pain etc., the sense of egoism also is directly perceived in the intellect because all the intellects associated with the

individual souls have arisen from the ego-principle of Īśwara (or Brahman).

That means, no action of the perceptive faculty or any evolution of the intellect itself is necessary.

Pain, pleasure etc., are qualities which reside in the intellect. When reflected upon the soul, they are wrongly attributed to the latter.

मात्राभूतेन्द्रियदीनां भगवद्बुद्धिजन्मतः ।

भगवद्बुद्धिबोध्यत्वाच्चिदा ग्राह्य तथेन्द्रियैः ॥

The subtle elements, the gross elements, the sense-organs etc., are fit to be known by the intellect of the Lord since they have been produced out of it. For the same reason they can be grasped by the individual soul as also its senses.

Since the intellect of the individual soul also has sprung up from the Lord, it must be capable of grasping the external world made up of these elements.

भूताति पञ्च तन्मात्राः पञ्च चैकादशेन्द्रियम् ।

अहम्बुद्धिप्रधानात्मपरेशास्तण्वसङ्ग्रहः ॥ इति षड्विंशति तत्त्वानि

॥ ९९ ॥

The five gross elements, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs of senses and action (including the mind), egoism, intellect, nature (*pradhāna*), the soul and the Supreme Lord—these are the first principles in brief and they are twenty-six.

आविस्तिरोभावा विकाराः स्युः क्रियाफलसंयोगात् ॥ १०० ॥

100. Manifestation and disappearance are modifications (of the existing), because of the connection with the result of the action (expressed by the root-verb).

प्रसङ्गादुत्पत्तिलयौ चिन्त्येते । तत्रोत्पत्तिराविर्भावक्षणा एव क्रिया योग्यता तथा तिरोभावस्तदयोग्यता एवं वृद्धिहानादयो विकारा एव भवन्ति । कुतः ? करोति घटं नाशयति घटमित्यादौ धात्वर्थफलसम्बन्धव्यपदेशात् ते च सत एव छटन्ते नासतः । तथा चोक्तम् (गीता २.१६) —

‘नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः’

इति । एवं भवति नश्यतीत्यादावपि क्रियाश्रयत्वं प्रतीयते । तच्च सत एव सम्भवति ॥

Creation and destruction will not be discussed as they are connected with the subject. Between these, creation is characterised by manifestation, the competency of an already existing thing to produce its effects. Similarly destruction is the incompetency to produce effects. In the same manner increase, decrease etc., are also modification of an already existing thing only. Why so? Because in such statements as, ‘he makes a pot’ ‘he destroys a pot’ etc., a connection has been specified between the object and the result of action implied by the verbal root. And these two (*i.e.*, manifestation and disappearance) can take place only with respect to a

thing that exists and with respect to that which does not exist. So has it been declared : 'Existence cannot belong to that which is not, nor non-existence to that which is' (*Gītā* 2.16). Similarly in such phrases as 'it exists', 'it is destroyed' etc., also, it is clear that the object is the basis for the action (implied by the verbal root). And this can happen only to a thing that exists.

स चाद्यक्षणसम्बन्धो नाशप्रतियोगित्वं च तदर्थः, आद्यत्वस्यानिश्चयः ।  
न चाविर्भावस्याविर्भावान्तरावश्यकत्वेऽनवस्थागौरवयोरन्यतरप्रसङ्गः, घटसाम-  
ग्र्या एवाविर्भावस्याविर्भावत्वात् । अन्यथा उत्पत्तेरुत्पावपि तथात्वप्रसङ्गात् ।  
एवञ्च घटस्य पूर्वपूर्वाविर्भावतिरोभावपरम्परैव प्रागभावस्तिरोभाव एव नाशः ।  
स च कदाचिदायन्तिकोऽपि, यथा देवदत्तशरीरस्य, यथा वामुक्तबुद्ध्यादीनाम् ।  
अन्योन्यात्यन्ताभावौ च परस्परविरुद्धधर्मतदधिकारणयोर्नातिरिच्येते । अन्यथा  
भावेऽप्यभावान्तरस्वीकारप्रसङ्गादिति । प्रलये तु प्रलयारूपविकारातिरिक्तस्य  
विकारस्याभाव एव । संस्कारास्तु सूक्ष्मात्मना तिष्ठन्तीति न कोऽदि दोषः ।  
पर्यवसिता भक्तिभीमांसा ॥

That ('manifestation') is the connection with the very first moment and it also means the counter entity to destruction, since 'the very first moment' cannot be defined, (accurately). And there is no scope for the argument that our position will lead to infinite regress or cumbrousness since every manifestation needs another manifestation to manifest it; because, the manifestation of the accessory things (of the pot like clay etc., and their union) is itself the manifestation of the pot. Otherwise, a similar

charge can be levelled against the doctrine of 'production' also, saying that one production needs another production.<sup>19</sup> This being the case, the 'antecedent non-existence' (*prāgabhāva*) of a pot (can be defined as) the series of previous manifestations and disappearances and 'destruction' as its disappearance (of the pot). And this destruction will sometimes be absolute as in the case of Devadatta's body (after his death) or of the intellects of liberated souls. And the two (other non-existences), 'the mutual non-existence' (*anyonyābhāva*) and 'the absolute non-existence' (*atyantābhāva*) are not really different from 'possessing mutually exclusive properties' and 'the site where the thing should have been' respectively.<sup>20</sup> Otherwise one has to accept another absence in the first absence and so on *ad infinitum*. But in a mundane dissolution, we do not have any other modification, than the one called 'mundane dissolution' (*pralaya*). Since the latent impressions produced by past actions continue to remain in a subtle form (to germinate into future merit and demerit and thus determine subsequent births) there is nothing wrong with this hypothesis. Thus ends this three-fold investigation into the doctrine of devotion.

<sup>19</sup> The crux of the problem is whether a causes or causes 'produce' (*utpatti*) an effect which was not there before, or, do they simply 'manifest' (*āvirbhāva*) the effect which pre-existed in the causes in a latent and subtle form. The followers of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika hold the former opinion whereas the Sāṅkhyas and Vedāntins uphold the latter on the basis of

*satkāryavāda*. Here it is being argued from the latter standpoint. 'Manifestation' simply means that all the relevant causes—the material, instrumental and the efficient—have come together. If it were something new, then the question would have arisen that this manifestation needs another manifestation to manifest it and so on. To avoid this, if we take recourse to the 'production theory' for the second or third manifestation, then the opponent would say that it is easier to accept that theory at the very beginning instead of making it cumbersome like this. After thus arguing it out, the commentator hits back saying that this very same defect can be pointed out *more* in their own production theory.

<sup>20</sup> After discussing 'manifestation', 'disappearance' is taken up for discussion. Just as the logicians hold that a thing is produced (*utpatti*) from its causes it can also be destroyed (*vināśa*) by other causes. As against this theory of (*utpatti*) and *vināśa*, the aphorism and the commentary are expounding the theory of 'manifestation' and disappearance' (*āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva*).

The logicians hold that *abhāva* (non existence) is of four kinds : (1) *prāgabhāva* (antecedent non-existence), e.g., the non-existence of a pot before its production ; (2) *pradhvaṅśā bhāva* (non-existence caused by destruction), e.g., the non-existence of the pot after it is destroyed ; (3) *anyonyābhāva* (mutual non-existence) e.g., of a pot in a cloth and of the cloth in the pot (4) *atyantābhāva* (absolute non-existence), e.g., 'there is no pot; here.' That means there is absolute non-existence of the pot here.

Our commentator is explaining these terms in his own way, in conformity with the theory of manifestation and disappearance : The *prāgabhāva* of the pot is nothing but the series of

manifestations and disappearances *before* the present manifestation. What the others call as *vināśa* or *nāśa* (destruction) is nothing but disappearance. Hence *pradhvaṃsābhāva* is the state after this disappearance ; or it will be the *pragabhāva* for a future manifestation. Being possessed of mutually of opposite qualities is itself *anyonyābhāva*. When we say that there is no pot in the cloth and *vice versa*, it simply means that the pot has potness' (*ghaṭatva*) which is absent in the cloth and *vice versa*. And, finally, *atyantābhāva* simply signifies the place. When we say there is no pot *here*, it simply refers to *this ground* not containing the pot. Orherwise, if we take that non-existence of the pot itself as something positive it will lead to queer conclusions ! For instance, when we say there is no pot here, it means there is non-existence of the pot here. Is there a pot in this non-existence ? No. So there is a non-existence of the pot in that non-existence of the pot ! This line of argument can thus be extended *infinitem*.

परिवीतपीतवसनं घनोपमं

शतपत्रपत्रसदृशायतेक्षणम् ।

धृतवेणुरेणुपरिमण्डितं गवां

हृदि वोऽस्तु कौस्तुभविभूषणं महः ॥ १ ॥

1. May the lute of the Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa adorned with the *kaustubha* gem, wearing yellow garments, (Himself) resembling the dark cloud, with lotus-like eyes, holding the flute and surrounded by the dust raised by the cows abide in your hearts !

गौडक्षमावसये विशारद इति ख्यातादभूद्भूमणेः

सर्वोर्वीपतिसार्वभौमपदभाक् प्रज्ञावतामग्रणीः ।

तस्मादास जलेश्वरो बुधवरः सेनाधिपः क्षमाभृतां  
स्वप्नेशेन कृतं तदङ्गजनुषा सद्भक्तिमीमांसनम् ॥२॥

2. There was in the bracelet of the country Bengal (*Gauḍa*) a well-known place like a gem (in that bracelet) in which existed a leader of the wise, named Viśārada, who held the post of monarch over all the rulers of the earth; from him was born Jaleśvara, the chief of the learned, and general of kings; by Svapneśvara his son, was this investigation into the doctrine of devotion composed.

इति श्रीस्वप्नेश्वरविद्वद्भिरविरचिते शाण्डिल्यशतसूत्रीये भाष्ये तृतीयस्या-  
ध्ययायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ॥ २ ॥

समाप्तश्चाध्यायः ॥ ३ ॥

—समाप्तं भक्तिमीमांसा—

*Thus ends the second section of the third chapter of the commentary on the hundred aphorisms of Śāṅḍilya composed by the most learned teacher Svapneśvara.*

THE THIRD CHAPTER ENDS HERE

THUS ENDS THIS INVESTIGATION INTO THE  
DOCTRINE OF DEVOTION





# अनुबन्धः सूत्रपाठः

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७. न क्रिया कृत्यनपेक्षणाज्ज्ञानवत् ॥
८. अत एव फलानन्त्यम् ॥
९. तद्वतः प्रपत्तिशब्दाच्च न ज्ञानमितरप्रपत्तिवत् ॥

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इति श्रीशाण्डिल्यमहर्षिप्रणीतभक्तिसूत्रम्



# सूत्राणां वर्णानुक्रमणिका

(संख्या सूत्रस्य)


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## ABOUT THE TRANSLATOR

Swami Harshananda is a monk of the Ramakrishna Order. After having served in the Ashramas of the Ramakrishna Math at Bangalore, Mangalore and Mysore, he was for some time at its Head Quarters in Calcutta also. At present he is the Correspondent of the Ramakrishna Institute of Moral and Spiritual Education at Mysore, an institution started in 1974 under the auspices of the local Ashrama to conduct various courses in Moral and Spiritual Education for the benefit of students, teachers and general public.

The Swamiji has translated the following Sanskrit works into Kannada, all of which have been published by the Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, Mysore : Śivasahasranāma, Śrī Durgā Saptasatī, Jīvanmukti Viveka, Ātmabodha, Aparokṣānubhūti. Vākyavṛtti, Laghu Vākyavṛtti and Śrī Ramakṛṣṇa Karṇāmṛtam.

He also delights in writing in Sanskrit. Among the few compositions published as booklets or in journals, Śrī Ramakṛṣṇa Suprabhātam has become very popular.



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## EXTRACTS FROM REVIEWS

“ The book under review is not a easy one to translate. Swami Harshananda . . . has rendered it into apt English. The Introduction and Notes exhibit his high critical Scholarship. ”

—*Bhavan's Journal*, 25-9-1977

“ The present edition is very welcome inasmuch as it sets out the text of both the sutra and bhasya in Devanagari and adds a very useful and scholarly English translation and commentary besides an informative Introduction. The bhashya is indeed reccondite in its own way using sastraic terminology, for above the reach of lay readers. The learned translation here brings it within the reach of one and all and is both accurate and elegant. The subtleties of the technical terms are lucidly explained in the notes. ”

—*Deccan Herald*, 27-11-1977

“ The book is useful for a study of Sandilya's work which appears to occupy an important position in the history of the Bhakti cult. The translator's notes are learned and illuminating. ”

—*Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission  
Institute of Culture*, July 1979